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 ABSTRACT	  	  Corporate	  Governance	  or	  Corporate	  Governments?	  Voluntary	  Firm	  Practices	  on	  Paths	  to	  Regulation	  	  	  Dennis	  Bogusz	  	   Recent	  economic	  turmoil	  has	  ignited	  fresh	  debate	  on	  regulation	  of	  economic	  activity.	   	   	   Global	   markets	   are	   rife	   with	   asymmetries	   in	   both	   informal	   and	   formal	  rules,	   but	   previous	   research	   has	   not	   provided	   accounts	   of	   regulation	   that	   bridge	  these	   asymmetries.	   	   This	   dissertation	   redresses	   that	   deficiency	   by	   analyzing	   the	  conditions	   that	   explain	   a	   regulatory	   paradox:	   how	   voluntary	   firm	   practice	  contributes	  to	  formal	  regulation.	  Regulation	  is	  considered	  having	  legal,	  political,	  and	  economic	  characteristics,	  but	   it	   is	   also	   an	   inherently	   social	   process.	   	   The	   recommendation,	   adoption,	   and	  spread	   of	   both	   firm	   practices	   and	   regulations	   entail	   a	   reflexive	   and	   dynamic	  relationship	  between	  organizations	  and	  their	  environments.	  	  The	  locus	  of	  inquiry	  is	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  since	  the	  1990s	  in	  ten	  countries	  with	  advanced	   capital	  markets.	   	  Regulatory	   change	   in	   these	   countries	   is	  indeed	   partially	   rooted	   in	   the	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   disclosures	   prior	   to	  regulation	  in	  over	  1500	  listed	  companies,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  additional	  key	  factors.	  	  These	   conditions	   include	   other	   firm	   behavior,	   namely	   corporate	   governance	  scandals	  and	  cross-­‐listings	  in	  a	  network	  of	  global	  stock	  exchanges.	  	  Historical	  capital	  market	   development	   and	   the	   political	   makeup	   of	   legislatures	   in	   their	   home	  countries	   of	   incorporation	   are	   additional,	   country-­‐level,	   conditions	   to	   regulation.	  	  
 Further,	  earlier	  regulation	  in	  some	  jurisdictions	  directly	  impacts	  the	  later	  regulation	  of	  the	  same	  governance	  practices	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  The	   paths	   to	   regulation,	   though	   causal,	   are	   not	   uniform	   across	   cases.	  	  Countries	   that	   are	   divergent	   in	   other	   accounts	   of	   national	   patterns	   of	   corporate	  governance	  actually	  converge	  along	  the	  paths	  to	  regulation	  I	  discuss.	  	  Divergence	  of	  countries	   persists,	   however,	   in	   governance	   arrangements	   that	   follow	   alternative	  paths	   to	   regulation	   or	   remain	   unregulated	   entirely.	   	   This	   analysis	   of	   comparative	  regulatory	  processes	  avoids	  both	  under-­‐socialized	  accounts	  of	  individual	  firms	  and	  over-­‐socialized	   accounts	   of	   countries.	   	   Its	  main	   contribution	   is	   an	   account	   of	   how	  business	   shapes	   regulation	   through	   both	   public	   and	   private	   ordering,	   implicating	  theories	  of	  regulation	  and	  comparative	  capitalism,	  as	  well	  as	  policy.	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  students	  in	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Corporations	  Responsible	  for	  Regulation	  	  	  
1.1	  	  	  The	  Regulatory	  Variety	  of	  Capitalism	  	  Capitalism	  is	  anything	  but	  uniform	  in	   the	  organization	  of	  economic	  activity.	  	  The	  rules	  of	  its	  game	  are	  as	  diverse	  as	  its	  players,	  providing	  ample	  empirical	  grist	  to	  the	   theoretical	   grind.	   	   Social	   scientists	   and	   legal	   scholars	   have	   been	   advancing	  research	   in	   comparative	   capitalism	   at	   an	   accelerating	   rate	   in	   the	   last	   decade,	   yet	  often	   in	   disparate	   theoretical	   traditions	   or	   without	   common	   methods	   for	   fruitful	  comparison.	   	   The	   substantive	  problem	  concerning	   formal	   rules	   of	   capitalism—the	  evolution	  of	  regulation—offers	  a	  timely	  motivation	  for	  redressing	  these	  deficiencies.	  	  This	   study	   builds	   on	   a	   strong	   foundation	   for	   comparative	   regulatory	   research,	  joining	   disparate	   theories	   and	   advancing	   a	   comparative	   method,	   to	   explain	   a	  regulatory	  phenomenon	  that	  has	  been	  previously	  overlooked.	  A	   key	   Polanyian	   tenet	   introduces	   a	   key	   perspective	   on	   comparative	  capitalism	   and	   its	   implication	   for	   comparing	   regulations.	   	   The	   organization	   of	  distinct	  market	  institutions	  requires	  that	  society	  “be	  shaped	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  as	  to	  allow	  that	  system	  to	  function	  according	  to	  its	  own	  laws”	  (Polanyi	  1944:	  57).	  	  These	  institutions	   act	   as	   both	   external	   and	   internal	   constraints	   on	   organizations.	   	   These	  earlier	   institutionalist	   accounts	   were	   skeptical	   of	   actor	   rationality,	   preferring	   the	  influence	   of	   external	   factors,	   such	   as	   culture	   and	   politics	   (Selznick	   1969).	   	   Later	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institutional	   accounts	   demonstrated	   that	   market	   actors	   conform	   to	   prevailing	  concepts	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  legitimacy	  and	  access	  to	  resources,	  even	  at	  the	  expense	  of	   efficiency	   (Meyer	   &	   Rowan	   1977).	   	   In	   the	   institutional	   isomorphic	   account	  particularly,	  organizations	  model	  their	  behavior	  on	  that	  of	  others	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  uncertainty	   and	   increase	   legitimacy	   (Powell	   and	   DiMaggio	   1991)1.	   	   The	   problem	  with	  institutional	  isomorphism	  is	  its	  lack	  of	  links	  between	  its	  variants	  whereas	  my	  inquiry	  directs	  attention	  to	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  mimetic,	  or	  normative,	  to	  the	  coercive.	  	  Institutional	   isomorphism	   also	   suffers	   from	   operationalization	   problems,	   which	  ultimately	   confound	   the	   distinctions	   of	   each	   of	   its	   variants	   (Mizruchi	   1999).	  	  Efficiency-­‐maximizing	   strategies	   notwithstanding,	   contemporary	   research	   further	  dispels	   the	   assumption	   that	   uncertainty	   needs	   to	   be	   reduced,	   when	   it	   can	   be	  deployed	  as	  an	  organization’s	  resource.	  Neoinstitutionalists	  replaced	   the	  earlier	   institutionalist	  accounts	  of	  external	  constraints	  on	  organizational	  behavior	  with	  meso-­‐level	  constraints	  such	  as	  internal	  organizational	   factors.	   	  Organizations	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  culture	  alone	  but	  can	  use	   it	   to	   shape	   their	   strategies	   (Swidler	   1986).	   	   They	   can	   also	   deploy	   symbolic	  interaction	   to	   entice	   others	   to	   act	   collectively	   in	   the	   design	   and	   reproduction	   of	  dominant	   arrangements	   (Fligstein	   2001,	   Dobbin	   and	   Dowd	   1997,	   Dobbin	   1994).	  	  Yet	  despite	   their	  attempt	  at	  meso-­‐level	  analysis,	  neoinstitutionalists	   tend	  to	  either	  
                                                1	  Actors	   external	   to	   the	   firm	   initially	   pressure	   firms	   to	   adopt	   specific	   practices,	  which	   might	   then	   be	   instance	   of	   normative	   isomorphism.	   	   Firms	   subsequently	  imitating	   the	   early	   adopters	   of	   such	   practices	   would	   then	   be	   symptomatic	   of	  mimetic	   isomorphism.	   	   Regulatory	   response	   to	   market	   disturbances	   or	   other	  reasons	  would	  simply	  be	  instance	  of	  coercive	  isomorphism.	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account	   for	   micro-­‐level	   change	   or	   deduct	   macro-­‐level	   change	   from	   historical,	  cultural	   analyses.	   	   Further,	   the	   direction	   of	   change	   is	   usually	   toward	  institutionalization,	   e.g.,	   field	   creation,	   but	   rarely	   toward	   deinstitutionalization2.	  	  Organizations	   could	   be	   considered	   institutional	   entrepreneurs	   acting	   as	   causal	  agents	  in	  institutional	  change	  (Campbell	  2004).	  	  Moreover,	  organizations	  might	  act	  as	   institutions	   themselves.	   	   The	  question	   of	   causality	   also	   haunts	   institutionalism,	  ignoring	  specific	  mechanisms	  and	  events	  that	  drive	  institutional	  change	  or	  stability.	  	  This	   problem	   of	   causality	   is	   one	   I	   resolve	   in	   this	   study’s	   evolutionary	   account	   of	  regulation.	  	  	  Polanyi’s	   suggestion	   that	   regulation	   of	   economic	   behavior	   lie	   between	   the	  extremes	   of	   laissez-­‐faire	   capitalism	   and	   reactionary	   policies	   of	   centrist	   states	  disenchanted	   with	   free	   markets	   inspired	   the	   Varieties	   of	   Capitalism	   (“VoC”)	  literature,	   an	   extension	   of	   institutionalism.	   	   VoC	   attributes	   coordination	   of	   the	  political	   economy	   to	   firms	   on	   a	   micro-­‐level	   and,	   on	   a	   macro-­‐level,	   to	   clusters	   of	  countries	  in	  dichotomous	  institutional	  typologies:	  Liberal	  Market	  Economies	  (LME)	  characterized	   by	   arms-­‐length’	   rules	   governing	   firm	   behavior	   and	   equity	   finance,	  and;	   Central	   Market	   Economies	   (CME)	   characterized	   by	   insider	   rules	   and	   debt	  finance	  (Hall	  &	  Soskice	  2001).	  	  Accordingly,	  LME’s	  like	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  consider	  primarily	   the	   objectives	   of	   disperse	   shareholders	  whose	   chief	   interests	   are	   short-­‐term	   returns	  on	   capital.	   CME’s	   like	  Germany,	   conversely,	   consider	   the	   interests	  of	  
                                                2	  One	  notable	  exception	   is	  Christine	  Oliver’s	  (1992)	   investigation	  of	  delegitimation	  of	  established	  organizational	  practices	  when	  exogenous	  factors	  compound	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  change.	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parties	   with	   concentrated	   shareholdings,	   such	   as	   families,	   other	   large	  conglomerates,	   and	   of	   states	   and	   constituencies	   like	   employees	   and	   suppliers.	  	  Intra-­‐group	   comparisons	   have	   sprung	   from	   this	   institutional	   “logic.”	   	   Non-­‐liberal	  economies	   like	   Japan	   and	   Germany	   have	   supposedly	   less	   trust	   in	   self-­‐regulating	  markets	  than	  LME’s,	  and	  prefer	  instead	  collective	  institutions	  to	  support	  social	  and	  political	  objectives	  through	  the	  economy.	  	  	  Theoretically	  and	  methodologically	  the	  VoC	  approach	  has	  been	  problematic.	  	  One	   problem	   is	   a	   tendency	   toward	   structural	   functionalism	   that	   attributes	  institutional	   logic	   to	   national	   systems,	   potentially	   confounding	   typology	   with	  ideology	   (Kogut	   &	   Ragin	   2006,	   O’Sullivan	   2005,	   Höpner	   2005).	   	   Accounts	   of	  institutional	   change	   require	   a	   more	   complex	   understanding	   of	   interdependence	  between	   organizations	   and	   polities.	   	   Institutions	   can	   become	   both	   exogenous	  constraints	  as	  well	  as	  enabling	  factors	  for	  future	  institutional	  change	  or	  innovation	  (Aoki	  2007,	  Thelen	  2004).	  	  	  Empirical	   examples	   serve	   to	   create	   ideal-­‐types,	   which	   potentially	  misrepresents	  some	  countries	  and	  fails	  to	  identify	  those	  institutional	  elements	  that	  change	  within	  and	  across	  countries	  over	  time	  (Crouch	  2005).	  	  Aguilera	  and	  Jackson	  (2003)	   prefer	   to	   avoid	   the	   dichotomy	   of	   the	   LME/CME	   typologies	   in	   lieu	   of	   a	  continuum	   of	   various	   stakeholder	   factors.	   	   Their	   continuum	   underscores	   how	  countries	   like	   France	   are	   anomalies	   in	   the	   LME-­‐CME	   dichotomy	   and	  might	   be	   so	  distinct	  by	  some	  factors	  so	  as	  to	  belong	  to	  no	  typology	  at	  all.	   	  VoC	  overlooks,	  also,	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  countries	  may	  change	  category	  over	  time.	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Further,	   VoC’s	   typologies	   of	   nations	   necessarily	   require	   the	   presence	   of	  greater	   inter-­‐group	   variation	   than	   intra-­‐group	   variation3.	   	   This	   requirement	   is	  acceptable	  for	  categorizing	  countries	  at	  precise	  temporal	  periods,	  but	  is	  problematic	  over	   time.	   	   A	   more	   historically	   contingent	   account	   of	   institutional	   change—or	  stability—requires	  specification	  of	  periodicity	  to	  institutional	  factors.	  	  If	  institutions	  are	   dynamic	   and	   their	   determinants	   of	   change	   are	   multiple,	   then	   institutional	  analysis	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  change	  as	  much	  as	  the	  institution	  (Elster	   1989,	   Campbell	   2002).	   A	   positive	   definition	   of	   institutions	   is	   one	   as	  mediations,	  which	  are	  “necessary	  for	  an	  actor	  to	  maintain	  a	  durable	  and	  sustainable	  substance”	   (Latour	   1999:	   307).	   	   This	   definition	   echoes	   original	   sociological	  positivism	   as	   the	   detection	   of	   law-­‐like	   patterns	   in	   the	   development	   of	   social	  relations	  (Comte	  1907).	  	  The	  real	  variety	  in	  earlier	  VoC	  literature	  is	  almost	  exclusively	  within	  Europe,	  with	   the	   exception	  of	   Japan,	   or	   between	   the	  United	   States	   and	   all	   countries.	   	   This	  limitation	  assumes	  sufficient	  variation	  among	  cases	  at	   the	  exclusion	  of	  others	   that	  now	  have	   increasing	  economic	   importance	  such	  as	  Brazil,	  Russia,	   India	  and	  China,	  among	  others.	  	  	  Not	   only	   has	   the	   variety	   in	   capitalism	  been	   limited	   geographically	   but	   also	  politically.	   	   Despite	   their	   similarities,	   democratic	   countries	   differ	   in	   ownership	  structure	   and	   capital	   market	   development	   (Roe	   2003).	   	   Nor	   is	   contemporary	  
                                                3	  Country	   classification	   by	   welfare	   regimes	   (interactions	   among	   labor	   markets,	  households	  and	  states)	  has	  a	  parallel	   logic	  to	  the	  VoC	  for	  comparative	  research	  on	  social	  inequality	  and	  globalization	  (Esping-­‐Andersen	  1999,	  1990).	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1.2	  	  	  Self-­‐Regulation	  	  Polanyi	  argues	  that	  a	  self-­‐regulating	  market	  “demands	  nothing	  less	  than	  the	  institutional	   separation	   of	   society	   into	   an	   economic	   and	  political	   sphere”	   (Polanyi	  1944:	  71).	  	  Firms	  join	  this	  institutional	  separation	  by	  self-­‐regulating,	  creating	  a	  new	  form	  of	  governance	   in	  regulatory	  capitalism.	   	  As	   the	   term	  suggests,	   self-­‐regulation	  implies	  firm-­‐initiated	  constraints	  of	  firm	  behavior.	  	  Synonymous	  with	  soft	  law,	  self-­‐regulation	   can	   achieve	   greater	   compliance	   with	   public	   objectives,	   such	   as	  environmental	  protection,	  but	  has	  limited	  effectiveness	  without	  pressure	  by	  formal	  regulatory	   bodies	   (Short	   and	   Toffel	   2008,	   Kagan	   et	   al.	   2003).	   	   Variants	   of	   self-­‐regulation	  include	  enforced	  self-­‐regulation	  whereby	  the	  state	  regulates	  rules	  crafted	  by	  firms,	  or	  co-­‐regulation,	  which	  refers	  to	  a	  tripartite	  regulatory	  process	  of	  industry	  associations	   and	   individual	   firms	   crafting	   voluntary	   standards,	   which	   the	   state	  oversees	   (Ayres	   &	   Braithwaite	   1992).	   	   Management-­‐based	   regulation	   similarly	  leaves	   regulatory	   innovation	   and	   experimentation	   primarily	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	  firms	  when	  governments	  have	  limited	  resources	  or	  expertise	  (Coglianese	  and	  Lazer	  2003).	  Firms	  can	  opt	  in	  or	  out	  of	  private,	  self-­‐regulatory	  institutions	  (Barnett	  &	  King	  2008),	  a	  key	  characteristic	  that	  I	  borrow	  in	  my	  reference	  to	  voluntary	  practice.	  	  By	  “voluntary,”	   I	   employ	   the	   legal	   sense	   of	   the	   term	   whereby	   firm	   behavior	   is	   not	  compulsory.	   	   Voluntary	   practices	   lie	   at	   one	   end	   of	   the	   self-­‐regulation	   spectrum	  where	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  by	  firms	  is	  weak;	  at	  the	  other	  end	  lie	  practices	  monitored	   by	   self-­‐regulatory	   bodies	   with	   enforcement	   powers	   (Coglianese	   et	   al.	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2004).	  	  Short	  (2008)	  identifies	  significant	  growth	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  of	  voluntary	  programs	  among	  American	   companies	   along	   this	   spectrum.	   	   Schneiberg	  &	  Bartley	  (2008)	   survey	   voluntary	   disclosures	   by	   firms	   concerning	   environmental	  sustainability,	  labor	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Listed	  companies	  voluntarily	  complied	  with	  unregulated	   corporate	   governance	   codes,	   especially	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  (Aguilera	  and	  Cuervo-­‐Cazurra	  2004).	  The	  advent	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  was	  also	  part	  of	  larger	  globalization	  processes.	  	  A	  global	   economy	   is	   especially	   abetted	  by	  deregulation	  policies,	  privatization,	   and	  the	   liberalization	  of	   trade	  and	  capital	  (Castells	  2000).	   	  Globalization	  has	  been	  met,	  paradoxically,	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   regulation	   both	   of,	   and	   by,	   the	   state	   (Levi-­‐Faur	  2008,	  Vogel	  1996).	  	  “New	  regulatory	  regimes	  are	  at	  least	  partly	  established	  through	  voluntary	   agreements,	   without	   recourse	   to	   strong	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	  mechanisms	   and	   with	   apparent	   disregard	   for	   values	   of	   ‘national	   sovereignty’”	  (Jordana	  &	  Levi-­‐Faur	  2004:	  5).	   	  The	  globalization	  of	  business	  regulation	  comprises	  “norms,	  standards,	  principles,	  and	  rules	  that	  govern	  commerce	  and	  the	  globalization	  of	  their	  enforcement”	  (Braithwaite	  &	  Drahos	  2000:	  10).	  	  	  In	  this	  way,	  government	  is	  increasingly	   coordinating	   functions	   of	   self-­‐regulating	   parties	   within	   the	   economy	  (Schepel	  2005).	  	  The	   advent	   of	   regulatory	   capitalism	   can	   also	   be	   considered	   the	   product	   of	  American	   business	   culture	   that	   emerged	   during	   the	   Progressive	   era	   (1890-­‐1913),	  advanced	  by	  the	  New	  Deal	  of	  the	  1930s	  and	  culminated	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  social	  rights	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  This	  culture	  has	  been	  rapidly	  expanding	  since	  then	  despite	  the	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push	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  creed,	  and	  its	  hallmarks,	  privatization	  and	  deregulation,	  in	  the	  1980s.	   	   Although	   by	   the	   1990s	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  deregulated	   their	   economies	   formally,	   regulation	  multiplied	   through	   other	   actors.	  	  This	   phenomenon	   arose	   even	   in	   countries	   with	   a	   long	   history	   of	   collective	  capitalism.	  	  For	  example,	  Japan,	  like	  several	  European	  countries,	  has	  recently	  given	  way	  to	  industry	  and	  trade	  associations	  to	  regulate	  more	  economic	  activity	  than	  the	  state	   and	   firm	   had	   previously.	   	   Developing	   countries,	   too,	   are	   quickly	   joining	  advanced	  economies	  in	  regulatory	  capitalism	  (Braithwaite	  2008).	  	  	  Self-­‐regulation	   cannot	   be	   viewed	   without	   the	   backdrop	   of	   regulation	   as	  enforced	   by	   the	   state.	   	   Regulatory	   agencies,	   and	   other	   para-­‐regulatory	  organizations,	   such	   as	   shareholder	   and	   business	   associations,	   impinge	   on	   firm	  behavior	   by	   exerting	   powerful	   influence	   in	   specific	   areas	   of	   firm	   control,	   akin	   to	  what	  Selznick	  refers	  to	  as	  private	  governments,	  a	  refashion	  of	  human	  resources	  to	  achieve	   specific	   outcomes	   in	   spite	   of	   predetermined	   legal	   rules	   (Selznick	   1969).	  	  This	   concept	   of	   private	   government	   is	   not	   entirely	   new,	   dating	   back	   to	   early	   20th	  century	  notions	  of	   ordering.	   	  What	   is	  new,	  however,	   is	   the	   concept	  of	   ordering	   to	  areas	   of	   regulation	   through	   both	   legal	   and	   extra-­‐legal	   norms,	   such	   as	   those	  described	   in	   enforced	   self-­‐regulation,	   soft	   law	   and	   voluntary	   regulatory	  arrangements.	  A	   traditional	   account	   of	   the	   origin	   of	   legal	   rules	   demonstrates	   that	   actors	  innovate	  laws	  deliberately	  to	  protect	  or	  promote	  their	  own	  interests	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  	  Change	  in	  actor	  behavior	  determines	  change	  in	  interpretations	  of	  the	  law	  or	  in	  the	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creation	  of	  new	  law	  to	  respond	  to	  new	  lines	  of	  behavior	  (Weber	  1978).	  	  	  Changes	  in	  social	   structure,	   according	   to	   Weber,	   also	   precipitate	   changes	   in	   law.	   	   “More	  frequent,	  however,	  is	  the	  injection	  of	  a	  new	  content	  into	  social	  actions	  and	  rational	  associations	  as	  a	   result	  of	   individual	   invention	  and	   its	   subsequent	   spread	   through	  imitation	  and	  selection”	  (Weber	  1978:	  755).	  	  	  For	   Luhmann,	   the	   law	   is	   inseparable	   from	   society.	   	   It	   is	   an	   operationally	  autonomous	   system	   within	   society	   continually	   evolving	   itself	   and	   society	   overall	  (Luhmann	   1989).	   	   Inspired	   by	   use	   of	   the	   term	   autopoeisis	   to	   describe	   closed	  networks	  of	  molecular	  production	  (Maturana	  and	  Varela	  1980),	  Luhmann	  finds	  that	  legal	   systems	   similarly	   produce	   legal	   norms,	  which	   reproduce	  when	   they	   interact	  (Luhmann	  1985,	  Teubner	  1987).	   	  Legal	  autopoiesis	  simply	  negates	   the	  primacy	  of	  law	  as	  a	  regulatory	  mechanism,	  and	  requires	  inspection	  of	  other	  social	  mechanisms	  in	   the	   production	   of	   norms.	   	   Systems	   of	   law	   are	   not	   an	   amalgam	   of	   actors	   and	  organizations,	   rather	  of	   legal	  acts;	   they	  are	   systems	  of	   communications	  capable	  of	  changing	  legal	  structures.	  	  	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (1997,	  1998,	  2000)	  advance	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  national	  origins	  of	   legal	   traditions	   are	   deterministic	   in	   increasing	   legal	   protection	   for	   investors,	  particularly	  company	  law	  and	  securities	  law	  on	  stock	  market	  development	  and	  firm	  ownership	  structure:	  “The	   historical	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   civil	   law	   countries	   are	   more	  likely	  to	  address	  social	  problems	  through	  government	  ownership	  and	  mandates,	   whereas	   common	   law	   countries	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   do	   so	  through	  private	  contract	  and	  litigation.	  	  When	  common	  law	  countries	  regulate,	   we	   expect	   their	   regulation	   to	   support	   private	   contracting	  rather	  than	  dictate	  outcomes”	  (La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  2008:	  310).	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  La	   Porta	   et	   al.	   echo	   Roe’s	   argument	   (2006)	   that	   many	   such	   legal	   rules	   of	  investor	  protection	  are	  statutory,	  even	  in	  common	  law	  countries,	  where	  regulation	  derives	  from	  code	  rather	  than	  judicial	  review.	  	  According	  to	  this	  paradigm,	  common	  law	  systems	  are	  superior	  to	  other	  legal	  systems,	  especially	  civil	  law	  of	  French	  origin,	  and	  implies	  that	  developing	  countries	  with	  a	  common	  law	  transplant	  would	  achieve	  greater	  economic	  growth,	  especially	  in	  financial	  sector	  development.	  	  Analytical	   flaws	   emerge	   in	   this	   account	   of	   law’s	   evolution.	   	   Different	   legal	  systems	   can	   plausibly	   innovate	   through	   experimentation	   and	   evolve	   according	   to	  different	   paths,	   some	   placing	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   shareholder	   rights	   than	   on	  creditor	  rights	  (Pistor	  et	  al.	  2002).	  	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  may	  have	  correctly	  observed	  that	  common	  law	  countries	  have	  traditionally	  been	  more	  open	  to	  experimentation	  with	  law	   than	   civil	   code	   countries,	   namely	   with	   the	   problems	   associated	   with	   the	  separation	   of	   firm	   ownership	   and	   management.	   	   This	   observation	   does	   not	  eliminate,	  however,	  another	  problem	  with	  their	  legal	  origin	  theory.	  	  Some	  countries	  have	   hybrid	   legal	   systems,	   and	   not	   all	   legal	   systems’	   control	   mechanisms	   are	  compatible.	   	  Political	  phenomena,	  namely	  party	  promises	  and	  citizens’	  information	  about	   political	   decisions,	   are	   more	   deterministic	   than	   legal	   origin	   insofar	   as	  economic	  development	  is	  concerned	  (Keefer	  2007).	  	  Legal	  origin	  theory	  neglects	  to	  account	   sufficiently	   for	   this	   hybridization.	   	   Further,	   the	   path	   to	   economic	  development	  has	  been	  paved	  by	  other	  legal	  artifacts,	  such	  as	  legislation	  in	  common	  law	   countries	   and	   judicial	   innovation	   in	   civil	   law	   countries,	   and	   by	   extra-­‐legal	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factors,	  such	  as	  historical	  path	  dependence	  of	   industrialization	  (Ahlering	  &	  Deakin	  2007).	  Within	  categories	  of	  legal	  origin,	  nuances	  emerge	  whereby	  some	  forms	  of	  law	  are	   coercive	   while	   others	   attribute	   rights	   and	   privileges.	   	   Law	   can	   regulate	  corporate	   actors	   in	   a	   constraining	   manner	   as	   well	   as	   create	   channels	   for	   the	  distribution	  of	  their	  power	  (Armour	  et	  al.	  2009b,	  Galligan	  2009).	  	  	  “Regulation	   is	   not	   a	   precise	   term,	   and	   arguably	   all	   law	   regulates	   in	  some	   sense.	   	   If	   it	   is	   confined	   to	  more	   plainly	   goal-­‐oriented	   law,	   law	  directed	   at	   achieving	   certain	   social	   goals,	   then	   it	   is	   useful	   in	  demonstrating	  a	  major	  part	  of	  modern	  law.	  	  For	  regulation	  then	  refers	  to	   law	   which	   seeks	   to	   control,	   re-­‐direct,	   restrict,	   and	   even	   prohibit	  activities	   that	   are	   otherwise	   lawful	   and	   legitimate”	   (Galligan:	   100-­‐101).	  	   Law	  on	  the	  books,	  or	  formal	  law,	  and	  law	  in	  practice	  is	  conceptualized	  as	  the	  intersection	   of	   national	   legal	   systems	   characterized	   by	   a	   recursive	   cycle	   of	  lawmaking	   and	   global	   legal	   norms	   through	   key	   international	   organizations	   and	  standards	  bodies	  (Halliday	  and	  Carruthers	  2007).	  	  There	  is	  a	  gap,	  however,	  between	  law	   on	   the	   books	   and	   law	   in	   practice	   whereby	   extensive	   codes	   and	   shareholder	  protections	   are	   not	   enforced	   or	   are	   interpreted	   in	   ways	   to	   alter	   their	   original	  meaning	  (Gourevitch	  &	  Shinn	  2005).	  	  	  Polanyi’s	   separation	   of	   institutions	   into	   economic	   and	   political	   spheres	   is	  parallel	  to	  law’s	  separation	  of	  law	  on	  the	  books	  and	  law	  in	  practice.	  	  Self-­‐regulation	  bridges	   these	   parallel	   separations.	   	   Political	   and	   institutional	   factors	   generally	  account	   for	   growth	   in	   regulation,	   but	   the	   role	   of	   organizations	   in	   the	   genesis	   of	  formal	  regulation	  has	  been	  largely	  absent.	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1.3	  	  	  From	  Self-­‐Regulation	  to	  Formal	  Regulation	  Joining	  disparate	   theoretical	   traditions,	   I	  propose	   that	   self-­‐regulation	   is	  not	  only	   a	   new	   variety	   of	   capitalism,	   but	   also	   a	   new	   form	   of	   governance.	  	  Institutionalism	   accounts	   for	   change	   based	   on	   organizational	   constraints	   in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  self-­‐regulation	  accounts	  for	  extra-­‐regulatory	  behavior,	  given	  legal	  or	  formal	  constraints.	  Political	   scientists	   and	   economic	   sociologists	   agree	   that	   rules	   matter	   but	  disagree	   on	   their	   origin	   (Gourevitch	   2007).	   	   The	   aforementioned	  VoC	   perspective	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  related	  debate	  on	  convergence	  toward	  liberal	  market,	  or	  Anglo-­‐American-­‐style,	  capitalism	  (Streeck	  and	  Yamamura	  2003).	   	  Both	   inter-­‐country	  and	  intra-­‐country	   comparisons	   provide	   a	   context	   in	   which	   to	   measure	   specific	  institutional	  changes,	   such	  as	   in	  regulation	  of	  voluntary	   firm	  practices,	   the	  crux	  of	  debates	   pertaining	   to	   VoC	   being	   corporate	   governance	   (Jackson	   2003).	   	   A	   more	  important	   consequence	   than	   convergence	   or	   divergence	   is	   to	   locate	   micro-­‐level	  behavior	  into	  general	  theories	  of	  cross-­‐national	  capitalist	  comparison	  (Hancké	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  	  A	   similar	   debate	   in	   legal	   and	   regulatory	   literature	   explores	   whether	   law	  determined	   ex	   ante	   by	   rule	   or	   statute,	   or	   ex	   post	   by	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	  standards	  and	  norms.	  	  If	  companies	  can	  choose	  jurisdiction	  in	  which	  to	  incorporate	  and	   raise	   capital,	   for	   example,	   does	   the	   lack	   of	   ex	   ante	   rules	   lead	   to	   greater	  uncertainty,	   meaning	   more	   judicial	   interpretation	   of	   standards,	   a.k.a.	   legal	  indeterminacy,	   or	   a	   race	   to	   the	   bottom	   of	   regulatory	   standards?	   	   “Self-­‐conscious	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supranational	   efforts	   to	   coordinate	   the	   regulation	   of	   corporations	   across	  jurisdictions	   are	   another	   important	   source	   of	   both	   distributional	   and	   efficiency	  pressures	  on	  corporate	  law	  (…)	  Loosely	  speaking,	  those	  efforts	  take	  two	  different—and	  largely	  conflicting	  forms—harmonization	  and	  regulatory	  competition”	  (Armour	  et	  al.	  2009a:	  31).	  	  Market	  forces	  can	  counter	  firms’	  regulatory	  arbitrage	  and	  prevent	  a	   “race	   to	   the	   bottom”	   of	   regulatory	   standards	   (Braithwaite	   and	   Drahos	   2000).	  	  Owing	   to	   economic	   integration,	   the	   supposed	   race	  has	  occasionally	  been	  upwards	  toward	   stricter	   standards	   across	   regulatory	   jurisdictions,	   leading	   to	   some	  convergence	  of	  regulation	  (Coglianese	  &	  Kagan	  2007).	  	  By	  comparing	  corporate	  law	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Germany	  to	  that	  in	  Delaware,	  Dammann	  (2009)	  actually	  finds	   an	   apparent	   absence	   of	   regulatory	   competition	   in	   Germany	   and	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	  both	  of	  which	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  standards	  than	  Delaware4.	  Despite	  the	  expansion	  of	  regulatory	  capitalism	  and	  its	  attendant	  multiplicity	  of	   non-­‐state	   regulatory	   actors,	   there	   remains	   an	   unanswered	   question	   as	   to	   how	  regulation	   evolves.	   	   Moreover,	   what	   remains	   unexplained	   is	   the	   outcome	   that	  tension	  between	  informal	  and	  informal	  rules,	  or	  between	  the	  variants	  of	  regulation,	  can	   provide.	   	   Moran	   (2000)	   even	   argues	   that	   a	   retreat	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   is	  underway.	   	   This	   poses	   an	   analytical	   problem.	   	   States	   have	   not	   retreated	   entirely	  from	   regulation	   yet	   only	   they	   have	   the	   legitimacy	   to	   create	   and	   enforce	   the	  most	  
                                                4 	  Damman’s	   observations	   about	   the	   environment	   of	   American	   regulatory	  competition	  are	  not	  entirely	  comparable	  to	  that	   in	  Europe	  since	  companies	  can	  be	  incorporated	   as	   Societas	   Europea	   in	   any	   of	   the	   EU	   member	   states.	   	   Further,	  American	   companies	   registered	   in	   Delaware	   can	   still	   be	   subject	   to	   cross-­‐jurisdictional	   regulation,	   depending	   on	   their	   industry	   and	   activities	   in	   states	   in	  which	  they	  operate	  beside	  Delaware.	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formal	  of	  regulation:	  law.	  	  Non-­‐state	  actors	  offer	  alternate	  forms	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  regulation.	   	   Although	   sociologists	   and	   anthropologists	   have	   long	   considered	   the	  origin	  of	   these	   informal	  rules,	  behavioral	  economists	  are	  only	  recently	   joining	  this	  debate	  (Piore	  2010).	  	  Differentiation	  between	  informal	  and	  formal	  rules	  has	  largely	  been	  an	  exercise	  in	  descriptive	  classification.	   	  Conversely,	  debates	  about	  the	  origin	  and	  evolution	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  rules—found	  in	  both	  institutionalist	  and	  legal	  literature—are	  analytically	  rich.	  	  	  If	   regulation	   is	   a	   coordinative	   mechanism	   that	   interacts	   with	   other	   social	  forces	  to	  exert	  pressure	  to	  achieve	  an	  organization’s	  behavioral	  outcome	  (Kagan	  et	  al.	   2003),	   it	   bears	   a	   strong	   resemblance	   to	   institutionalism.	   	   North	   (2005,	   1990)	  famously	  distinguished	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  types	  of	  rules:	  “Institutions	   are	   composed	   of	   formal	   rules,	   informal	  constraints,	   and	   their	   enforcement	   characteristics.	   	   Formal	   rules	   are	  constitutions,	   laws,	   rules,	   and	   regulations;	   informal	   constraints	   are	  made	   up	   of	   conventions,	   norms	   of	   behavior,	   and	   self-­‐imposed	  constraints	   on	   conduct.	   	   Enforcement	   is	   either	   first	   person	   (self-­‐imposed),	  second	  person	  (retaliation),	  or	  third	  person	  (ranging	  from	  peer	  pressure	  to	  governmental	  enforcement)”	  (North	  2005:	  43).	  	  	  	  The	  dispersion	  of	  state-­‐based	  powers,	  especially	  that	  from	  law,	  toward	  other	  actors	   and	   norms	   challenges	   a	   hierarchical	   view	   of	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	  control	  (Scott	  2004).	  	  Law,	  in	  this	  view,	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  ultimate	  form	  of	  regulation	  because	  other	  parties	  have	  broken	  up	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  of	  such	  control.	  	  In	  light	  of	   pervasive	   market	   crisis	   and	   renewed	   concerns	   about	   economic	   governance,	  however,	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  has	  brought	  back	  into	  question	  the	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validity	   of	   neoliberal	   policies,	   especially	   deregulation	   and	   regulatory	   activity	   by	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  Recommendations	   by	   international	   organizations	   obtain	   legitimacy	   and	  authority	   by	   their	   member	   countries,	   whose	   national	   rules	   may	   be	   mutually	  reinforcing	   (Jacobsson	   and	   Sahlin-­‐Andersson	   2006).	   	   Standards	   also	   originate	   in	  international	   organizations,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   or	   influential	  individuals	  like	  management	  guru,	  Peter	  Drucker.	  	  Voluntary	  adoption	  of	  standards	  is	   not,	   however,	   automatic.	   	   It	   requires	   conviction	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   adopter,	   and	  perhaps	  more	   widely,	   of	   society,	   not	   just	   the	   initiator	   of	   the	   standard	   (Brunsson	  2004).	  	  Nor	  are	  all	  standards	  created	  equal:	  they	  can	  arise	  under	  situations	  of	  both	  stability	  and	  of	   instability.	   	  A	  third-­‐party	   is	  also	  necessary	  to	  mediate	  between	  the	  “standardizer”	  and	  “standardizee”	  (Dumez	  2004).	  	  This	  would	  imply	  that	  regulation	  includes	  more	   than	   dyadic	   relationships	   among	  market	   actors.	   	   The	   evaluation	   of	  firm	  behavior	  occurs	  both	  internally	  and	  externally.	   	  Monitoring	  processes	  by	  non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   occurs	   either	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   extant	   rules	   or	   are	  coupled	  with	  formal	  rules	  to	  ensure	  compliance.	  	  It	  is	  the	  failures	  of	  such	  monitoring	  by	   way	   of	   scandals	   and	   crises	   that	   afford	   opportunities	   to	   observe	   regulatory	  change.	  The	   debate	   about	   convergence	   and	   divergence	   in	   institutional	  complementarity	  previously	  discussed	  has	  a	  counterpart	  in	  the	  legal	  literature,	  but	  with	   less	   trivial	   implications.	   	   It	   both	   challenges	   the	   legal	   origin	   theory	   as	  well	   as	  provides	  comparative	  analyses	  of	  evolutionary	  legal	  systems.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  
 17 
century,	   corporate	   law	   across	   Europe	   and	   the	   United	   States	   remained	   largely	  divergent,	   but	   convergence	   was	   evident	   in	   functionally	   equivalent	   securities	  regulations,	  either	  through	  cross-­‐listings	  on	  foreign	  exchanges	  or	  harmonization	  of	  governance	   standards	   (Coffee	   1999).	   	   The	   mergers	   of	   exchanges	   across	   political	  borders	   could	   possibly	   accelerate	   this	   harmonization	   process.	   	   Divergence	   in	  shareholder	   protection	   laws	   and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,	   creditor	   protection	   laws,	  was	  evident	  until	   the	  1980s,	   followed	  by	  some	  convergence	  (Armour	  et	  al.	  2009).	   	  The	  authors	   attribute	   transnational	   (e.g.,	   European	   Union)	   standards	   and	   corporate	  governance	  codes	  as	  a	  more	  powerful	   influence	  in	  this	  two-­‐way	  development	  than	  legal	  origin	  (Armour	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  “[T]he	  differences	  between	  common	  law	  and	  civil	  law	   systems	   are	   the	   result	   of	   complementarities	   between	   legal	   and	   economic	  institutions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  national	  systems”	  (Armour	  et	  al.	  2009:	  628).	  	  Even	  precise	  laws,	   regardless	   of	   their	   origin,	   require	   interpretation	   and	   are	   contingent	   upon	  social	   context.	   	   Regulatory	   laws	   specifically	   seek	   to	   change	   extant	   social	   relations	  and	  practices	  by	  placing	  constraints	  on	  behavior,	  potentially	  conflicting	  with	  social	  spheres.	  	  	  I	   have	   identified	   several	   accounts	   that	   explain	   how	   distinct	   aspects	   of	  regulation	   evolve,	   but	   still	   necessary	   is	   an	   account	   of	   how	   self-­‐regulation	   evolves	  into	   formal	   regulation.	   	   Population	   ecology,	   in	   the	   original	   sense,	   studies	   the	  interactions	   of	   organisms	   and	   their	   environments.	   	   Population,	   or	   organization,	  ecology	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   similarly	   studies	   organizations,	  which	  meet	   specific	  objectives	   with	   public	   legitimacy	   and	   social	   support	   (Hannan	   &	   Freeman	   1984,	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Hannan	  &	  Carroll	  1992).	  	  Organizations	  are	  like	  other	  social	  systems	  in	  that	  they	  are	  defined	   in	   relational	   terms.	   	   Their	   specialized	   functions	   provide	   links	   to	   larger	  systems.	   	  They	  are	  distinct	   from	  other	   social	   systems,	  however,	  by	   the	  primacy	  of	  specific	  goal	  achievement.	  	  Such	  goals	  are	  also	  measurable	  in	  terms	  of	  output;	  that	  of	  one	   organization	   can	   be	   the	   input	   of	   another	   (Parsons	   1956).	   	   This	   reflexivity	  between	  organizations	  and	  systems	  in	  the	  ecological	  account	  is	  partially	  missing	  in	  the	   recursiveness	   of	   law	   in	   Luhmann’s	   account,	   where	   law	   is	   indivisible	   from	   a	  superordinate	  social	  system.	  	  Legal	  autopoeisis	  lacks,	  however,	  a	  sufficient	  account	  of	  law’s	  evolution.	  	  By	  identifying	  mechanisms	  for	  change	  to	  law	  as	  the	  most	  formal	  kind	   of	   regulation,	   we	   might	   as	   well	   accept	   that	   such	   regulation	   functions	  autonomously	   within	   social	   systems	   once	   developed.	   	   Organizational	   ecology	  analogously	  borrows	  a	  Darwinian	  account	  of	  species	  survival	  but	  lacks	  his	  account	  of	  species	  origin,	  or	  its	  reproduction	  (Stark	  2009).	  An	   extension	   of	   population	   ecology	   identifies	   organizations	   by	   signals,	   or	  social	   codes,	   that	  are	   like	  genetic	   code	  providing	  default	   traits	   (Pólós	  et	   al.	  2002).	  	  The	   identification	   of	   firms	   by	   codes	   or	   rules,	   however,	   does	   not	   suffice	   for	   an	  understanding	  of	  how	  organizations	  in	  turn	  shape	  these	  rules	  much	  less	  account	  for	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  rules	  in	  different	  formats.	  	  The	  coding	  process	  is	  as	  important	  as	  the	  codes	  and	  their	  environments	  	  (Thévenot	  2007).	  	  When	  exogenous	  factors	  influence	  organizational	  behavior,	  be	  they	  industry	  standards,	  codes	  of	  best	  practice,	  as	  well	  as	  formal	  law,	  they	  alter	  the	  “DNA”	  of	  the	  organization.	   	  The	  codes	  by	  which	   systems	  originally	   classified	  organizations	   then	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assume	   functional	   roles	   beyond	   identification.	   	   Organizations	   do	   not	   survive	   like	  biological	   organisms.	   	   Some	   organizations,	   particularly	   firms,	   do	   indeed	   cease	  operations	   and	   are	   liquidated,	   but	   many	   more	   are	   taken	   apart,	   recombined,	   and	  survive	  in	  new	  form.	  	  Population	  ecology,	  however,	  does	  not	  permit	  empirical	  tests	  of	   an	   organization’s	   progeny	   or	   innovations	   (Young	   1988)	   or	   for	   organizations’	  survival	   from	   an	   actor-­‐oriented	   perspective	   (Lazega	   and	   Favereau	   2002).	  	  Population	  ecology	  thus	  originally	  served	  to	  explain	  the	  diversity	  and	  adaptability	  of	  organizations.	  	  The	   transformation	   of	   regulation	   from	   informal	   to	   formal	   regulation	   is	  accordant	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   heterarchy5.	   	   Defined	   by	   a	   lateral	   structure	   of	  accountability,	  heterarchy	  comprises	  organizational	  heterogeneity	  and	  diversity	  of	  evaluative	  principles	  (Stark	  2009,	  2007).	  	  Heterarchy	  allows	  a	  view	  of	  both	  the	  firm	  and	   its	   regulatory	   environment	   in	   an	   account	   of	   evolution.	   	   It	   also	   requires	   an	  understanding	  as	  to	  how	  firms	  and	  regulators	  respond	  to	  other	  forces,	  events,	  and	  circumstances	   with	   competing	   values	   systems.	   	   Knight’s	   distinction	   between	   risk	  and	   uncertainty	   partially	   resolved	   an	   economic	   problem	  of	   identifying	   risk-­‐taking	  for	  economic	  purposes,	  but	  avoided	  risk-­‐taking	  and	  its	  inverse,	  risk	  mitigation,	  as	  a	  social	   phenomenon	   (Knight	   1921).	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   regulation	   is	   to	   reduce	  uncertainty,	   prevent	   future	   crisis,	   or	   at	   least	   mitigate	   associated	   risks.	   	   Risk	   in	  heterarchy	   becomes	   a	   “‘modular’	   organization,	   networking	   the	   individual	  information-­‐processing	  units,	  i.e.	  linking	  them	  up	  with	  their	  respective	  neighboring	  
                                                5	  For	  the	  original	  concept	  of	  the	  term,	  see	  McCulloch	  (1965).	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units	  without	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  imposing	  an	  organizational	  schema”	  (Luhmann	  1993:	  185).	  	  	  This	  approach	  differs	  from	  the	  institutionalist	  account	  of	  rules	  or	  other	  constraints	  on	  the	  organization	  as	  mutually	  reinforcing,	  and	  invites	  a	  reflexive	  and	  dynamic	  process	  of	  regulatory	  evolution.	  	  Heterarchy	  frames	  regulation	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  prevention,	  the	  reduction	  of	  potential	  loss	  or	  harm	  from	  specific	  behavior.	  	  Uncertainty	   can	   be	   a	   basic	   resource	   to	   resolve	   collective	   action	   problems.	  	  Formal	   organizations	   in	   particular	   handle	   uncertainty	   according	   to	   their	   own	  capabilities	   as	  well	   as	   to	   their	   contingencies,	   the	   effects	   of	  which	   are	   occasionally	  unintended	   or	   counter-­‐intuitive	   (Crozier	   &	   Friedberg	   1980).	   	   Uncertainty	   can	  translate	  into	  an	  organization’s	  or	  an	  individual’s	  power	  and	  become	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process:	  “we	  audit,	  and	  we	  regulate,	  when	  we	  cease	  to	  trust”	  (Moran	   2000:	   10).	   	   	   In	   an	   experimentalist	   circumstance,	   legally	   enforceable	   rules	  and	   regulations	   are	   flexible,	   adaptable,	   and	   co-­‐optive	  with	  other	  more	   formal,	   but	  not	   rigid,	   forms	   of	   pressure	   to	   enforce	   compliance	   with	   standards.	   	   “They	   take	  diversity	   as	   a	   resource	   to	   be	   fostered	   rather	   than	   reduced	   via	   enforcement”	  (Schneiberg	  &	  Bartley	  2008:	  49).	  Evolutionary	   approaches	   are	   therefore	   appropriate	   for	   explaining	  precisely	  how	   social	   context	   matters	   in	   the	   development	   of	   regulation.	   	   One	   solution	   is	   to	  grant	  authority	  to	   individuals	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  rules	  as	  opposed	  to	  exogenous	  forces	  Ostrom	  (2000).	  	  Polanyi	  (1944)	  would	  agree	  that	  a	  command	  economy	  makes	  for	   ungovernable	   states,	   but	   reminds	   us	   that	   self-­‐regulated	   markets	   have	   also	  destroyed	  society.	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Law	  operates	   in	   similar	   fashion	   to	   the	   socio-­‐cognitive	   construction	  of	   truth	  whereby	  its	  worth	  is	  dependent	  upon	  other	  law	  (Simmel	  1978).	  	  It	  is	  determined	  by	  balancing	  subjective	   interests	  of	   individuals	  with	  objective	  values.	   	   “Agents	  do	  not	  usually	  have	  a	  single	  way	  of	  calculating,	  and	  that	  coordination	  is	  above	  all	  a	  problem	  of	  agreement	  on	  the	  way	  of	  calculating”	  (Eymard-­‐Duvernay	  2002:	  62-­‐63).	  Regulators,	   firms,	   and	   other	   market	   actors	   have	   multiple	   principles	   of	  evaluation	   with	   which	   to	   innovate	   rules	   governing	   firm	   behavior	   in	   various	  geographic	   markets.	   	   These	   evaluative	   criteria	   manifest	   especially	   in	   situations	  requiring	   a	   justification	   for	   action	   such	   as	   in	   friction,	   disagreement,	   or	   crisis,	  whereby	   these	   actors	   bring	   multiple	   evaluative	   frameworks	   instead	   of	   universal	  norms,	   to	   determine	   and	   co-­‐ordinate	   action	   (Boltanksi	   and	   Thévenot	   1991,	  Thévenot	   2002).	   	   This	   notion	   of	   worth	   provides	   an	   escape	   from	   the	   dichotomy	  between	  sociology’s	  plurality	  of	  values	  and	  moral	  universalism	  by	  “considering	  the	  possibility	  of	   a	   limited	  plurality	  of	  principles	  of	   equivalence	  which	   can	  be	  used	   in	  order	   to	   support	   criticisms	  and	  agreements”	   (Boltanski	   and	  Thévenot	  1999:	  365).	  	  Actors	   make	   decisions	   by	   evaluating	   other	   actors	   and	   objects	   according	   to	   a	  presupposed	   order,	   transforming	   uncertainty	   into	   risk	   without	   eliminating	  uncertainty	  entirely.	   	  Not	  all	  the	  orders	  are	  legitimate	  in	  terms	  of	  serving	  common	  notions	   about	   the	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   economic	   organization;	   they	   are	   instead	  historically	   constructed	   (Thévenot	   2002).	   	   Consequently,	   regulation	   can	   be	  expressed	  as	  this	  search	  process	  for	  rules	  of	  coordinating	  the	  economy.	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In	   contrast	   to	   both	   the	   neoinstitutionalist	   account	   of	   how	   certain	  understandings	  stabilize	  markets	  and	  to	  a	  structuralist	  account	  of	  markets	  as	  stable,	  patterned	   institutions,	   performativity	   is	   primarily	   interested	   in	   what	   markets	   do	  through	   the	  production,	  mobilization	  and	  diffusion	  of	   technologies	   to	   stabilize	   the	  world,	   or	   “society”	   around	   certain	   understandings	   (Fourcade	   2007).	   	   Relevant	   to	  this	  study	  of	  voluntary	  firm	  practices	  evolving	  into	  legal	  regulation	  is	  that	  “forms	  of	  social	   regulation,	  whereby	   persons	   and	   entities	   (e.g.,	   organizations,	   nation-­‐states)	  are	  governed	   ‘at	  a	  distance’,	  by	  calculable	  agencies	  that	  rate,	  rank,	  divide	  them	  up,	  and	  recombine	  them”	  (Fourcade	  2007:	  1026).	  	  Indeed	  firm	  practices	  that	  were	  originally	  voluntary	  and	  have	  since	  become	  regulatory	  may	  not	  just	  be	  a	  case	  of	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  practice	  or	   institutionally	   prescribed	   behavior,	   rather	   of	   performativity.	   	   As	   such,	   the	  practices-­‐cum-­‐rules	   in	   this	  account	  would	  actually	  perform,	  shape,	  and	   format	   the	  economy.	  	  It	  goes	  beyond	  agencements6	  and	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  outcomes	  independent	  of	  actor	  cognition	  (Callon	  2007).	  	  Conventions	  are	  synonymous	  with,	  but	  not	  equal	  to,	  rules.	  “Conventions	  refer	  to	   values,	   rules	   and	   representations	   that	   influence	   economic	   behavior.	   	  Structures	  refer	   to	   patterns	   of	   interests	   and	   relationships,	   reflecting	   resource	  interdependencies	   among	   members	   of	   any	   social	   system”	   (Favereau	   and	   Lazega	  2002:	   1).	   	   This	  Weberian	   approach	   emphasizes	   interaction	   and	   norms	   to	   explain	  
                                                6	  The	   closest	   English	   equivalent	   is	   “arrangement”	   or	   “assemblage”	   though	   neither	  term	   captures	   the	   French	   connotation	   of	   adaptability	   to	   different	   configurations.	  	  For	   instance,	   a	   machine	   has	   operating	   instructions	   for	   its	   user,	   but	   does	   not	  necessarily	  control	  or	  limit	  how	  one	  uses	  the	  machine.	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social	   change	   or	   stability,	   given	   dynamic	   structures.	   	   Existing	   conventions,	   or	  embedded	   norms,	   must	   therefore	   be	   distinguished	   from	   new	   conventions,	   or	  endogenous	  rules	  (Favereau	  and	  Lazega	  2002).	   	  Selznick	  (1957)	  adopted	  a	  similar	  approach	   that	  combined	  structure	  and	  culture	   to	  explain	  regulatory	  change	  as	   the	  redistribution	  of	  resources,	  requiring	  the	  support	  of	  members	  with	  both	  power	  and	  legitimacy.	   	   This	   echoes	   a	   key	  Weberian	   contribution	   to	   legitimacy	   as	   applying	   to	  every	  system	  of	  domination	  and	  its	  related	  administrative	  structures	  (Weber	  1978).	  The	   question	   of	   legitimacy	   is	   precisely	   where	   the	   Conventions	   School	  intersects	   with	   a	   structural	   approach	   (Favereau	   and	   Lazega	   2002).	   	   Certain	   key	  actors	   can	   use	   their	   status	   and	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   regulatory	   process:	   “Underneath	  every	   kind	   of	   rule,	   there	   is	   a	   conventional	   representation	   of	   the	   collective”	  (Favereau	  and	  Lazega	  2002:	  23).	  	  Although	  Burt	  (2004,	  1992)	  emphasizes	  structural	  opportunities	   for	  actors	  to	  affect	  changes	   in	  relationships,	   they	   lack	  the	  concept	  of	  worth,	  or	  multiplicity	  of	  evaluative	  principles,	  among	  actors.	  A	   market	   implies	   calculative	   agencies,	   an	   organization,	   and	   a	   process	   in	  which	  calculative	  agencies	  oppose	  one	  another.	   	  Calculability,	  or	   ranking,	   requires	  cognitive	   psychology	   and	   cultural	   frames	   to	   ascertain	   a	   course	   of	   action	   and	   its	  effects	   (Callon	   1998).	   	   Agents’	   resistance	   to	   calculative	   rationality—and	   therefore	  the	  market—is	  also	  related	  to	  embeddedness	  (Granovetter	  1985).	   	  Although	  Piore	  and	  Sabel	  (1984)	  argue	  that	  the	  network	  form	  of	  organizations	  is	  a	  superior	  form	  of	  organization,	  White	  argues	  they	  are	  only	  interim	  forms.	  	  	  “The	   common	   idiom	   in	   the	   new	   institutional	   economics	   is	  building	   up	   views	   of	   organizations	   in	   terms	   of	   agency	   and	   contract	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relations.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   confounds	   coherency	   in	   theory	   by	  overlooking	  the	  contextual	  and	  interactive	  field	  relations	  that	  precede	  and	  structure,	   rather	   than	  grow	   from,	  agency	  and	  contract	   relations.	  	  The	   litmus	  test	   is	  accounting	   for	  the	  way	  valuations	  emerge	  (…)	  The	  main	   open	   problem	   for	   the	   social	   capital	   school,	   in	   my	   opinion,	   is	  supplying	   some	   explicit	   mechanism	   to	   account	   for	   valuations	   (…)	  Valuations	  should	  be	  endogenized”	  (White	  2002:	  340-­‐341).	  	  	  Network	   structure	   is	   capable	   of	   promoting	   variety	   and	   coordination	   of	  relationships	  but	  lacks	  an	  authority	  relationship	  that	  forces	  organizational	  structure	  (Kogut	  2000).	  	  Norms	  and	  institutional	  factors	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  particular	  set	   of	   rules	  of	   cooperation	   and	   competition,	   though	  not	  necessarily	   that	   of	   formal	  rules.	   	  As	  rules	  generate	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  network,	  “the	  structure	  itself	   influences	  subsequent	   behavior”	   (Kogut	   2000:	   410),	   echoing	   an	   autopoeitic	   notion	   of	   the	  evolution	  of	  law.	  Institutional	  change	  and	  stabilization	  occurs	  not	  just	  within	  national	  systems	  but,	   also,	   in	   the	   transnational	   space	   between	   them	   (Djelic	   and	   Quack	   2003).	  	  Transnational	   implies	   a	   space	   of	   social	   interaction,	   both	   process	   and	   structure,	  across	  national	  boundaries	  involving	  at	   least	  one	  non-­‐state	  actor	  (Apeldorn	  2007).	  	  	  This	   concept	   of	   transnationalization	   avoids	   the	   supposed	   dissolution	   of	   state	  influence	  in	  globalization.	  	  Regulation	  is	  patently	  beyond	  the	  strict	  purview	  of	  state	  or	  political	  control.	  	  	  “The	  idea	  of	  regulatory	  networks	  points	  to	  complex	  interconnections	  between	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   individual	   and	   organizational	   actors—interconnections	   that	   can	   be	   direct	   or	   mediated	   (…)	   Finally,	   with	   a	  focus	  on	  regulatory	  networks	  comes	  a	  question	  about	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  more	  generally	  about	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  private	  authority.	   	  With	  a	  broadening	   set	   of	   rule-­‐makers	   and	   institution-­‐builders,	   the	   way	   of	  authorizing	  rules	  and	  institutional	  frames	  is	  likely	  to	  broaden	  as	  well”	  (Djelic	  and	  Quack	  2008:	  308).	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  As	   they	  do,	  conflicts	   in	   transnational	  space	  are	   likely	   to	  provide	  a	  major	  source	  of	  institutional	   change	   (Djelic	   and	   Quack	   2008).	   	   	   This	  would	   imply	   perhaps	   nested	  hierarchy	  despite	  attempts	  at	  heterarchy.	  According	   to	   Thévenot	   (2007),	   standardization	   and	   regulation	   bodies	   are	  members	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  cognitive	  and	  evaluative	  frameworks	  governing	  economic	  action.	   	  During	  moments	  of	  dispute	  or	   crisis,	   public	  qualifications	  of	   this	   common	  good	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  state.	  	  The	  evaluation	  must	  be	  valid	  for	  a	  third	  party,	  made	   in	   a	   language	   that	   links	   actors,	   giving	   an	   official,	   legitimate	   quality	   to	   the	  engagement.	  	  To	  follow	  a	  rule	  is	  a	  practice	  in	  itself,	  even	  though	  belief	   in	  a	  rule	  is	  not	  the	  same	   thing	   as	   following	   it	   as	   per	  Wittgenstein;	   rules	   are	   insufficient	   to	   establish	  practice;	   they	   require	  example.	   	  Rules	  also	  generally	   function	   tacitly.	   	  When	  made	  explicit,	   they	   no	   longer	   function	   as	   rules	   but	   as	   objects	   of	   discourse.	   	   They	   are	  invented	   in,	   and	   evolve	   with,	   practice;	   as	   such,	   rules	   are	   inseparable	   from	   usage	  (Dumez	  &	  Suquet	  2009,	  Favereau	  2009,	  Galligan	  2009)7.	  	  Firm	   practices	   evolve	   as	   do	   the	   firms	   interpreting	   and	   adopting	   them.	  	  Further,	  ideas	  must	  materialize	  in	  order	  to	  move	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  	  	  “A	  practice	  not	  stabilized	  by	  a	  technology,	  be	  it	  a	  linguistic	  technology,	  cannot	  last;	   it	   is	  bound	  to	  be	  ephemeral.	   	  A	  practice	  or	  an	  institution	  cannot	  travel;	  they	  must	  be	  simplified	  and	  abstracted	  into	  an	  idea,	  or	  at	  least	  approximated	  in	  a	  narrative	  permitting	  a	  vicarious	  experience,	  and	   therefore	   converted	   into	   words	   or	   images”	   (Czarniawska	   and	  Sevón	  2005).	  
                                                7	  Rules	   also	   form	   a	   system.	   	   One	   arbitrates	   constantly	   with	   a	   system	   of	   rules	  according	  to	  the	  importance	  attached	  to	  the	  rules.	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  Imitation	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  learning	  and	  is	  one	  method	  of	  spreading	  voluntary	  practices.	  	  If,	  according	  to	  Tarde	  (1903),	  what	  gets	  imitated	  is	  superior	  to	  what	   is	   not,	   how	   do	   actors	   evaluate	   what	   is	   better,	   dominant,	   or	   even	   coercive?	  	  Pure	   imitation	   falsely	   assumes	   the	   mimicked	   practice	   is	   static	   and	   that	   no	   other	  causes	  make	   the	   imitated	   object	   less	   appealing.	   	   Further,	   imitators	   differ	   in	   their	  susceptibility	  to	  adopt	  or	  imitate	  a	  practice,	  but	  that	  they	  can	  identify	  more	  than	  one	  translation	  outcome.	  Can	   one	   assume	   that	   regulation	   or	   any	   organizational	   constraints	   remain	  static	  as	  they	  move	  from	  actor	  to	  actor,	  or	  from	  one	  market	  to	  another?	  	  Bourdieu’s	  rubgy	  ball	  remains	  the	  same	  as	  it	  passes	  from	  one	  player’s	  hand	  to	  another.	  	  Latour’s	  scientific	  objects,	  however,	  change	  as	  they	  pass	  from	  one	  scientist	  to	  another.	   	  The	  diffusionist	   account,	   which	   would	   assume	   that	   a	   corporate	   governance	   practice	  spread	   unchanged	   from	   one	   firm	   to	   another,	   and	   from	   one	   market	   to	   another,	  suffers	   from	   three	   consequences	   according	   to	   Latour.	   	   First	   behavior	  would	   seem	  caused	   by	   the	   object	   itself.	   	   Second,	   even	   if	   ideas,	   objects,	   and	   facts	   reproduced	  exactly	   as	   they	   diffused—itself	   a	   fallacious	   claim—originator,	   or	   inventor,	   would	  take	  excessive	  credit.	  	  The	  agent	  still	  needs	  other	  actors	  to	  pass	  the	  object	  around,	  to	  carry	   forward	   their	   ideas.	   	   Last,	   and	   to	   maintain	   the	   first	   two	   consequences,	   the	  diffusionists	  would	  say	  that	  if	  the	  path	  of	  an	  idea	  were	  interrupted,	  it	  was	  because	  an	  invented	  “society”	  blocked	  it	  unless	  they	  suddenly	  accepted	  it.	  	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  object	  change	  in	  passage,	  but	  so	  do	  people.	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“Diffusion	  implies	  a	  central	  broadcast	  point	  and	  wide	  reception	  with	   rather	   passive	   receivers,	   whereas	   translation	   implies	   a	   more	  relational	  and	  active	  process	  of	  reception.	  	  The	  concepts	  of	  circulation	  and	   translation	   recognize	   that	   ideas	   follow	   various	   routes	   and	  networks,	   and	  emphasize	   the	  possibility	   that	   ideas	  may	  be	  edited	   in	  the	  process	  of	  travel”	  (Powell	  et	  al.	  2005:	  233).	  	  	   Path	   generation	   occurs	   even	   when	   institutions	   are	   already	   in	   place	   and	  increases	   with	   exogeneity	   (Djelic	   and	   Quack	   2007).	   	   Because	   path	   generation	   is	  unpredictable	   ex	   ante,	   it	   is	   a	   potentially	   useful	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	  role	  of	  shocks	  in	  the	  capital	  markets	  on	  the	  spread	  and	  local	  adaptation	  of	  corporate	  governance	  practices.	   	  Paths	  are	  also	   likely	   to	  develop	  qualities	  unintended	  by	  the	  actors	   involved	  (Stark	  and	  Bruzst	  1998).	   	  Path	  generation	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  social	  structure	  at	  a	  fixed	  point	  in	  time,	  rather	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  network	  positions,	   allowing	   firms	   to	   mitigate	   uncertainty	   and	   gain	   legitimacy	   (Stark	   and	  Vedres	  2006).	  	  This	  notion	  of	  paths	  coalesces	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  paths	  that	  I	  develop	  in	   this	   study	   to	   explain	   the	   evolution	   of	   self-­‐regulation	   into	   formal	   regulation.	   	   It	  evokes	  the	  idea	  that	  multiple	  trajectories	  to	  the	  same	  end	  are	  possible	  and	  that	  the	  variation	   is	   partial	   to	   comparative	   regulatory	   research.	   	   It	   also	   indicates	   a	  combination	  of	  key	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  formal	  regulation.	  	  Next	  I	  discuss	  the	  area	  of	  inquiry	  in	  which	  I	  model	  the	  paths	  to	  regulation.	  	  
1.4	  	  	  Corporate	  Governance	  as	  Locus	  for	  Regulatory	  Evolution	  Corporate	  governance	   is	   the	   ideal	   locus	  of	   the	  evolution	  of	   regulation	   from	  the	  informal	  to	  the	  formal.	  	  Indeed	  much	  of	  the	  previous	  research	  on	  regulation	  has	  pointed	   to	   tensions	   between	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   legally	   enforceable	   regulation	   of	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specific,	  often	  industry-­‐based,	  practices.	   	  Corporate	  governance	  is	  a	  practice,	   it	  has	  national	   and	   institutional	   variety,	   and	   it	   is	   also	   part	   of	   global	   norm-­‐making.	  “Explaining	   law	   and	   regulation	   is	   thus	   central	   to	   any	   account	   of	   corporate	  governance”	   (Gourevitch	   &	   Shinn	   2005:	   xii).	   	   Further,	   “[i]n	   the	   era	   of	   regulatory	  capitalism,	  more	   of	   the	   governance	   that	   shapes	   the	   daily	   lives	   of	  most	   citizens	   is	  corporate	  governance	  than	  state	  governance”	  (Braithwaite	  2008:	  4).	   	  My	  extension	  of	   this	   line	   of	   argument	   is	   that	   corporate	   governance	   can	   be	   conceptualized	   as	   a	  transformation	  of	  state	  governance	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  origination	  of	  rules.	  Voluntary	  firm	  practices	  include	  a	  variety	  of	  actions	  that	  are	  unregulated	  by	  government.	   	  The	   sources	  of	   these	  practices	   are	  both	  endogenous	  and	  exogenous.	  	  Among	  a	  library	  of	  regulations	  to	  analyze,	  those	  pertaining	  to	  corporate	  governance	  offer	  a	  timely	  empirical	  motivation.	  	  There	   are	  many	   definitions	   of	   corporate	   governance	   itself.	   	   Among	   those	   I	  find	  useful	  as	   I	  develop	   its	  regulatory	  evolution	   in	  this	  study	   include	  the	   following	  contributions.	  	  “At	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  corporate	  governance	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  internal	   governance	  mechanisms	   of	   corporations,	   and	   society’s	   conception	   of	   the	  scope	  of	  corporate	  accountability”	  (Deakin	  &	  Hughes	  1997:	  2).	  Corporate	   governance	   is	   traditionally	   concerned	   with	   the	   relationships	  associated	  with	  separated	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  firms	  (Berle	  and	  Means	  1933),	  especially	   that	  between	  publicly	   traded	   firms	  and	   investors	   in	   the	  capital	  markets	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(Useem	   1996,	   Fligstein	   2001)8.	   	   Corporate	   governance	   can	   be	   viewed	   first	   as	   a	  system:	   “A	   governance	   system	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   totality	   of	   institutional	  
arrangements—including	   rules	   and	   rule-­‐making	   agents—that	   regulate	   transactions	  
inside	  and	  across	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  economic	  system”	  (Hollingsworth	  et	  al.	  1994:	  5).	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  governance	  comprises	  a	  larger	  realm	  of	  control	  than	  “government”	  (Braithwaite	   2008).	   	   This	   summation	   of	   institutional	   factors	   limits	   the	   requisite	  reflexivity	   and	   dynamism	   in	   the	   development	   and	   spread	   of	   voluntary	   corporate	  governance	  practices.	  Aguilera	  and	  Jackson	  (2003)	  define	  corporate	  governance	  as	  “the	  relationships	  among	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  process	  of	  decision	  making	  and	  control	  over	  firm	  resources.”	  “Corporate	  governance	  as	  a	  practice	  is,	  like	  any	  social	  practice,	  rule-­‐governed	   (…)	   If	   we	   speak	   of	   the	   regulation	   of	   corporate	   governance	   we,	  however,	  refer	  to	  something	  that	  is	  external	  to	  the	  corporation	  and	  its	  governance,	  yet	  shapes	  that	  governance	  to	  a	  very	  significant	  extent”	  (van	  Apeldorn	  2007:	  4-­‐5).	  	  Defining	   corporate	   governance	   both	   as	   a	   system	   and	   as	   a	   practice	   (Cornelius	   and	  Kogut	  2003),	  better	  meets	  the	  demands	  of	  this	  dissertation’s	  empirical	  analysis.	  	  	  Corporate	  governance	  of	  problems	  in	  the	  classical	  agency	  view	  considers	  the	  firm	  a	  nexus	  of	   contracts	   to	   resolve	   conflicts	   over	   control	   of	   the	   firm	   (Jensen	   and	  
                                                8	  In	   this	   view,	   corporate	   governance	   is	   not	   to	   be	   confused	   with	   corporate	   social	  responsibility.	  	  Corporate	  governance	  is	  generally	  associated	  with	  control–the	  rights	  and	  powers	  of	  shareholders	  in	  publicly	  traded	  firms–whereas	  social	  responsibility	  is	  a	  broader,	  normative	   concept	  about	   firms’	   relations	   in	   society	  and	  which	   includes	  such	   issues	   as	   corporate	   philanthropy,	   sustainable	   development,	   and	   the	  redistribution	   of	   wealth.	   	   Because	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   is	   defined	   by	   a	  broader	  set	  of	  stakeholders	  including	  employees,	  suppliers,	  and	  habitants	  in	  an	  area	  affected	  by	  a	  firm’s	  operations,	  it	  lies	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  analysis.	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Meckling	   1976)9.	   	   Listed	   firms	   join	   an	   intricate	   web	   of	   contractual	   relationships	  tying	  firm	  managers,	  or	  agents,	  who	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  firm’s	  shareholder-­‐owners.	  	  Corporate	   governance	   in	   the	   agency	   account	   is	   functionalist:	   its	   underlying	  assumption	   is	   that	   corporate	   governance	   leads	   to	   efficiency.	   	   Optimal	   corporate	  governance	  structures	  displace	   less	  efficient	   structures	  based	  on	   transaction	  costs	  (Williamson	  1981).	  	  Although	  the	  law	  does	  indeed	  provide	  a	  governance	  framework,	  namely	   binding	   contracts,	   Williamson	   assumes	   it	   can	   sufficiently	   mitigate	   future	  hazards	  and	  uncertainties10.	  	  Corporate	   ownership	   structures	   from	   an	   efficiency,	   or	   agency,	   perspective	  resolve	   the	   monitoring	   of	   market	   transactions	   and	   reduce	   uncertainty	   through	  formal,	  contractual	  devices.	  	  Suppliers	  of	  capital	  employ	  such	  devices	  to	  ensure	  that	  firm	   managers	   do	   not	   expropriate	   or	   misuse	   capital	   (Shleifer	   and	   Vishny	   1997).	  	  This	  agential	  view	  brings	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  capital	  markets’	  chief	  actors,	  investors,	  under	   the	   rubric	  of	   juridical	   control	  of	   firms	   (La	  Porta,	  Lopez-­‐de-­‐Silanes,	   Schleifer	  and	   Vishny	   2000).	   	   	   Corporate	   law,	   in	   such	   an	   account,	   serves	   primarily	   as	   a	  contractual	  mechanism	  to	  reduce	  agency	  and	  transaction	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  
                                                9	  Armour	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  offer	  an	  insightful	  play	  on	  words:	  “It	  is	  perhaps	  more	  accurate	  to	   describe	   the	   firm	   as	   a	   ‘nexus	   for	   contracts’,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   a	   firm	   serves,	  fundamentally,	  as	  the	  common	  counterparty	  in	  numerous	  contracts	  with	  suppliers,	  employees,	   and	   customers,	   coordinating	   the	   actions	   of	   these	   multiple	   persons	  through	  exercise	  of	  its	  contractual	  rights”	  (7).	  	  
10 To	   be	   fair,	   he	   does	   provide	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   that	   “shows	   economics	   as	  being	  informed	  by	  both	  law	  and	  organization,	  the	  three-­‐way	  product	  of	  which	  is	  the	  New	   Institutional	   Economics.	   The	   object	   of	   the	   latter	   is	   to	   reshape	   the	   way	  economists	   and	   other	   social	   scientists	   think	   about	   and	   investigate	   the	   purposes	  served	  by	  economic	  and	  political	  institutions”	  (Williamson	  1996:	  386).	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cost	  of	   capital,	   thus	  contributing	   to	  maximization	  of	   share	  value	   (Easterbrook	  and	  Fischel	  1991).	  	  Multiple	   parties	   including	   shareholder	   representatives,	   states,	   stock	  exchanges,	  and	  of	  course	  the	  owners	  and	  managers	  of	  the	  firm,	  search	  for	  modes	  of	  corporate	  governance.	   	  Markets	  and	  hierarchies	  are	  primary	  modes	  of	  governance	  according	   to	   one	   account	   of	   economic	   organization.	   	   Corporate	   hierarchies	   	   “are	  institutions	  that	  permit	  some	  actors	  to	  wield	  authority	  over	  others	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  property	   rights	  vested	   in	  a	   formal	  organization	   to	  which	  both	  categories	  of	  actors	  belong”	   (Hollingsworth	   et	   al.	   1994:	   5).	   	   Firms	   are	   accountable	   to	   the	   state,	   the	  market	   (capital	  markets	   for	   traders	  of	   shares,	   plus	   financial	   institutions	   like	   asset	  managers	   holding	   shares),	   informal	   networks	   (of	  managers	   and	   board	  members),	  and	   associations.	   	   Firms	   are	   accountable,	   however,	   to	   yet	   other	   parties	   such	   as	  shareholder	  representatives	  and	  advocacy	  groups.	  	  “Sociological	  work	  on	  corporate	  governance	   provides	   a	   useful	   curative	   to	   this	   functionalist	   approach,	   ﬁnding	   that	  corporate	   governance	   does	   not	  work	   as	   advertised	   even	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   the	  prototype	   case”	   (Davis	   2005:	   159).	   	   Economic	   benefits	   of	   voluntary	   practices	   are	  patently	   not	   the	   only	   reason	   firms	   adopt	   them.	   	  Nor	   is	   there	   sufficient	   account	   of	  why	   voluntary	   practices	   in	   one	   geographic	   market	   would	   apply	   to	   another.	  	  Economic	   institutions	   are	   themselves	   social	   constructions	   (Granovetter	   and	  Swedberg	  1992)	  hence	   the	   framework	   for	  analyzing	   corporate	  governance	   cannot	  be	  exclusively	  economic.	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An	  alternative	  view	  considers	  the	  variability	  and	  structure	  of	  relationships	  in	  corporate	  governance	  by	  including	  institutional	  governance	  mechanisms	  (Allen	  and	  Gale	   2000).	   	   Scholars	   in	   the	   institutionalist	   vein	   argue	   that	   corporate	   governance	  does	  not	  simply	  reflect	  the	  needs	  of	  investors	  to	  protect	  capital	  and	  that	  the	  tension	  between	  ownership	  and	  control	  of	  publicly	  traded	  firms	  is	  not	  easily	  reduced	  to	  an	  account	   of	   agency	   costs.	   	   Like	   agency	   accounts	   institutionalism	   holds	   a	   similar	  dichotomy	   of	   efficiency	   versus	   legitimacy.	   	   Emphasizing	   effectiveness	   of	   control	  mechanisms	   over	   their	   efficiency,	   institutionalists	   advocate	   that	   socially	   optimal	  control	   of	   the	   firm	  depends	   on	   equal	   distribution	   of	   ownership	   and	   voting	   rights,	  which	   is	  not	   evident	   in	  many	  non-­‐Anglo-­‐American	   firms	   (Harris	   and	  Raviv	  1987).	  	  This	   framework	   partially	   remedies	   the	   theoretical	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   classic	  agency	   view	   of	   corporate	   governance	   by	   considering	   external	   parameters	   of	  organizational	  behavior.	  	  Although	  firms	  do	  not	  necessarily	  select	  the	  institutions	  of	  their	   home	   country	   or	   stock	   exchange,	   their	   shareholders	   may	   be	   partial	   to	   the	  various	   governance	   mechanisms	   available	   across	   capital	   markets.	   	   This	   problem	  creates	   the	   need	   to	   distinguish	   institutional	   variation	   from	   firm	   level	   variation	   in	  corporate	   governance	   practices.	   	   It	   also	   trades	   a	   purely	   functionalist	   account	   of	  corporate	  governance	  for	  a	  moderate	  functionalist	  account,	  whereby	  actors	  are	  not	  just	   constrained	   by	   institutions,	   as	   they	   are	   useful	   of	   them,	   especially	   under	  conditions	  of	  likely	  benefit	  to	  them.	  	  Roe	   (2003)	   argues	   politics	   explains	   cross-­‐national	   diversity	   of	   corporate	  governance	  systems	  more	  than	  legal	  and	  economic	  theories.	  	  A	  country’s	  composite	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of	   legal	   rules	   governing	   firms	   depend	   on	   the	   initial	   ownership	   structure	   of	   firms	  prevalent	   in	   that	   country	   (Bebchuk	   and	   Roe	   1999-­‐2000).	   	   He	   does	   not,	   however,	  conceptualize	   dynamism	   of	   political	   ideology	   within	   political	   parties	   yet	   such	  dynamism	  might	  partially	   explain	  why	   it	  was	   center-­‐left	   parties	   that	  were	  behind	  major	  corporate	  governance	  reforms	  in	  Europe	  over	  the	  past	  decade.	  	  	  Corporate	   governance	   in	   historical	   perspective	   leads	   us	   back	   to	   the	  United	  States.	   	  Djelic	   (2006)	  attributes	   several	   factors	  with	   the	  spread	  of	   the	   free	  market	  ideology	   from	   the	   United	   States	   to	   other	   countries.	   	   First,	   the	   rise	   of	   postwar	  American	  hegemony	   coupled	  with	   the	   economic	   crises	   of	   the	  1970s	   stretched	   the	  limits	  of	  Keynesian	  economics.	   	  Many	  countries	   increasingly	  depended	  on	  Bretton	  Woods	   institutions	   that	   espoused	   the	   Chicago	   school	   mantra	   of	   free	   markets.	  	  Further,	  capitalism	  replaced	  communism	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  Lastly,	  an	  epistemic	   community	   mingled	   with	   policy	   makers	   to	   homogenize	   the	   economics	  profession	   on	   a	   global	   scale.	   	   Organizations	   like	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  and	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  were	  carriers	  of	  this	  economics	  mantra.	  	  So,	  too,	  were	  regulations	  that	  occasionally	  instituted	  economic	  action	  beyond	  their	  original	  context.	  As	   per	   Fiss	   (2008),	   much	   of	   the	   corporate	   governance	   literature	   from	   the	  economics	  and	  legal	  traditions	  has	  placed	  the	  shareholder	  at	  its	  center	  whereas	  the	  institutional	   approach	   considers	   political	   processes.	   	   His	   is	   much	  more	   culturally	  symbolic	  as	  well,	  allowing	  greater	  dynamism	  in	  corporate	  governance	  arrangements	  and	   regular	   interpretation.	   	   This	   also	   allows	   a	   challenge	   to	   two	   aspects	   of	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institutionalism:	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  practice	  and	  purposive	  agency	  (Fiss	  2008:	  392).	  	  On	  the	  former,	  even	  legitimated	  practices	  can	  be	  challenged	  or	  they	  can	  require	  as	  much	  effort	  to	  maintain	  as	  to	  change.	   	  Legal	  sanctions	  can	  have	  a	  stabilizing	  effect,	  but	  only	  for	  a	  time.	  	  On	  the	  latter,	  agents	  try	  to	  influence	  the	  adoption	  of	  practices.	  	  “A	  focus	  on	  practices	  is	  attractive	  to	  the	  study	  of	  corporate	  governance	  because	  the	  normative	   claims	   that	   inform	   governance	   models	   are	   not	   always	   readily	  transformed	  into	  corresponding	  practices”	  (Fiss	  2008:	  393).	   	  Diffusion	  of	  practices	  through	   political	   and	   cultural	   processes	   demonstrates	   local	   variation	   in	   the	  practices.	  	  Deeg	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  the	  shareholder	  value	  paradigm,	  including	  enhanced	  legal	  protections	   for	  minority	   shareholders,	   is	   one	   trend	   in	   corporate	   governance.	  	  Another	  is	  the	  increased	  role	  for	  boards	  of	  directors	  and	  performance-­‐related	  pay.	  	  Corporate	  governance	  reforms	  within	  Europe,	  according	  to	  Deeg,	  still	  demonstrate	  persistent	  divergence	  because	   “countries	  adopted	  voluntary	  corporate	  governance	  codes	   rather	   than	   a	   full	   regime	   of	   mandatory	   corporate	   governance	   rules”	   (Deeg	  2009:	  561).	  	  Full	  regime	  change	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  change	  underway,	  precisely	  if	  we	  shift	  the	  focus	  to	  firm	  relationships	  with	  the	  state.	  	  Deeg	  further	  notes	  that	  only	  the	  largest	   of	   listed	   firms	   are	   moving	   toward	   an	   international	   model	   of	   corporate	  governance	  institutions	  and	  practice.	  	  	  The	   nuance	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   control	   mechanisms	   of	   firms,	  however,	   points	   to	   a	   significant	   lack	   of	   discussion	   on	   corporate	   governance:	  understanding	  regulatory	  change	  as	  a	  function	  of	  informal	  firm	  control.	  	  Without	  the	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voluntary	   practice,	   how	   is	   firm	   behavior	   discernibly	   different	   from	   random	   or	  mimetic?	   	  More	  problematic	  would	  be	  monitoring	   firm	  behavior	  prior	   to	  adopting	  an	   externally	   recommended	   practice	   or	   regulation.	   	   Further,	   a	   practice	   is	   only	  meaningful	   if	   like	  firms	  are	  actually	  practicing	  it	  whether,	  as	  Dumez	  (2009)	  would	  argue,	  whether	  they	  “believe”	  in	  the	  practice	  or	  not.	  Corporate	   governance	   has	   an	   historical	   evolution	   that	   varies	   even	   within	  countries	  (Herrigel	  2005).	   	   Indeed	  the	   increased	   internationalization	  of	   the	  capital	  markets	  is	  one	  factor	  that	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  diversity	  of	  corporate	  governance	  institutions	   across	   countries	   despite	   pressures	   to	   converge	   towards	   an	   Anglo-­‐American	  model	  (Jackson	  2003,	  O’Sullivan	  2003).	  	  Shareholder	  protection	  laws	  offer	  comparative	   cases	   of	   corporate	   governance	   agency,	   although	   earlier	   research	  suffers	   from	   the	   assumption	   that	   such	   laws	  were	   static	   and	   overly	   deterministic.	  	  These	  laws	  in	  transition	  economies,	  however,	  demonstrate	  hybridization	  of	  adopted	  and	  local	  legal	  traditions	  (Pistor	  2000).	  	  Further	  such	  laws	  appear	  to	  converge	  across	  countries	  since	  the	  turn	  of	  this	  century	  (Lele	  and	  Siems	  2006).	  	  Some	  accounts	  of	  continued	  divergence	  argue	  that	  legal	   traditions	   are	   not	   entirely	   mutable	   (Guillén	   2000),	   although	   capital	   market	  activity	  can	  otherwise	  be	  a	  useful	  metric	  for	  institutional	  convergence	  (Guillén	  and	  O’Sullivan	   2004).	   	   Neither	   the	   diversity	   of	   shareholder	   protection	   laws	   nor	  variability	   in	   regulation	   alone	   can	   explain,	   however,	   why	   firms	   adopt	   voluntary	  practices.	   	   Both	   investors	   and	   the	   firms	   in	   which	   they	   invest	   create	   rules	   by	  considering	  their	  own	  respective	  interests	  (Fligstein	  2001).	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This	  attention	  to	  firm-­‐driven	  rules	  is	  all	  the	  more	  pertinent	  in	  advancements	  in	   the	   corporate	   governance	   literature	   precisely	   because	   states	   have	   become	  apparently	   less	   implicated	  in	  the	  design	  and	  enforcement	  of	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  (Fligstein	  and	  Choo	  2005).	  Although	   extant	   theories	   supply	   a	   variety	   of	   approaches	   to	   understanding	  regulatory	  reform,	  few,	  however,	  neatly	  account	  for	  the	  transition	  from	  informal	  to	  formal	   rule.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   what	   drives	   government	   to	   regulate	   corporate	  governance	   practices,	   even	   when	   firms	   and	   other	   market	   actors	   already	   uphold	  related	   standards?	   	  What	   emerging	   form	  of	   governance	  might	   this	   evolution	   from	  self-­‐regulation	  into	  formal	  regulation	  imply?	  My	   framework	   overcomes	   the	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   problems	   of	  earlier	  approaches	  by	  joining	  disparate	  theories	  on	  regulation	  from	  institutionalism	  and	  law,	  while	  providing	  for	  a	  causal	  analysis	  of	  specific	  regulatory	  change.	  	  I	  retain	  the	   variety	   of	   capitalism	   without	   attributing	   logic	   to	   inanimate	   constructs	   like	  polities.	   	   Instead	   I	   account	   for	   particular	   institutions	   that	   can	   be	   aggregated	  nationally	   and	   compared	   internationally.	   I	   expect	   to	   find	   that	   voluntary	   firm	  behavior	  is	  indeed	  a	  prerequisite	  condition	  for	  regulation,	  and	  that	  specific	  patterns	  of	  regulation	  should	  arise	  across	  various	  countries.	  	  
1.5	  	  	  Outline	  of	  Chapters	  The	   next	   chapter	   details	   the	   research	   design.	   	   Secondary	   data	   stem	   from	  various	   sources	   that	   I	   will	   adjoin	   to	   an	   original	   dataset	   of	   firm	   disclosures	   of	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corporate	   governance	   practices.	   	   I	   present	   a	   selection	   of	   these	   practices	   from	  international	  standards	  and	  previous	  corporate	  governance	  research.	  	  	  The	   third	   chapter	   provides	   an	   evaluation	   of	   firms’	   adoption	   of	   corporate	  governance	  practices	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  regulation	  and	  other	  formal	  rules.	  	  I	  provide	  the	   results	   of	   Qualitative	   Comparative	   Analysis	   (QCA)	   to	   explain	   the	   paths	   to	  regulation	   of	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   among	   the	   target	   set	   of	   over	   1500	  listed	   firms.	   	  These	  paths	   include	   the	   combination	  of	   this	   voluntary	   firm	  behavior	  with	  other	  key	  causal	  conditions.	  	  The	   fourth	   chapter	   augments	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   QCA	   with	   additional	  qualitative	  data	  on	  the	  conditions	  and	  outcomes	  particular	  to	  the	  focal	  practices	  in	  every	   regulating	   country,	   supplementing	   the	   cross-­‐national	   comparison	   with	  country-­‐specific	  contexts.	  	  I	  discuss	  the	  overall	  findings	  of	  the	  comparative	  analysis,	  limitations	  and	  counterfactuals,	  and	  their	  theoretical	  and	  policy	  implications.	  I	   conclude	   the	   dissertation	   by	   arguing	   that	   this	   analysis	   offers	   several	  advantages	  to	  study	  comparative	  regulatory	  processes	  and	  identifying	  key	  areas	  of	  inquiry	  for	  future	  research.	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Chapter	  2	  	  
	  
Research	  Design	  	  	  
2.1	  	  	  Selection	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  Practices	  This	   unprecedented	   research	   requires	   an	   eclectic	   mix	   of	   data	   source	   and	  method	   to	   test	   whether	   voluntary	   firm	   practice	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	  regulation.	   	   First,	   I	   identify	   a	   group	   of	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   for	  comparative	   analysis,	   the	   most	   salient	   of	   which	   should	   reflect	   interests	   of	  regulators,	  firms,	  and	  other	  market	  actors.	  	  Two	  sources	  reflect	  these	  interests	  and	  help	   identify	   which	   governance	   practices	   merit	   further	   analysis.	   	   I	   select	   the	  governance	  practices	  that	  overlap	  in	  these	  two	  sources.	  	  The	  OECD’s	  Principles	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	   (“OECD	  Principles”)	  embody	  corporate	  governance	  on	  both	  systemic	  and	  firm	  levels,	  and	  are	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  corporate	   governance	   practices	   for	   several	   reasons.	   	   First,	   their	   coverage	   of	  corporate	  governance	   is	  comprehensive	   in	   input	   from	   its	   thirty	  member	  countries	  and	  runs	  the	  gamut	  from	  recommended	  practices	  at	  the	  firm	  level	  to	  country	  level	  regulations.	   	   The	   OECD	   Principles	   do	   not	   form	   a	   single	   set	   of	   legally	   binding,	  regulatory,	   or	   even	   voluntary	   measures;	   rather	   they	   are	   a	   token	   of	   policy	  coordination	   among	  member	   countries.	   	   The	  OECD	  Principles	   correspond	   to—but	  do	  not	  equate—various	  regulations,	  voluntary	  codes,	   institutional	  norms,	  and	   firm	  practices	  across	  countries.	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Second,	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   take	   into	   account	   diverse	   sources	   of	   policy	  perspectives,	  not	   just	  of	   government	   representatives,	  but	  of	  other	   stakeholders	  as	  well,	  including	  those	  from	  the	  private	  sector,	  labor,	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  Since	  2006,	  the	  OECD	   has	   been	   conducting	   qualitative	   assessments	   on	   the	   implementation	   and	  enforcement	   of	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   among	   its	   member	   countries11.	   Government	  authorities,	  accountants,	  shareholders,	  ratings	  agencies,	  and	  academics	  form	  teams	  to	  assess	  the	  OECD	  Principles.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  OECD	  Principles	  implicate	  not	  only	  the	  thirty	  member	  countries	  of	  the	  OECD,	  but	  many	  non-­‐members	  as	  well.	   	  The	  World	  Bank,	   IMF,	   and	   Financial	   Stability	   Forum	   agreed	   in	   1999	   to	   include	   the	   OECD	  Principles	   as	   one	   of	   their	   Twelve	   Key	   Standards	   for	   Sound	   Financial	   Systems	   to	  prevent	  financial	  market	  crises	  like	  those	  in	  emerging	  and	  transition	  economies	  that	  occurred	  earlier	  in	  the	  decade.	  	  These	  international	  organizations	  now	  use	  the	  OECD	  Principles	   in	   their	   own	   country	   assessment	   programs 12 .	   	   This	   breadth	   of	  stakeholders	   and	   representative	   countries	   further	   lends	   variation	   to	   corporate	  governance	  on	  both	  macro	  and	  micro	  levels.	  Third,	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   provide	   a	   current	   overview	   of	   corporate	  governance	  practices13.	   	  From	  the	  latest	  version	  of	  the	  OECD	  Principles	  I	  can	  trace	  
                                                11	  See	   the	  Methodology	  For	  Assessing	  The	  Implementation	  of	  the	  OECD	  Principles	  On	  
Corporate	  Governance,	  December	  1,	  2006.	  	  12	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  use	  the	  OECD	  Principles	  in	  their	  Review	  of	  Observance	  of	  
Standards	  and	  Codes	  (ROSC)	  as	  part	  of	  their	  Financial	  Sector	  Assessment	  Programs	  (FSAP),	  itself	  a	  voluntary	  assessment	  program.	  	  13	  Member	   countries	   agreed	   to	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   in	   1999	   and	   revised	   them	   in	  2004.	   	   The	   revisions	   include	   the	   recommendations	   from	   the	   2002	   Survey	   of	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back	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   corporate	   governance	   practices,	   as	   they	  move	  between	  micro	  and	  macro	   levels	  over	   time,	   from	  various	  actors	  within	  and	  across	  countries.	   Lastly,	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   highlight	   the	   most	   salient	   issues	   in	  international	  corporate	  governance.	  	  They	  identify	  corporate	  governance	  issues	  that	  are	  observable	  in	  both	  voluntary	  and	  regulatory	  forms,	  from	  which	  I	  select	  a	  group	  of	  practices	  for	  comparative	  analysis.	  	  The	   second	   source	   that	   helps	   identify	   which	   practices	   to	   analyze	   is	  Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services	  (“ISS”),	  which	  compiles	  64	  firm-­‐level	  governance	  attributes—of	   which	   44	   are	   comparable	   across	   countries14.	   	   These	   attributes	   fall	  into	  four	  broad	  categories	  of	  corporate	  governance	  examined	  in	  previous	  research	  (Aggarwal	  et	  al.	  2007)15.	  	  The	  first	  ISS	  category	  includes	  firm-­‐level	  attributes	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  such	  as	  its	  composition,	  election,	  independence	  and	  transparency.	  	  The	  second	  category	  also	  includes	  independence	  and	  transparency	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  
                                                                                                                                            
Developments	   in	  OECD	  Countries	   and	   relate	   to	   the	   legal	   framework	   of	   the	   original	  OECD	   Principles,	   including	   the	   rights	   and	   obligations	   of	   shareholders,	   minority	  shareholder	  protection,	  transparency	  and	  disclosure.	  	  Although	  the	  OECD	  called	  for	  additional	  policy	  enhancements	   in	   light	  of	   the	   latest	  economic	  crisis,	   it	  has	  not	  yet	  revised	  its	  Principles	  of	  Corporate	  Governance.	  	  14	  Institutional	  Shareholder	  Services	  acquired	  the	  Investor	  Responsibility	  Research	  Center	  (IRRC),	  a	  rival	  shareholder	  advisory	  service	  that	  also	  compiled	  guidelines	  for	  corporate	  governance.	   	   In	   January	  2007	   ISS	  was	  acquired	  by	  RiskMetrics	  Group,	  a	  for-­‐profit,	  risk	  management	  firm	  formerly	  part	  of	  JP	  Morgan	  until	  1998.	  	  RiskMetrics	  in	   turn	   was	   acquired	   by	   MSCI,	   provider	   of	   equity	   indices	   and	   risk	   management	  advice,	  in	  early	  2010.	  	  15	  This	   is	   an	   extension	   of	   research	   based	   on	   the	   original	   IRRC	   index	   corporate	  governance	  provisions	  in	  Bebchuk	  et	  al.	  2005,	  Gompers	  et	  al.	  2003,	  and	  Rosenbaum	  1986,	  which	  focus	  on	  US	  firms.	   	  Aggarwal	  et	  al.	  2007	  more	  recently	  categorize	  the	  governance	  practices,	   (a.k.a.	   “provisions”	  or	   “attributes”)	   in	  broader	  categories	   for	  international	  comparison	  and	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  OECD	  Principles.	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the	   firm’s	   external	   auditors,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   fees	   paid	   to	   them	   and	   board	  ratification	   of	   their	   engagement	   for	   both	   auditing	   and	  non-­‐auditing	   services.	   	   The	  third	  category	  includes	  types	  of	  executive	  compensation	  and	  its	  determinants.	  	  	  I	   exclude	   the	   fourth	   ISS	   category,	   which	   pertains	   solely	   to	   anti-­‐takeover	  practices,	  such	  as	  poison	  pills,	  supermajority	  voting,	  “blank	  checks”	  and	  other	  anti-­‐takeover	   devices.	   	   These	   attributes,	   although	  under	   the	   broad	   rubric	   of	   corporate	  governance,	  do	  not	  address	  problems	  of	  control	  in	  the	  firm	  as	  an	  ongoing	  concern,	  and	  apply	  exclusively	  to	  hostile	  takeovers,	  which	  are	  infrequent	  and	  especially	  rare	  outside	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Therefore,	   I	   consider	   anti-­‐takeover	   attributes	   in	   the	  historical	  context	  of	  corporate	  governance	  development	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  category	  of	  internationally	  comparable	  firm	  practices.	  	  	  Of	  the	  remaining	  three	  ISS	  categories,	  I	  consider	  those	  attributes	  that	  overlap	  with	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   specifically	   on	   shareholder	   rights,	   which	   target	  governance	   practices	   applying	   specifically	   to	   publicly	   traded	   firms.	   	   Some	   ISS	  attributes,	   such	   as	   separate	   roles	   for	   CEO	   and	   Chairman	   or	   staggered	   boards,	  actually	   reflect	   not	   just	   firm-­‐level	   attributes,	   but	   institutional	   ones	   as	   well.	   	   The	  immediate	  objective	   is	   to	   locate	   the	  most	  salient	  practices	  among	   firms	   in	  various	  countries	   while	   accounting	   for	   variation	   in	   the	   origin,	   voluntary	   adoption,	   and	  regulation	   of	   these	   practices.	   	   The	   resulting	   selection	   of	   corporate	   governance	  practices	   from	   the	  OECD	  Principles	   and	   the	   ISS	   attributes	   totals	   eight	  practices	   in	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three	   categories:	   Board,	   Executive	   Compensation,	   and	   Auditing16.	   	   In	   a	   discrete	  category	  is	  a	  practice	  whereby	  the	  firm	  discloses	  participation	  in	  a	   loosely	  defined	  scheme	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   corporate	   governance,	   which	   may	   include	   the	  aforementioned	  practices	  among	  others.	  	  	  
Table	  2.1	  
Corporate	  Governance	  Practices	  
	  





































































































Table	  2.1	  lists	  the	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  by	  category	  and	  my	  definitions	  of	  those	  practices,	   along	  with	   the	  associated	  OECD	  Principles	  and	   ISS	  attributes.	   	  My	  annotations	   for	   each	  practice	  draw	  attention	   to	   the	  various	   specificities—cultural,	  industrial,	  and	  others—that	  are	  likely	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  adoption	  of	  each	  practice	  across	  firms	  and	  countries.	  	  Of	  these	  select	  corporate	  governance	  practices,	  I	   will	   present	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   paths	   to	   regulation	   of	   three—specialized	   board	  committees,	  director	   independence,	  and	  auditor	   independence—in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  and	  the	  others	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  	  
2.2	  	  	  Temporal	  Period	  The	   1990s	   coincides	   with	   the	   global	   advent	   of	   shareholder	   value	   and	  increased	   financialization	   that	  occurred	  a	  decade	  earlier	   in	   the	  United	  States	   (Roy	  1997,	  Dore	  2000,	  Fligstein	  2001).	  	  In	  Europe,	  international	  corporate	  debt	  levels	  as	  a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   rose	   markedly	   from	   the	   1990s,	   as	   did	   the	   dispersion	   of	  ownership	  among	  large	  companies	  (Deeg	  2009)	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  regulatory	  state	  (Majone	  1997)	  despite	   an	   attendant	  disappearance	  of	   public	   intervention	   (Dumez	  1998).	   	   This	   period	   also	   marks	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   liberal	   economics	   in	   both	  developed	  and	  emerging	  capital	  markets	  (Fourcade	  and	  Babb	  2002).	   	  Even	  though	  corporate	   governance	   issues	   date	   back	   to	   separation	   of	   ownership	   and	   control	   of	  the	  firm	  since	  Berle	  and	  Means	  (1933),	  the	  discourse	  of	  corporate	  governance	  and	  its	  direct	  tie	  to	  executive	  compensation	  occurs	  since	  the	  1990s	  (Erturk	  et	  al.	  2004).	  	  
 44 
The	   1990s	   also	   begins	   an	   era	   of	   heightened	   regulation	   and	   increases	   in	  national	  budgets	   for	   this	  purpose	   (Braithwaite	  2008).	   	  Globalization	  does	  not	   just	  refer	   to	   the	   intensification	   of	   capital	   ties	   between	   states	   and	  markets	   during	   this	  period,	  but	  also	  of	  regulation	  (Braithwaite	  and	  Drahos	  2000).	   	  Both	  the	  number	  of	  companies	  listing	  shares	  on	  stock	  exchanges,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relative	  amounts	  of	  their	  capitalization,	   accelerates	   during	   this	   time.	   	   The	   added	  used	  of	   securitization	   as	   a	  financial	   tool,	   coupled	  with	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  shareholder	  value	  paradigm,	  also	  manifest	  during	  this	  time.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  decade	  thus	  identifies	  the	  time	  period	  with	  which	  to	  open	  the	  analysis.	  	  I	  select	  1989	  as	  the	  start	  year	  for	  selection	  of	  regulatory	  regimes	  for	   comparative	   analysis,	   and	   include	   all	   data	   available	   through	  2008	   inclusive.	   	   I	  use	   1989,	   which	   precedes	   by	   one	   year	   the	   focal	   time	   period,	   for	   country	   and	  company	  selection.	  	  This	  year	  also	  coincides	  with	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  corporate	  governance	  recommendations	  from	  IRRC/ISS	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  	  	  
2.3	  	  	  Preliminary	  Country	  Selection	  The	  next	  step	  in	  selection	  turns	  to	  the	  countries	  that	  potentially	  regulate	  the	  focal	   corporate	   governance	   practices.	   	   The	   country	   selection	   is	   conducted	   in	   two	  stages:	  the	  first	  to	  establish	  a	  preliminary	  list	  of	  countries	  based	  on	  the	  size	  of	  their	  capital	   markets,	   and	   a	   second	   by	   identifying	   listed	   companies	   in	   those	   markets.	  	  Because	  the	  comparative	  country	  analysis	  is	  partially	  dependent	  on	  firm	  behavior,	  I	  employ	  an	  iterative	  selection	  of	  country-­‐cases	  based	  on	  the	  selection	  of	  firms.	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Large	  advanced	   capitalist	   economies	   comprise	   the	   countries	   in	  which	   I	   can	  model	   my	   theory	   of	   regulation	   of	   voluntary	   corporate	   governance	   practice.	   	   To	  develop	  a	  list	  of	  the	  largest	  such	  economies,	  I	  begin	  with	  the	  OECD’s	  thirty	  member	  countries	   plus	   its	   five	   “Accession	   Candidate	   Countries”	   and	   five	   “Enhanced	  Engagement	  Countries”	  to	  represent	  a	  population	  of	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies	  as	  listed	  in	  Table	  2.217.	  	  	  
Table	  2.2	  	  	  	  
Potential	  Advanced	  Economies	  for	  Analysis	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  





!1$,2*3%* 4&2#* ).%3# 52*6%3
!1$,2%* 718#09&12/ -$,&'%* ).%'*
5#3/%10 :#8%"& ;$2*#3 ;'+%*
)*'*+* <#,.#23*'+$ =1$$%* ;'+&'#$%*













Accession	  Candidate	  Countries	  are	  applicants	  to	  membership	  in	  the	  OECD	  through	  a	  lengthy	   process	   of	   policy	   examination	   by	   current	   members.	   	   Their	   eventual	  membership	   is	   likely,	   but	   conditional	   upon	   specified,	   jointly	   agreed	   criteria18 .	  	  	  Enhanced	   Engagement	   countries	   occupy	   a	   slightly	   more	   ambiguous	   position	   in	  which	   they	   participate	   variably	   in	   policy	   coordination,	   data	   sharing,	   committee	  meeting	  participation,	  and	  adhesion	  to	  the	  organization’s	  legal	  instruments,	  but	  are	  not	  presently	  in	  discussion	  to	  become	  applicants	  to	  the	  OECD.	  	  From	  this	  initial	  pool	  of	  forty	  countries,	  one	  can	  expect	  variation	  in	  capital	  markets	  regulations	  as	  well	  as	  size	  of	  the	  capital	  markets.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  and	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Exchanges,	  an	   international	   trade	  association	  of	  51	  stock	  exchanges,	  provide	  two	  metrics	  of	  capital	  market	  size—total	  market	  capitalization	  and	  the	  total	  value	   of	   stocks	   traded—that	   I	   use	   to	   reduce	   the	   country	   selection	   for	   feasibility’s	  sake.	  
	   	  
                                                





	  	   Figure	   2.1	   plots	   the	   values	   of	   these	   yearly	   metrics	   in	   each	   of	   the	   forty	  countries19.	   	  The	  fitted	  values	  lines	  indicate	  a	  clear	  linear	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  size	  metrics.	  	  The	  panel	  data	  are	  balanced	  whereby	  country-­‐year	  pairs	  uniquely	  identify	   each	   observation	   and	   little	   difference	   between	   data	   sources	   is	   evident.	  These	  metrics,	   however,	   are	   insufficient	   for	   ranking	   countries	   by	   the	   their	   capital	  markets.	   	  The	  total	  values	  of	  shares	  traded	  or	  market	  capitalization	  per	  annum	  are	  notional	   values	   that	   are	   not	   relative	   to	   the	   size	   of	   each	   country’s	   economy.	   	   I	  therefore	   use	   these	   same	   stock	  market	  metrics	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   each	   country’s	  annual	   GDP	   for	   a	  more	   refined	   comparison	   of	   capital	  markets	   across	   this	   pool	   of	  
                                                19	  The	   World	   Federation	   of	   Exchanges	   data	   are	   unavailable	   for	   Czech	   Republic,	  Estonia,	  Iceland,	  the	  Russian	  Federation,	  and	  the	  Slovak	  Republic.	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forty	  countries.	   	  Because	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Exchanges	  data	  are	  not	  adjusted	  for	  GDP,	  I	  therefore	  use	  the	  World	  Bank	  Development	  Indicators	  in	  order	  to	  refine	  my	  selection	  of	  countries	  for	  comparative	  analysis.	  Of	   the	   two	   World	   Bank	   Indicators,	   shares	   traded	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	  metric	   is	   the	  preferable	  metric	  over	  market	  capitalization.	   	  The	   latter	  accounts	   for	  heterogeneity	   in	   share	  price	   across	   countries,	  which	   could	   skew	  country	   rankings	  based	   on	   the	  many	   price	   determinants	   that	   are	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   comparative	  regulatory	   research.	   	   Shares	   traded	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   is	   a	   better	  metric	   for	  comparing	  size	  of	   the	  capital	  markets	   in	  a	  country	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  ascertaining	  scale	   of	   regulatory	   purview	   than	   when	   conflated	   by	   share	   prices	   in	   the	   market	  capitalization	  metric.	  	  The	  periodic	  stock	  market	  data	  for	  the	  countries	  do	  not	  follow	  a	   normal	   distribution.	   I	   use	   the	  median	   instead	   of	   the	  mean	   as	   a	   cutoff	   point	   for	  largest	  capitalist	  economies	  in	  this	  population	  of	  OECD+10	  countries.	  	  Their	  overall	  median	  shares	  traded	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  is	  20%.	  	  I	  keep	  the	  23	  countries	  that	  lie	  above	  the	  median,	  or	  in	  other	  words	  in	  a	  semi-­‐final	  list	  of	  countries	  to	  analyze.	  	  	  	  
2.4	  	  	  Firm	  Selection	  and	  Final	  Country	  Selection	  Next	   I	   identify	   firms	   incorporated	   in	   this	   semi-­‐final	   group	   of	   23	   countries	  with	   advanced	   capital	   markets	   for	   evidence	   of	   adoption	   of	   corporate	   governance	  practices.	  	  The	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  I	  survey	  apply	  to	  public	  firms	  across	  all	   industries.	   	   “Public”	  or	   “listed”	  company	   is	  defined	  differently	  across	  countries;	  the	  working	  definition	   I	   employ	   is	  one	  where	  companies	  have	  at	   least	  50%	  of	   the	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shares	  traded	  on	  a	  stock	  exchange.	  	  Armour	  et	  al.	  2009	  identify	  legal	  characteristics	  common	   to	   corporations	   across	   jurisdictions,	   including:	   legal	   personality,	   limited	  liability,	   transferable	   shares,	   delegate	   management	   under	   a	   board	   structure,	   and	  investor	   ownership.	   	   Legal	   names	   of	   the	   selected	   public	   companies	   vary	   from	  “incorporated”	   to	   “company”	   in	   English.	   	   Their	   equivalents,	   such	   as	  “Aktiengesellschaft,”	  “société	  anonyme,”	  and	  the	  like,	  in	  other	  countries,	  are	  included	  in	  the	  firm	  selection.	  	  I	   defined	   the	   population	   as	   the	   largest	   such	   public	   firms	   by	   home	   country	  without	   prejudice	   to	   industry.	   	   Thomson	   ONE	   Banker	   provides	   historic	   financial	  data	  on	  public	  companies	  worldwide.	   	  From	  this	  database,	  I	  selected	  all	  companies	  that	  were	  ever	   listed	  on	  the	  primary	  stock	  exchange	  in	  each	  of	  the	  23	  countries	  of	  my	   semi-­‐final	   list	   during	   at	   least	   five	   years,	   not	   necessarily	   consecutive,	   between	  1989	  and	  2008	  inclusive.	  	  	  I	  selected	  companies	  that	  had	  shares	  listed	  during	  at	  least	  five	  years,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  consecutive,	  in	  the	  time	  frame20.	  	  This	  batch	  includes	  companies	  that	  may	   have	   been	   delisted	   as	   a	   result	   of	   acquisition,	   nationalization	   or	   liquidation	  during	  the	  time	  frame.	  	  Private	  firms	  and	  any	  firms	  wholly	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	  or	  states	   in	   discrete	   years	   are	   excluded.	   	   The	   maximum	   number	   of	   companies	   per	  
country	   with	   at	   least	   five	   year	   of	   available	   capitalization	   data	   ranges	   from	   10	   to	  2295,	   with	   an	   overall	   mean	   of	   576.9	   and	   median	   of	   276.	   	   I	   am	   looking	   for	   the	  
                                                20	  Thomson	  ONE	  may	  have	  missing	  interim	  years	  of	  data.	  	  The	  five	  non-­‐consecutive	  year	  criterion	  mitigates	  that	  risk.	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countries	   with	   the	   most	   listed	   firms;	   therefore	   I	   use	   the	   median	   number	   of	  companies	   per	   country	   as	   a	  minimum	   cutoff	   point21.	   	   Countries	  with	   at	   least	   276	  firms	   in	   the	  Thomson	  ONE	  database	   are	   included	   in	   the	   final	   list	   of	   ten	   countries	  having	  the	  largest	  public	  companies.	  	  	  There	  is	  still	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  capitalization	  among	  the	  companies	  now	  in	  the	  final	  list	  of	  ten	  countries.	  	  In	  a	  final	  step	  of	  firm	  selection	  (within	  the	  ten	  countries),	  I	  retain	  all	  companies	  with	  a	  periodic	  average	  market	  capitalization	  above	  their	  home	  country’s	   mean	   aggregate	   company	   market	   capitalization.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   I	   have	  selected	  the	  ten	  largest	  countries	  and	  their	  respective	  largest	  companies.	  	  Figure	  2.2	  indicates	  box	  plots	  of	  the	  final	  list	  of	  ten	  countries	  ranked	  by	  their	  periodic	  median	  stock	  market	  capitalization,	  and	  the	  maximum	  potential	  number	  of	  listed	  companies	  incorporated	   in	   each	   country,	   for	   the	   comparative	   regulatory	   analysis.	   	   The	   box	  plots	  in	  Figure	  2.2	  indicate	  the	  final	  list	  of	  ten	  countries	  for	  analysis,	  ranked	  by	  the	  periodic	  mean	   stock	  market	   capitalization	   of	   the	   companies	   incorporated	   in	   their	  jurisdictions.	  	  In	  parentheses	  is	  each	  country’s	  final	  number	  of	  companies	  that	  I	  will	  analyze	   for	   evidence	   of	   voluntary	   corporate	   governance	   practice.	   The	   number	   of	  companies	   from	  all	  countries,	  or	   the	  summation	  of	  numbers	   in	  parentheses,	   totals	  1563.	  	  	  	  
	   	  





2.5	  	  	  Analysis	  of	  Regulatory	  Change	  in	  Countries	  To	  accomplish	  my	  task	  of	  explaining	  the	  causal	  paths	  of	  regulating	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  across	  this	  final	  list	  of	  ten	  countries,	  I	  use	  fuzzy	  set	  Qualitative	  Comparative	  Analysis	  (fsQCA).	  	  QCA	  broadly	  compares	  the	  different	  combinations	  of	  conditions—configurations—of	   cases	   that	   produce	   a	   given	   outcome	   (Rihoux	   and	  Ragin	  2009,	  Ragin	  2008,	  Fiss	  2007,	  Kogut	  and	  Ragin	  2006).	   	  Traditional	  statistical	  methods	  would	  not	  capture	   the	  comparisons	  between	   the	  relatively	   few	  countries	  under	   analysis.	   	  Nor	  would	   they	   allow	   inclusion	  of	   qualitative	  data	   in	   formulating	  the	  regulatory	  outcome	  on	  an	   individual	  country	  basis	   like	  QCA.	   	  The	  origin	  of	   the	  methodology	   traces	   to	  David	  Hume	  and	   John	  Stuart	  Mill,	   and	   to	   tensions	  between	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deductive	   and	   inductive	   logic	   more	   broadly,	   and	   to	   formalizations	   of	   logical	  reasoning	  by	  George	  Boole	  and	  visualizations	  of	  such	  by	  John	  Venn.	  	  Fuzzy	  sets	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  “grades	  of	  membership”	  between	  zero	  and	  one	  (Zadeh	  1965).	  More	   importantly,	   the	   logic	   of	   linear	   relations	   and	  multivariate	   regression	   differs	  from	  that	  of	  cases	  and	  set	  membership.	  	  As	   the	   title	   of	   this	   dissertation	   suggests,	   there	   are	   multiple	   paths,	   or	  trajectories,	  to	  regulation.	   	   Jackson	  (2005)	  employs	  fsQCA	  in	  22	  OECD	  countries	  to	  measure	   the	   different	   paths	   of	   employee	   participation	   in	   boards,	   which	   are	  conditioned	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  political	  systems	  and	  union	  coordination.	  	  Kogut	  et	  al.	   (2004)	   similarly	   employ	   fsQCA	   to	   explain	  multiple	   paths	   of	   corporate	   strategy	  diffusing	  from	  Japanese	  manufacturing	  practices.	   	  QCA	  has	  made	  great	  strides	  as	  a	  method	   for	   explaining	   paths	   in	   other	   areas,	   such	   as:	   social	   behavior	   caused	   by	  configurations	  of	  both	  genetic	  and	  social	  conditions	  (Shanahan	  et	  al.	  2008);	  natural	  resource	   management	   by	   various	   Native	   American	   nations	   (Dolan	   2009),	   and;	  viability	  of	  social	  movement	  organizations	  (Cress	  and	  Snow	  2004).	   	  Though	  not	  to	  provide	   an	   exhaustive	   list	   of	   examples,	   I	   highlight	   the	   diversity	   of	   compelling	  research	   agendas	   to	   which	   QCA	   can	   find	   a	   methodological	   home,	   especially	   with	  dealing	  with	   a	   small	  N	   problem	   and	   combinatorial	   logic,	   both	   anathema	   to	   linear	  regression.	  	  Inspired	  by	  its	  applicability	  to	  explaining	  paths	  and	  its	  logic,	  I	  use	  fsQCA	  to	   explain	   the	   paths	   to	   regulation	   of	   select	   corporate	   governance	   practices.	   	   This	  comparative	   case	   analysis	   of	   regulations	   in	   ten	   countries	   explains	   the	   paths	   to	  regulation	  in	  countries	  similar	  in	  key	  capitalistic	  aspects,	  yet	  different	  in	  others.	  
 53 
2.5.1	  	  	  Outcome	  of	  Regulation	  	  The	   observed	   outcome	   is	   the	   regulation	   of	   each	   corporate	   governance	  practice	  in	  Table	  2.1	  in	  all	  ten	  of	  the	  selected	  countries.	  	  This	  outcome	  is	  predictably	  uneven	  whereby	   some	   countries	  might	   adopt	   statist	   approaches	   to	   regulating	   the	  capital	  markets,	  like	  France	  and	  China,	  while	  others	  might	  adopt	  a	  more	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	   like	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Although	   the	   outcome	  may	  appear	  naturally	  dichotomous—regulate	  the	   focal	  practice	  or	  not—regulation	  can	  be	  measured	  as	  more	  or	  less	  in	  direct	  government	  control.	  	  Countries	  might	  vary	  in	   degree	   of	   regulation	   compared	   to	   other	   countries,	   dependent	   on	   their	   legal	  framework	   and	   functional	   equivalence	   to	   regulation	   of	   the	   focal	   corporate	  governance	   practices.	   	   Germany,	   for	   instance,	   now	   enforces	   firms	   to	   explain	   any	  noncompliance	  with	   the	  voluntary	  provisions	  of	   its	  national	  corporate	  governance	  code.	  	  In	  order	  to	  capture	  national	  variation	  in	  regulation	  of	  director	  independence,	  therefore,	  I	  employ	  a	  multi-­‐value	  scoring	  mechanism	  for	  the	  regulatory	  outcome.	  	  In	  fuzzy	  set	  QCA	  parlance,	  threshold	  values	  for	  set	  membership	  are,	  at	  the	  extremes,	  1	  for	   full	   regulation	   and	  0	   for	   full	   non-­‐regulation.	   	   The	  qualification	   for	   a	   particular	  score	   depends	   on	   my	   qualitative	   assessment	   of	   whether	   a	   particular	   practice	   is	  regulated.	  	  Between	  non-­‐regulation	  and	  ambiguous	  regulation	  lies	  informal	  control,	  or	  a	  standard	  that	  constrains	  companies	  without	  express	  control	  by	  the	  government	  or	   one	  of	   its	   regulatory	   agencies.	   	   Conversely,	   between	   ambiguous	   regulation	   and	  full	  regulation	  lies	  formal	  constraint,	  which	  the	  government	  or	  its	  regulatory	  agency	  defers	   to	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  source	   to	  promulgate	  rules.	   	  Membership	  scores	   for	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regulations,	   therefore,	   are	   not	   based	   on	   a	   measurement	   of	   the	   strength	   of	   one	  regulation	   over	   another;	   rather	   it	   is	   a	   measurement	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   a	  government	   regulates	   the	   focal	   practice	   among	   listed	   companies	   within	   its	  jurisdiction.	   	  With	   ten	   countries	   under	   analysis,	   a	   pseudo-­‐continuous	   scale	   of	   set	  membership	  is	  not	  particularly	  instructive.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  assign	  one	  of	  four	  discrete	  scores,	  according	  to	  the	  categories	  under	  which	  each	  practice	  in	  every	  country	  falls:	  0	  if	  there	  is	  no	  regulation	  by	  the	  last	  year	  of	  analysis,	  i.e.	  2008;	  0.25	  if	  the	  practice	  is	  not	   regulated	   by	   the	   government,	   but	   mandated	   by	   third	   parties	   that	   the	  government	  sanctions;	  0.75	  if	  the	  government	  specifically	  requires	  the	  practice	  but	  allows	  companies	  or	  non-­‐governmental	  bodies	  to	  define	  criteria	  and	  its	  compliance,	  or	  has	  a	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  provision	  whereby	  companies	  are	  not	  required	  by	  law	  to	  adopt	  the	  particular	  practice,	  but	  are	  required	  by	  law	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  do	  not;	  1	   if	   the	   government	   defines	   such	   criteria	   and	   establishes	   clear	   government	  sanctions	  criteria	  for	  non-­‐compliance,	  hence	  full	  regulation	  of	  each	  focal	  practice22.	  	  I	  code	  for	  fuzzy	  set	  membership	  in	  regulation	  outcome	  similarly	  to	  how	  Schneiberg	  and	  Bartley	  (2008)	  define	  “regulation	  by	  information”	  as	  a	  form	  of	  regulation	  “that	  makes	   securing	   behavioral	   change	   exogenous	   to	   the	   regulation	   itself—ceding	  sanctioning	  to	  other	  actors”	  (Schneiberg	  and	  Bartley	  2008:	  43-­‐44).	  	  	  
                                                22	  The	  score	  of	  0.5	  would	  represent	  maximum	  ambiguity:	  whether	  the	  regulation	  is	  defined	  and	  enforced	  by	  the	  government	  or	  not.	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Regulations	  are	  in	  the	  form	  of	  statutes	  of	  corporate	  law	  and	  securities	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  commercial	  codes,	  available	  through	  Westlaw23.	  	  I	  code	  each	  country	  by	  year	  from	  1989	  to	  2008	  evidence	  of	  regulation	  for	  every	  target	  governance	  practice.	  	  I	  do	  not	   presuppose	   that	   every	   country	   regulates	   every	   practice,	   rather	   that	   some	  countries	  regulate	  specific	  practices.	  	  Any	  practice	  for	  which	  no	  regulation	  occurs	  by	  2008	  in	  a	  given	  country	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  0.	  	  I	   sourced	   the	   Georgetown	   University	   Law	   Center’s	   Foreign	   Law	   Guide,	   the	  WestLaw	  database,	  and	  primary	  sources	  of	  law,	  e.g.	  US	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations.	  I	   search	   by	   relevant	   terms,	   cross-­‐reference	   different	   sub-­‐sections	   for	   relevant	  clauses,	   e.g.	   executive	   compensation	   in	   the	   form	  of	   stock	  options	  might	  be	  appear	  under	   more	   than	   one	   category,	   various	   terminology	   for	   the	   same	   item,	   e.g.	  “compensation,”	  “remuneration”	  meaning	  different	  things	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  India	  and	   Japan.	   	   I	   also	   search	   for	   evidence	   of	   regulatory	   specification	   that	   companies	  have	   in	  developing	   criteria	   and	  disclosure	   requirement.	   	   Table	  2.3	   indicates	   these	  regulations	  per	  country	  and	  their	  corresponding	  fuzzy	  set	  scores.	  	  Why	  not	  simply	  dichotomize	  these	  values?	  	  Visualize	  regulation	  as	  light	  from	  a	  dimmer	  switch.	   	  Half	  way	  is	  a	   fuzzy	  view	  of	  regulation	  by	  the	  state.	   	  Fully	  on	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	   the	  state	  regulates	   this	  activity.	   	  We	  especially	  want	   to	  capture	   the	  nuance	  within	  the	  law	  because	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  evolutionary	  regulation,	  namely	  that	  which	  originates	  in	  normative	  behavior.	  	  The	  light	  switch	  does	  not	  simply	  go	  on	  
                                                23	  Statues	   and	   codes	   from	   some	   jurisdictions	   are	   available	   directly	   online	   while	  others	  are	  sourced	  through	  Westlaw.	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full	   in	   all	   cases;	   it	   turns	   on	   and	   once	   past	   the	   point	   of	   ambiguity,	   can	   build	   in	  intensity.	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2.5.2	  	  	  Causal	  Conditions	  Seven	  conditions	  are	  hypothesized	  to	  combine	  in	  configurations	  that	  lead	  to	  the	   regulatory	   outcome.	   	   These	   conditions	   are	   hypothetically	   causal,	   both	  individually	  and	  combinatorially.	  	  That	  combinatory	  process	  is	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  The	  first	  condition	  is	  whether	  a	  stock	  exchange	  listing	  rule,	  in	  lieu	  of	  regulation,	  establishes	  specific	  criteria	  for	  the	  focal	  practice.	   	  The	  second	  and	  third	  conditions	  turn	  to	  firm	  behavior.	  	  Firms	  quite	  plausibly	  self-­‐regulate	  according	  to	  the	  same,	  or	  nearly	  same,	  criteria	  by	  which	  national	  authorities	  regulate.	  	  When	  firms	  essentially	  adopt	  these	  practices	  before	  formal	  regulation	  occurs,	  their	  behavior	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  voluntary	  corporate	  governance	  practice.	  	  Prevalence	  of	  this	  voluntary	  behavior,	  or	   self-­‐regulation,	   is	   the	   second	   causal	   condition.	   	   The	   third	   is	   the	   occurrence	   of	  related	  corporate	  governance	  scandal	  occurs	  prior	  to	  regulation.	  	  	  Of	  course	   firms	  do	  not	  write	   their	  own	  regulatory	  recipes	  alone;	  regulatory	  authorities	  need	   to	  assist	   in	   that	   task	   if	   formal	   regulation	   is	   to	   follow.	   	  The	   fourth	  causal	   condition	   tests	  whether	   legislatures	   that	   are	  majority	   left-­‐leaning	  are	  more	  likely	   to	   accomplish	   this	   task	   than	   their	   right-­‐leaning	   counterparts.	   	   The	   fifth	  condition	  measures	  whether	  the	  stock	  exchange	  ties	  via	  cross-­‐listings	  in	  each	  of	  the	  focal	   countries	   also	   lead	   to	   regulation	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   other	   causal	  conditions.	   	   Likewise,	   countries	   that	   rely	  more	   heavily	   on	   the	   capital	  markets	   for	  economic	   growth	   have	   potentially	   greater	   stakes	   in	   regulation	   and	   thus	   the	  proportion	  of	  capital	  markets	  to	  GDP	  comprises	  the	  sixth	  causal	  condition.	   	  A	  final,	  seventh,	  condition	  considers	  that	  regulation	  by	  other	  countries	   in	  the	  group	  of	  ten	  
 61 
will	  have	  a	  cumulative	  influence	  regulation	  in	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  not	  yet	  regulated	  a	  given	   corporate	   governance	   practice.	   	   Details	   of	   each	   of	   these	   causal	   conditions	  follow.	  	  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Condition	  2:	  Voluntary	  Adoption	  of	  Practices	  by	  Firms	  The	  second	  causal	  condition	  is	  the	  prevalence	  of	  firms’	  adoption	  of	  the	  target	  practices.	  	  I	  consider	  the	  adoption	  voluntary	  when	  it	  is	  coterminous	  with	  absence	  of	  regulation	   in	   a	   given	   year.	   	   Once	   the	   same	   practice	   becomes	   regulated,	   adoption	  implies	   compliance.	   	   Why	   measure	   corporate	   disclosures?	   	   “If	   the	   purpose	   of	  information	  disclosure	   is	   to	   change	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   firm	  by	  making	  managers	  more	   aware	   of	   and	   concerned	   about	   their	   organization’s	   social	   outputs,	   then	   we	  would	   consider	   information	   disclosure	   rules	   to	   be	   elementary	   forms	   of	  management-­‐based	  [self-­‐]regulation”	  (Coglianese	  &	  Lazer	  2003:	  695).	  	  I	  assume	  that	  the	   firms	   voluntarily	   disclose	   their	   practices	   in	   response	   to	   shareholder	   demand,	  although	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   firms	   disclose	   their	   governance	   practices	   for	   other	  audiences.	   	   Lack	  of	  data	  on	   shareholders	   for	  many	  of	   the	   companies	  precludes	  an	  explanation	  of	  alternative	  incentives	  for	  voluntarily	  disclosure	  prior	  to	  regulation.	  Annual	  reports	  and	  shareholder	  proxy	  statements	  evince	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  focal	  corporate	  governance	  in	  the	  target	  countries	  before	  and	  after	  any	  regulation.	  	  The	  Mergent	   database,	   available	   online	   and	   at	   the	   Service	   and	   Industry	   Business	  Library	  branch	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Public	  Library,	  is	  a	  depository	  of	  annual	  reports	  that	  provides	   the	   requisite	   company	   data	   in	   all	   countries	   save	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Canada.	   	   The	   primary	   source	   of	   evidence	   of	   practice	   adoption	   for	   Canadian	  companies	   is	   the	   proxy	   circular	   available	   online	   at	   the	   Canadian	   government’s	  SEDAR	   database.	   	   The	   counterpart	   to	   the	   proxy	   circulars	   among	   American	  companies	  is	  the	  definitive	  proxy	  statement	  (DEF	  14A)	  available	  online	  at	  the	  SEC’s	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Edgar	   service.	   	   Proxy	   statements	   in	  Canada	   and	   the	  US	  provide	  more	   information	  related	  to	  corporate	  governance	  than	  annual	  reports,	  which	  are	  used	  here	  only	  as	  a	  secondary	  data	  source.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  same	  list	  of	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  in	  Table	  2.1,	  I	  research	  companies’	  annual	  reports	  and	  proxy	  statements	  for	  disclosure	  of	   adoption	   of	   any	   of	   the	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   in	   each	   year	   from	   the	  earliest	  available	  year	  to	  the	  latest.	  	  	  The	   Mergent	   database,	   SEDAR	   and	   SEC	   Edgar	   have	   overwhelmingly	   little	  available	   data	   prior	   to	   1997.	   	   At	   least	   70.8%	   of	   the	   company’s	   data	   is	  missing	   in	  1996,	   at	   least	   83.3%	   in	  1995,	   and	   at	   least	   84.5%	   in	  1994,	   depending	  on	   the	   focal	  practice.	   	  This	  portion	  of	  missing	  data	   in	  earlier	  years	   increases	  to	  99.0%	  in	  1989.	  	  In	  1997,	  however,	  the	  portion	  of	  missing	  data	  decreases	  to	  43.0%,	  and	  to	  14.8%	  by	  2008.	   	   Therefore	   I	   calibrate	   fuzzy	   set	   scores	   of	   for	   every	   country	   in	   each	   year	  between	  1997	  and	  2008	  inclusive.	  	  I	  turn	  to	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  each	  focal	  practice	  specifically.	  	  
Specialized	  Board	  Committees	  I	   code	   the	   presence	   of	   specialized	   board	   committees,	   e.g.,	   remuneration,	  nomination,	  audit,	  etc.,	  when	  the	  company’s	  board	  has	  at	  least	  one	  such	  committee	  and	   this	   presence	   is	   explicitly	   stated	   in	   the	   published	   reports.	   	   The	   word	  “committee”	   is	   often	  used	   to	  describe	   any	  of	   specialized,	   functional	   groups	  within	  Chinese,	   Japanese,	   and	  Korean	   companies,	   including	   even	  external	  parties	   such	   as	  the	  Corporate	  Accounting	  Standards	  Committee	   in	   Japan.	   	   	  These	  companies	  often	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have	   executive	   and	   supervisory	   committees,	   which	   is	   synonymous	   with	   the	  executive	  members	  of	   the	  board	  and	  directors	   in	  companies	   from	  other	  countries.	  	  These	   are	  not	   the	   specialized	   committees	   sought	  within	   boards	   and	   are	   therefore	  not	   counted	   as	   such.	   	  What	   is	   counted	   as	   a	   specialized	   committee	   among	  Chinese	  companies	   are	   the	   usual	   audit	   (审计 ,	   shěnjì)	   or	   examination	   (审核 ,	   shěnhé),	  nomination	   (提名,	   tímíng),	   risk	   (风险,	   fēngxiǎn),	   or	   remuneration	   (薪酬,	   xīnchóu)	  committees24 .	   	   Further,	   Japanese	   boards	   sometimes	   have	   what	   is	   referred	   to	  occasionally	   as	   the	   “director	   evaluation	   committee”,	   which	   combines	   functions	   of	  the	   remuneration	   and	   nomination	   committee.	   	   The	   presence	   of	   a	   compliance	  committee	   by	   itself	   did	   not	   constitute	   a	   board	   committee	   among	   Japanese	  companies.	   	   As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   Japanese	   companies	   also	   met	   changes	   to	  corporate	  law	  in	  the	  early	  half	  of	  the	  decade	  that	  allowed	  them	  to	  choose	  between	  a	  traditional	   corporate	   structure	   void	   of	   Western	   style	   boards	   with	   specialized	  committees	  and	  one	  with	  such	  boards.	  	  
Director	  Independence	  In	   all	   countries,	   companies	   may	   actually	   have	   independent	   directors	   but	  unless	  this	  fact	  is	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  published	  documents,	  I	  do	  not	  count	  them	  as	  having	   independent	  directors.	   	   I	  also	  code	  as	  1	  those	  companies	  that	  acknowledge	  that	   their	   board	   members	   are	   not	   independent,	   or	   that	   the	   majority	   is	   not	  independent,	   so	   long	   as	   they	   disclose	   director	   independence	   criteria,	   and	   their	  
                                                24	  When	   remuneration	   is	   referred	   to	   in	   accounting	   items,	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   board	  committee	  name,	  it	  is	  often	  replaced	  by	  (报酬,	  bàochou).	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compliance	  or	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  such	  criteria.	  	  The	  coding	  is	  not	  an	  assessment	  of	  each	  board’s	  level	  of	  director	  independence	  per	  se,	  rather	  a	  measure	  of	  disclosure	  of	  whether	  directors	  are	  presented	  by	  the	  board	  as	  independent	  at	  all.	  Corporate	   practices	   are	   possibly	   identical,	   or	   functionally	   equivalent,	   to	  independence	   criteria,	   but	   unless	   these	   are	   disclosed	   under	   the	   specific	   rubric	   of	  director	  independence,	  they	  are	  not	  counted.	  	  I	  also	  count	  members	  as	  independent	  if	   they	   are	   noted	   as	   “outside”	   or	   “external”	   such	   as	   in	   some	   Korean	   companies	  (externe	  or	  unabhängig	   in	  German	  companies)	  versus	   “independent”	   (独立,	  dúlì	   in	  Chinese	  companies).	  	  In	  Korean	  companies,	  there	  are	  external	  directors	  (사외이사,	  saoeisa)	  coded	  
as	  0	  and	  independent	  external	  directors	  (독립	  사외이사,	  dongnip	  saoeisa)	  coded	  as	  
1.	   	  British	  and	  Indian	  boards	  include	  executive	  and	  non-­‐executive	  board	  members,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  independent.	  	  Chinese	  companies	  began	  following	  this	  format	  as	  well.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  types	  of	  directors,	  there	  are	  also	  supervisors	  from	  the	  board’s	   supervisory	   committee,	   which	   includes	   executives	   (typically	   those	   just	  below	   the	   level	   president	   and	  vice-­‐president	   of	   the	   company),	   like	   those	   found	   in	  the	  executive	  committee	  of	   the	  tow-­‐tiered	  board	  structures	  of	  French	  and	  German	  companies.	   	   Canadian	   companies	   sometimes	   have	   an	   independent	   lead	   director,	  synonymous	  with	  the	  senior	  independent	  director	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Often	   before	   2002	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   many	   companies	   had	   shareholder	  proposals	   reported	   in	   the	   proxy	   statements	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   director	  independence	  criteria.	   	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  boards	  often	  recommended	  against	  this	  
 68 
shareholder	  proposal.	  	  The	  code	  is	  still	  0	  for	  a	  proposal;	  only	  once	  the	  board	  actually	  adopts	  and	  discloses	  director	  independence	  criteria	  does	  it	  earn	  the	  code	  of	  1.	   	  US	  companies	   would	   also	   be	   coded	   as	   1	   for	   director	   independence	   if	   even	   only	   one	  specialized	   committee	   of	   the	   board	   were	   composed,	   entirely	   or	   partially,	   of	  independent	   directors.	   	   The	   question	   for	   this	   practice	   across	   countries	   was	  regardless	  of	  majority	   independent	  directors,	  but	   that	   independent	  directors	  were	  even	  present	  on	  the	  boards	  at	  all.	  	  	  
	  
Auditor	  Independence	  	   In	   Australia,	   an	   “Independence	   Declaration”	   appears	   occasionally,	   which	  clearly	   defines	   companies’	   compliance	  with	   auditor	   independence	   criteria.	   	   I	   also	  code	   companies	   as	   having	   an	   independent	   auditor	   even	   without	   a	   similar	  declaration	  so	  long	  as	  clear	  mention	  of	  “independent”	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  auditor	  is	   provided.	   	   Some	   French	   annual	   reports’	   translations	   indicate	   the	   “independent	  auditors”	  (commissaires	  aux	  comptes)	  reports,	  but	  in	  the	  original	  French,	  there	  is	  no	  mention	   of	   independence	   whatsoever,	   much	   less	   a	   definition	   of	   independence	   or	  any	   criteria	   in	   either	   the	   original	   French	   or	   English	   translation.	   	   More	   often,	  however,	   these	  were	   referred	   to	   as	   “statutory”	   or	   “external”	   auditors.	   	   In	  German	  companies’	  reports,	   these	  auditors	  (Abschlussprüfers)	  are	  almost	  always	  translated	  as	   “independent	   auditors”	   in	   English	   even	   though	   no	   reference	   is	   made	   in	   the	  original	  German	  to	  any	  independence	  criteria.	  Japanese	   companies	   include	   independent	   auditors	   among	   their	   statutory	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auditors.	   	   These	   “corporate	   auditors”	   attend	   board	  meetings	   and	   report	   on	  more	  than	  just	  accounting	  matters.	  	  The	  task	  of	  auditing	  in	  the	  accounting	  sense	  is	  left	  to	  both	  internal	  auditors	  and	  the	  external,	  or	  “independent”	  auditors,	  which	  are	  widely	  labeled	  as	  such	  without	  any	  attendant	  criteria	  and	  hence,	  coded	  as	  0.	  	  	  In	  Korea	  (double	  check	  coding):	  independent,	  or	  external,	  auditor	  (외부감사,	  
oebugamsa).	   	   In	   China,	   occasionally	   the	   English	   versions	   of	   annual	   reports	   omit	  reference	   to	   auditor	   independence,	   in	  which	   case	   the	  Chinese	  original	   prevails.	   In	  the	   United	   Kingdom,	   around	   the	   year	   2000	   reference	   in	   the	   auditor’s	   report	   of	  companies’	   annual	   reports	   mention	   the	   following:	   “Our	   responsibilities,	   as	  independent	   auditors,	   are	   established	   by	   statute,	   the	   Accounting	   Practices	   Board,	  the	   Listing	   Rules	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange,	   and	   by	   our	   profession’s	   ethical	  guidance.”	  	  This	  mention	  does	  earn	  the	  auditors	  “independence”	  (coded	  as	  1),	  even	  though	  the	  company	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  “independent	  auditors”	  in	  that	  year’s	  annual	   report.	   	   	   What	   does	   not	   earn	   the	   value	   of	   1	   is	   a	   self-­‐declaration	   of	   an	  independent	   opinion	   in	   their	   audit	   of	   the	   firm,	   with	   no	   other	   mention	   of	   the	  auditor’s	   independence,	   for	   example:	   “It	   is	   our	   responsibility	   to	   form	   an	  independent	   opinion,	   based	   on	   our	   audit,	   on	   those	   financial	   statements	   and	   to	  report	  our	  opinion	  to	  you.”	   	  Appendix	  A	  contains	  additional	  precisions	  on	  the	  data	  collection	  and	  coding	  process	  for	  the	  aforementioned	  practices	  and	  others.	  Once	   I	   coded	   every	   company’s	   adopted	   practices	   by	   year,	   I	   generated	   a	  cumulative	   total,	   by	   country	   and	   year,	   of	   firms	   that	   have	   adopted	   each	   practice.	  	  These	   cumulative	   totals	   are	   then	   recalculated	   as	   interval-­‐scale	   variables	   before	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.	   	   The	   maximum	   ambiguity	   point,	   or	   crossover	   point,	   is	   calculated	   by	  
halving	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  firms	  available	  in	  each	  country	  and	  year	  between	  1997	  and	  2008	  inclusive25.	   	   In	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  threshold	  values	  for	  each	  full	  membership	   and	   full	   non-­‐membership,	   or	   anchors,	   for	   each	   country’s	   yearly	  cumulative	  total	  of	  firm	  adoptions,	  I	  use	  the	  25th	  and	  75th	  percentiles	  for	  the	  low	  and	  high	   anchors	   respectively26.	   	   The	   natural	   cross-­‐over	   point	   into	   set	  membership	   is	  0.50.	  	  Figure	  2.3	  indicates	  plots	  of	  firms’	  cumulative	  adoption	  of	  each	  practice	  from	  1997	   to	   2008,	   aggregated	   by	   home	   country,	   and	   their	   corresponding	   fuzzy	   set	  scores.	  
	   	  
                                                25	  Firms	  with	   non-­‐missing	   data	   for	   governance	   practices,	   as	   a	   proportion	   to	   total	  listed	   firms	   per	   country,	   are	   as	   follows:	   Australia	   90/97;	   Canada	   116/117;	   China	  33/36;	  France:	  44/48;	  Germany	  65/66;	  India	  84/121;	  Japan	  350/355;	  Korea	  66/93;	  United	   Kingdom	   137/139;	   United	   States	   317/338.	   	   Cumulative	   totals	   of	   firms	  adopting	   each	   practice,	   and	   their	   corresponding	   fuzzy	   set	   scores,	  were	   calculated	  including	  the	  firms	  with	  missing	  practice	  data.	  	  26	  This	  simple	   interval-­‐scale	  method	  of	  calibrating	   fuzzy	  set	  scores	   is	  preferable	   to	  the	  alternative,	  “indirect	  method”	  for	  determining	  set	  anchors,	  which	  would	  require	  the	  intermediary	  step	  of	  categorizing	  the	  prevalence	  of	  adoption	  rates	  by	  grades	  of	  membership.	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Figure	  2.3	  	  Voluntary	  Practice	  Prevalence	  and	  Fuzzy	  Set	  Scores	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region;	  those	  points	  producing	  a	  flat	  line	  near	  the	  top	  represent	  full	  membership	  in	  the	  set	  of	  companies	  adopting	  the	  respective	  governance	  practices.	  	  
Condition	  3:	  Corporate	  Governance	  Scandals	  “Disasters	  and	  scandals	  of	  one	  kind	  or	  another	  routinely	  call	  forth	  responses	  which	  emphasize	  more	  prescriptive	  rules,	  more	  powerful	  regulatory	  authorities	  and	  related	  features”	  (Scott	  2004:	  166).	  	  “Changes	  in	  rules	  often	  follow	  the	  accumulation	  of	  ‘deviant’	  behavior,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  bringing	  formal	  rules	  or	  legal	  regimes	  back	  into	  alignment	   with	   behavior”	   (Streeck	   and	   Thelen	   2005:	   15-­‐16).	   	   The	   OECD	   also	  analyzes	   the	   event	   of	   crises	   in	   its	   assessments	   of	   the	   Principles:	   “Analysis	   of	   past	  crises	   and	   corporate	   collapses/scandals	   will	   also	   be	   necessary	   so	   as	   to	   allow	   the	  reviewer	  to	  understand	  the	  realpolitik	  of	  companies	  in	  a	  jurisdiction”	  (OECD	  2006:	  11).	   “Governance	   scandals	   in	   particular	   provide	   opportunities	   when	   the	  seams	  come	  apart,	  allowing	  for	  regimes	  to	  be	  criticized	  and	  changed.	  	  As	   such,	   the	   study	   of	   such	   scandals,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   are	  managed	   by	   corporations	   and	   regulators,	   as	   well	   as	   how	   they	   are	  framed	  and	  used	  for	  mobilization	  by	  various	  interest	  groups,	  such	  as	  activist	  investors,	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  institutional	  theory	  and	  provide	   fertile	   ground	   for	   future	   research.	   	   Such	   an	   approach	  might	  eventually	  offer	  a	  more	  systematic	   framework	  of	   the	  conditions	   that	  lead	   to	   relatively	   strongly	   institutionalized	   versus	   less	   strongly	  institutionalized	  models	  of	  corporate	  governance”	  (Fiss	  2008:	  402).	  	  	  
 With	   these	   motivations	   in	   mind,	   I	   develop	   a	   third	   causal	   condition	  comprising	   firm-­‐specific,	   corporate	   governance	   scandals.	   	   These	   scandals	   are	  operationalized	  as	  cumulative,	  binary	  events	  in	  the	  period	  between	  1989	  and	  2008	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inclusive.	  	  I	  used	  two	  news	  sources	  to	  identify	  corporate	  scandals	  related	  to	  the	  focal	  practices.	  	  In	  LexisNexis	  Academic,	  I	  searched	  within	  the	  fields	  “US	  and	  major	  world	  publications”	   during	   the	   past	   twenty	   years	   for	   each	   country	   using	   the	   following	  search	   terms:	   company	  OR	  corporat!	  w/s	  scandal	  OR	   fraud	  OR	  scam;	  and/or	  each	  stock	  w/1	  market	  OR	  stock	  w/1	  exchange	  (ASX	  or	  Sydney,	  TSX	  or	  Toronto,	  Shanghai	  Securities	   and/or	   Stock	   Exchange,	   NYSE	   Euronext	   Paris	   and	   NYSE	   Euronext	   New	  York,	   Deutsche	   Börse/Frankfurter	   Wertpapierbörse,	   Bombay	   Stock	   Exchange,	  Tokyo	   Stock	   Eechange,	   KOSPI	   and	   Korea	   Exchange,	   London	   Stock	   Eexchange).	  	  Search	  terms	  also	  contained	  the	  relevant	  corporate	  governance	  practices:	  board	  w/s	  committee;	   board	   w/1	   independen!;	   	   director	   pre/3	   independen!;	   manager	   OR	  executive	   w/3	   compensation	   OR	   remuneration;	   manager	   OR	   executive	   w/s	  compensation	  AND	  share	  OR	  equity;	  manager	  OR	  executive	  AND	  stock	  w/1	  option!;	  auditor	  w/s	  independen!;	  auditor	  w/s	  fee;	  corporate	  w/1	  governance.	  I	   also	   used	   Factiva	   using	   the	   following	   search	   terms:	   scandal	   OR	   fraud	   OR	  scam	  between	  January	  1,	  1989	  and	  December	  31,	  2008	  using	  the	  following	  criteria	  from	   the	   database’s	   pull-­‐down	   menus	   of	   search	   criteria:	   all	   [news]	   sources,	   all	  companies,	   all	   industries;	   subject:	   Corporate	   Crime/Legal/Judicial	   Or	   Corporate	  Actions	  Or	  Corporate	  Governance/Investor	  Relations	  Or	  Executive	  Pay	  Or	  Directors	  Dealings	   Or	   Ownership	   Changes	   Or	   Regulation/Government	   Policy.	   I	   restrict	   the	  search	   by	   country	   (stock	   exchange	   restriction	   for	   search	   not	   available).	   	   Foreign	  language	  articles	  are	  highly	  limited	  in	  Factiva	  including	  mostly	  recent	  (as	  of	  2008)	  additions,	  and	  did	  not	  return	  any	  related	  articles	  in	  my	  search.	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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  search	  is	  to	  identify	  actual	  companies	  and	  the	  associated	  scandals	  as	  reported	  by	  major	  media.	  I	  disregarded	  news	  stories	  that	  focus	  only	  on	  investigations	  or	  probes	  by	  regulatory	  agencies	  where	  any	  corporate	  malfeasance	  is	  speculative.	   	   Such	   speculation,	   or	   relinquished	   accusations	   or	   charges,	   do	   not	  constitute	  actual	  scandal.	  	  Of	  course,	  one	  scandal	  is	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  next	  in	  terms	  of	  damages	  or	  severity.	   	  For	   lack	  of	  a	  common	  metric,	   I	  used	  the	  number	  of	  reported	  scandals	  in	  each	  country	  per	  year	  related	  to	  the	  focal	  practices27.	  	  From	   a	   preliminary	   list	   of	   111	   corporate	   scandals,	   I	   then	   returned	   to	  LexisNexis	  Academic	   to	   research	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   scandal.	   	   Search	  criteria	  within	  this	  database	  included	  Major	  US	  and	  World	  Publications,	  Major	  World	  Publications-­‐non-­‐English,	   TV	   and	   Radio	   Broadcast	   Transcripts,	   Newswire	   Services,	   Web	  Publications,	   and	   the	  Company	   sources	   file	   (which	  has	   eighteen	   sources	   including	  Hoover’s,	  Morningstar,	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s,	  and	  Worldscope)	  during	  the	  past	  twenty	  years.	   	   Search	   terms	   included	   the	   company	  name,	   home	   country	   and	   “scandal”	   or	  “fraud”	  or	  “scam”	  to	  return	  the	  largest	  possible	  results	  without	  bias	  to	  reporting	  on	  the	  term	  “corporate	  governance.”	  	  This	  permitted	  greater	  scrutiny	  of	  each	  company.	  	  	  Although	   I	   initially	   conducted	   the	   search	   using	   terms	   in	   English	   only,	  LexisNexis	   does	   offer	   foreign	   language	   searches	   in	   select	   foreign	   languages.	   	   A	  secondary	  search	  for	  scandals	  in	  French	  and	  German	  –	  the	  only	  other	  two	  languages	  represented	  by	   the	  selected	  countries	  –	   revealed	  no	  additional	   corporate	   scandals	  than	  those	  I	  uncovered	  in	  the	  English-­‐only	  search.	  	  Underreporting	  of	  scandals	  from	  
                                                27	  This	   does	  measure,	   of	   course,	   severity	   of	   each	   scandal	   relative	   to	   an	   individual	  company	  or	  country.	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other	   non-­‐Anglophone	   countries,	   namely	   China,	   Japan	   and	   Korea,	   is	   a	   possibility;	  however,	  given	  that	  the	  focal	  companies	  are	  among	  the	  largest	  listed	  companies	  in	  the	   world,	   many	   with	   listings	   and	   significant	   operations	   beyond	   their	   home	  jurisdictions,	   and	   that	   English	   is	   the	   lingua	   franca	   of	   business,	   the	   likelihood	   of	  underreporting	   of	   corporate	   governance	   scandals	   by	   the	  major	   international	   and	  local	  news	  sources	  captured	  in	  the	  LexisNexis	  search,	  is	  reasonably	  scant.	  	  The	  final	  list	   of	   97	   corporate	   governance	   scandals	   I	   consider	   in	   the	   analysis	   as	   a	   causal	  condition	  for	  regulation	  appear	  in	  Table	  2.528.	  	  All	  countries	  but	  Korea	  have	  at	  least	  one	  scandal	  over	  the	  time	  period.	  I	   then	   calculate	   the	   cumulative	   sum	   of	   scandals	   per	   practice	   and	   country.	  	  Scandals	   for	  the	  outcome	  of	  general	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure	  aggregate	  all	  scandals	  from	  other	  practices.	  	  Fuzzy	  set	  scores	  are	  then	  calculated	  by	  first	  ranking	  all	   countries’	   cumulative	   scandals	   per	   practice,	   then	   standardizing	   the	   ranked	  values.	  	  Hence	  fuzzy	  set	  scores	  per	  frequency	  are	  static	  across	  countries	  as	  indicated	  in	  Table	  2.6.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  scores	  for	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  scandals	  are	  the	  same	  in	  all	  countries.	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Figure	  2.4	  shows	  plots	  of	   the	  fuzzy	  set	  scores	  per	  total	  number	  of	  companies	  with	  each	  type	  of	  scandal.	  	  The	  audit	  fee	  and	  non-­‐audit	  fee	  practices	  exhibit	  clear	  binary	  categorization	  while	  all	  other	  practices	  exhibit	  the	  expected	  curvilinear	  relationship	  between	  cumulative	  total	  scandals	  and	  their	  corresponding	  fuzzy	  set	  scores.	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to	  the	  following	  categories:	  extreme-­‐left;	   left,	  center-­‐left,	  center,	  center-­‐right,	  right,	  extreme-­‐right.	  	  	  Accordingly	  all	  parties	  left-­‐of-­‐center	  are	  coded	  1	  for	  left	  and	  all	  right	  of	  center	  parties,	  and	  center,	  are	  coded	  as	  0.	   	  This	  somewhat	  crude	  categorization	  allows	   testing	   whether	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   are	   required	   to	   legislate,	   and	   by	  extension,	  regulate,	  a	  given	  governance	  practice.	  	  The	  PARline	  database	  provides	   the	  number	  of	   seats	  and	  vacancies	  by	  main	  political	  parties,	  independent	  parties,	  other	  (especially	  regional	  ones),	  in	  initial	  and	  final	  electoral	  rounds,	  where	  applicable.	   	   I	  consider	  the	  full	  year	  for	  once	  the	  seats	  are	  occupied	  post-­‐election	  and	  consider	  the	  election	  year	  versus	  year	  of	  office.	  	  Data	  limitations	   preclude	   accounting	   for	   any	   resignations	   prior	   to	   next	   elections	   or	  appointments.	  	  One	  limitation	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  parties	  vote	  according	  to	  supposed	  ideology.	   	   Although	   these	   parties	   might	   diverge	   on	   their	   approaches	   to	   civil	   and	  social	  policies,	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  generally	  left	  parties	  will	  adopt	  a	  more	  statist,	  regulatory	  approach	  to	  governing	  economic	  activity.	  	  Another	  potential	  limitation	  is	  the	  comparison	  of	  legislatures	  across	  different	  political	  systems.	   	  China	  is	  the	  clear	  exception	  to	  the	  others	  in	  being	  the	  sole	  non-­‐democratic	  country.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  include	  its	  legislature,	  code	  1	  for	  left-­‐leaning	  in	  all	  years,	  due	  to	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  in	  its	  legislature.	  	  In	  all	  countries,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  executive	  for	  those	  countries	  that	  have	  these	  as	  a	  separate	  branch	  of	  political	   power.	   	   Heads	   of	   state	   vary	   widely	   in	   function	   and	   ability	   to	   co-­‐opt	  regulation.	   	   Likewise	   I	   do	   not	   include	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judiciary	   in	   a	   review	   of	   the	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regulation	   in	  the	  coding	  of	   this	  condition.	   	  The	  focus	  here	   is	   the	   legislature	  and	  its	  likelihood	  to	  regulate,	  political	  leaning	  being	  a	  hypothetical	  condition.	  Distributions	   of	   political	   parties	   are	   calculated	   as	   percentages	   of	   each	  chamber	  of	  a	  given	  legislature.	  	  China	  and	  Korea	  have	  unicameral	  legislatures.	  	  The	  remaining	  eight	  countries	  have	  bicameral	  legislatures,	  however,	  not	  all	  are	  equal	  in	  political	  representation	  or	  legislative	  power.	  	  Three	  parliamentary	  systems,	  Canada,	  India	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  follow	  this	  pattern.	   	  Canada’s	  House	  of	  Commons	  is	  the	   primary	   legislative	   chamber	   whereas	   its	   Senate	   is	   not	   directly	   elected	   nor	  deliberates	  on	  bills.	   	  India’s	  and	  Germany’s	  legislatures	  follow	  similar	  patterns.	  For	  these	  countries,	  I	  calculate	  the	  percentage	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  political	  parties	  from	  their	  respective	  primary	  chambers	  only.	   	  For	  all	  others,	   i.e.	  Australia,	  France,	   Japan	  and	  the	   United	   States,	   I	   calculate	   the	   total	   of	   left-­‐leaning	   parties	   per	   chamber	   and	  average	  the	  two.	  	  	  Appendix	  B	  includes	  these	  legislatures	  by	  their	  chambers’	  official	  names.	  A	  notable	  challenge	  is	  the	  comparison	  of	  legislatures	  across	  different	  political	  systems.	   	   China	   is	   the	   clear	   exception	   to	   the	   nine	   others	   in	   being	   the	   sole	   non-­‐democratic	   country29.	   	   I	   do	   not	   consider	   the	   influence	   of	   an	   executive	   branch	   of	  government	   for	   those	   countries	   that	   have	   one	   because	   such	   heads	   of	   state	   vary	  widely	   in	   function	   and	   ability	   to	   influence	   legislation	   and	   to	   enact	   regulation	  unilaterally	   or	   authorize	   regulatory	   agencies	   to	   do	   so	   with	   just	   the	   minimum	  enabling	  legislation.	  	  For	  similar	  reasons,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  	  
                                                29	  China	  is	  also	  exceptional	  whereby	  its	  communists	  might	  behave	  as	  capitalists.	   	   I	  revisit	  this	  initial	  coding	  scheme	  for	  China	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	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The	  focus	  here	  is	  the	  legislature	  and	  its	  likelihood	  to	  regulate,	  political	  leaning	  being	  a	  hypothetical	  condition.	  	  See	  Figure	  2.5	  for	  the	  synopsis	  of	  left-­‐right	  legislatures	  per	  country	  for	  the	  years	  1990	  to	  200830.	  
Figure	  2.5	  
 Crisp	  set	  scores	  take	  the	  value	  of	  1	  when	  the	  yearly	  legislature	  is	  majority	  left,	  i.e.	  >0.50,	  and	  0	  otherwise.	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Condition	  5:	  Ties	  between	  Countries’	  Primary	  Stock	  Exchanges	  Another	   condition	   turns	   to	   the	   network	   of	   stock	   exchanges	   on	   which	   the	  selected	  companies	  are	  listed	  and	  cross-­‐listed.	  	  Although	  much	  research	  has	  already	  demonstrated	   the	   influence	   of	   board	   interlocks	   and	   cross-­‐listings,	   this	   condition	  focuses	   instead	   on	   the	   direct	   ties	   between	   stock	   exchanges	   as	   an	   influence	   on	  regulation.	  	  Thomson	  ONE	  Banker	  provides	  the	  list	  of	  all	  stock	  exchanges	  on	  which	  the	  selected	  companies	  are	  listed;	  however,	  the	  data	  are	  not	  time-­‐series.	   	  Although	  panel	  data	  on	  exactly	  which	  exchanges	   the	   companies	  were	   listed	  would	  be	   ideal,	  the	  latest	  year,	  i.e.	  2008,	  of	  data	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  useful	  proxy	  to	  test	  for	  the	  impact	  of	   ties	   between	   the	   exchanges	   on	   their	   home	   countries’	   regulation	   for	   the	   entire	  time	   period.	   	   I	   also	   ensured	   that	   only	   the	   years	   for	   which	   a	   firm’s	   market	  capitalization	  data	  were	  also	  available	  matched	  the	  years	  in	  which	  I	  considered	  its	  listing	  on	  multiple	  exchanges.	  	  	  	   I	  tabulate	  the	  total	  number	  of	  exchanges	  on	  which	  each	  company	  has	  a	  share	  listing,	   then	   aggregate	   the	   company	   totals	   by	  home	   country,	   as	   indicated	   in	  Table	  2.7.	  	  This	  aggregate	  indicates	  the	  number	  of	  companies	  listed	  on	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  other	  exchanges	  among	  the	  focal	  countries.	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Chinese	  and	  Korean	   companies	   in	   the	   selection	  do	  not	  have	   listings	  on	  any	  of	   the	  other	   exchanges	   of	   the	   focal	   countries,	   although	   the	   former	   typically	   have	   dual	  listings	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  Indian	  companies	  from	  this	  selection	  are	  also	  grossly	  lacking	  in	  cross-­‐listings	  on	  the	  exchanges	  of	  the	  focal	  countries,	  or	  others.	  	  Fuzzy	  scores	  are	  calculated	  using	  the	  standardization	  of	  the	  ranked	  values.	   	  Figure	  2.6	   indicates	  the	  plots	   of	   the	   ties	   between	   each	   of	   the	   primary	   stock	   exchanges	   and	   their	  corresponding	  fuzzy	  scores.	  	  
Figure	  2.6	  
Fuzzy	  Set	  Scores	  of	  Stock	  Exchange	  Ties	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Condition	  6:	  Size	  of	  Capital	  Markets	  in	  National	  Economy	  Variation	  in	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  across	  countries	  is	  a	  function	  of	  capital	  market	  development	  and	  independent	  accounting	  (Blair	  2003).	  	  The	  growth	  of	   stock	   market	   influence	   on	   corporate	   governance	   arrangements	   varies	   across	  countries,	  even	  non-­‐liberal	  (in	  the	  economic	  sense)	  ones	  (O’Sullivan	  2003).	  	  Capital	  market	  development	   thus	   forms	   the	  seventh	  causal	  condition.	   	  One	  metric	  of	   such	  development	  within	  countries	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  ratio	  of	  stock	  market	  capitalization	  to	  bank	   deposits	   (Hall	   and	   Soskice	   2001).	   	   Dispersed	   ownership	   of	   equity	   versus	  concentrated	   ownership	   is	   another	   metric,	   whereby	   “’strong’	   regulation	   permits	  ‘weak’	  owners,	  while	   ‘weak’	  regulation	  necessitates	   ‘strong’	  owners”	  (Coffee	  1999:	  648).	   	   The	   metric	   of	   capital	   market	   development	   relative	   to	   national	   economy	  already	   features	   as	   part	   of	   the	   case	   selection.	   	   The	   World	   Bank	   Development	  Indicators	  provides	  time-­‐series	  ratios	  of	  stock	  markets	  to	  GDP	  for	  all	  ten	  countries.	  	  I	   employ	   this	   metric	   again	   as	   a	   causal	   condition	   to	   test	   the	   hypothesis	   that	  companies	  with	  larger	  capital	  markets	  relative	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  regulate	  corporate	  governance	  practices31.	  	  	  I	   first	   calculate	   the	   cumulative	   moving	   average	   of	   each	   country’s	   ratio	   of	  stock	  markets	  to	  GDP	  starting	  in	  1989.	  	  I	  then	  transform	  these	  values	  into	  fuzzy	  sets,	  using	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  standardized	  rank	  method.	  	  Figure	  2.7	  displays	  each	  
                                                
31 This	  is	  not	  analogous	  to	  “sampling	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable.”	  	  See	  Ragin	  (2009),	  Ragin	  (2000),	  Mahoney	  and	  Goertz	  (2006)	  for	  an	  elaboration	  on	  this	  conundrum	  in	  multivariate	  regression	  and	  its	  inapplicability	  in	  set	  relations	  and	  QCA. 
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country’s	   membership	   in	   the	   set	   of	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets	   against	   its	  cumulative	  moving	  average	  of	  stock	  market	  capitalization	  to	  GDP.	  
Figure	  2.7	  
Fuzzy	  Set	  Scores	  of	  Highly	  Developed	  Capital	  Markets	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Results	  of	  Qualitative	  Comparative	  Analysis	  	  
3.1	  	  	  Introduction	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   demonstrate	   key	   configurations	   of	   causal	   conditions—paths—related	   to	   the	   regulation	   of	   previously	   voluntary	   corporate	   governance	  practices.	   	   I	   first	   discuss	   the	   combination	   of	   conditions,	   how	   I	   handle	   temporality	  and	   sequence	   of	   conditions	   and	   outcome	   for	   each	   governance	   practice,	   and	  introduce	  issues	  of	  consistency	  and	  coverage.	  	  Next	  I	  present	  the	  results	  of	  the	  fsQCA	  as	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   for	   each	   focal	   governance	   practice.	   	   I	   conclude	   by	  presenting	   a	   composite	   view	  of	   the	   causal	   paths	  by	   country-­‐cases	   and	   summarize	  country-­‐level	  regulation	  of	  these	  practices.	  	  The	  outcome	  is	  the	  regulation,	  coded	  in	  a	  multi-­‐value	  scheme	  as	  0,	  0.25,	  0.75	  or	   1,	   as	   described	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   	   The	   conditions	   used	   in	   the	   fsQCA	   to	   determine	  causal	   paths	   to	   regulation	   of	   each	   of	   the	   focal	   corporate	   governance	   practices,	   as	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	  are	  as	   indicated	   in	  Table	  3.1.	   	  These	  conditions	  are	   per	   country-­‐case	   or,	   for	   firm-­‐level	   behavior,	   i.e.	   voluntary	   practice,	   corporate	  scandals,	  and	  exchange	  ties,	  aggregated	  at	  the	  country-­‐level.	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Not	  all	   seven	  hypothetical	   conditions	  combine	   in	   causal	  paths,	  or	   “recipes”,	  for	  every	  practice32.	   	  Rather,	   I	  select	  between	  four	  and	  six	  conditions	  to	  run	  in	  the	  first	   step	   of	   the	   analysis,	   and	   three	   to	   four	   in	   the	   second	   step,	   explained	   in	  more	  detail	  below.	  	  More	  than	  six	  conditions	  do	  not	  yield	  interpretable	  solutions	  for	  such	  a	   small	   number	   of	   cases.	   	   A	   high	   number	   of	   conditions	   are	   computationally	  problematic	  as	  well,	   increasing	  the	  number	  of	   logical	  configurations	  exponentially:	  2k	  rows	  where	  two	  possible	  outcomes	  (0	  or	  1)	  for	  k	  conditions	  exist	  for	  crisp	  sets;	  or	  2k	  corners	  in	  multidimensional	  vector	  space	  for	  fuzzy	  sets,	  and	  the	  outcomes	  are	  x	  and	  1-­‐x	   (where	  x	   is	   the	  membership	   score	  between	  0	  and	  1,	  while	  1-­‐x	   represents	  negation)	  (De	  Meur	  &	  Rihoux	  2002,	  Ragin	  1987).	  	  Therefore	  I	  keep	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  six	  conditions	  modeled	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  any	  one	  corporate	  governance	  practice.	  	  Further,	   I	   do	   not	   expect	   identical	   configurations	   across	   the	   various	   governance	  practices	   to	   explain	   the	   outcome	   of	   regulation.	   	   Rather,	   diversity	   of	   paths	   is	  plausible.	  Temporality	   and	   sequence	   of	   causal	   conditions	   is	   integral	   to	   this	   analysis.	  	  The	  two	  concepts,	  however,	  are	  not	  entirely	  exchangeable.	  	  Sequence	  implies	  events	  concatenate	   over	   time	   leading	   to	   outcomes	   whereas	   temporality	   does	   not	  necessarily	   imply	   such	   sequence;	   events	   can	   occur	   in	   discreet	   time	   periods	   or	   in	  singular	   time.	   	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   a	   particular	   order	   of	   events	   is	   crucial	   to	   the	  outcome	   (Abbott	   2001,	   1995)	   especially	   when	   unanticipated	   changes	   to	   causal	  relationships	  alter	  the	  course	  of	  events	  (Mahoney	  2000,	  Sewell	  1996).	  	  Yet	  it	  is	  also	  
                                                32	  Paths	  are	  synonymous	  with	  configurations,	  or	  combinations	  of	  conditions.	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possible	   in	   policy	   reform	   to	   synthesize	   shifts	   in	   causal	   configurations	   over	   time	  (Krook	  2006).	   	   I	  handle	  the	  temporal	  dimension	  by	  directly	   including	  in	  the	  fsQCA	  configurations	   as	   they	   occur	   in	   discreet	   years.	   	   The	   tables	   in	   the	   forthcoming	  sections	   display	   the	   conditions	   per	   country-­‐case	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   regulation	  between	  1989	  and	  2008	  where	  the	  outcome	  is	  non-­‐zero,	  or	  those	  conditions	  in	  2008	  if	   the	  outcome	  equals	   zero,	  meaning	  no	   regulation	  of	   the	   focal	   practice.	   	  With	   the	  exception	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures,	  the	  values	  for	  which	  have	  already	  been	  lagged	  by	  one	  year	  as	  described	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   values	   for	   the	   causal	   conditions	  are	  cotemporaneous	  with	  the	  listed	  outcomes.	  	  The	  condition,	  PRAC,	  is	  qualified	  as	  truly	   voluntary	   when	   companies	   adopt	   the	   practice	   prior	   to	   any	   regulation	  (outcome>0.50).	  	  This	  method	  captures	  the	  fuzzy	  set	  scores	  of	  all	  conditions	  and	  the	  outcome	  at	  the	  time	  of	  regulation,	  or	  until	  time	  to	  regulate	  “runs	  out”	  in	  2008.	  	  This	  method	   also	   avoids	   artificially	   inflating	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   year	   for	   all	  configurations,	  which	  would	   ignore	   the	   time-­‐specific	   values	   of	   conditions	   and	   the	  outcome.	  	  	  To	   handle	   the	   sequential	   dimension,	   I	   incorporate	   an	   additional	   causal	  condition	  in	  the	  QCA	  minimization	  process	  as	  Ragin	  and	  Strand	  (2008)	  and	  Rihoux	  and	   Ragin	   (2009)	   suggest.	   	   I	   describe	   this	   particular	   condition,	   which	   I	   call	  cumulative	   regulation,	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   	   To	   recapitulate,	   when	   the	   number	   of	   all	  countries	   regulating	   a	  practice	   is	   greater	   than	   zero	   in	   yearj	   and	   countryi	  regulates	  that	  practice	  (outcome>0.50),	  then	  the	  condition	  equals	  1	  if	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  regulating	   is	  greater	  than	  zero	   in	  yearj-­‐1.	   	   In	   this	   instance,	  other	  countries	  regulate	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the	  same	  practice	  before	  countryi	  regulates	  it.	  	  If,	  however,	  the	  number	  of	  countries	  regulating	  equals	  zero	  in	  yearj-­‐1,	   then	  the	  condition	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  zero.	   	  In	  this	  instance,	   other	   countries	   indeed	   regulate	   the	   practice,	   but	   not	   prior	   to	   countryi.	  	  When	   countryi	   does	   not	   regulate	   the	   practice	   by	   the	   year	   2008	   (outcome<0.50),	  then	   it	  does	  not	   receive	  a	   crisp	  set	   score	  and	   is	   instead	   treated	  as	  a	   “do	  not	   care”	  configuration	   in	   the	   QCA	   minimization	   process,	   which	   includes	   it	   the	   secondary	  reduction.	  	  The	  sequential	  dimension	  of	  the	  analysis	  rests	  uniquely	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  this	  condition.	  	  “Sequence”	  is	  not	  synonymous	  with	  “paths,”	  which	  I	  refer	  here	  as	  the	  specific	  combinations	  of	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  regulation.	  The	   fsQCA	   is	   run	   in	   Stata	   11	  using	   the	   fuzzy	   program	   (Longest	   and	  Vaisey	  2008).	   	  Although	  this	  program	  differs	  from	  the	  program	  fsQCA	  program	  developed	  by	   Ragin	   and	   Davey	   (2008),	   it	   still	   provides	   requisite	   complex	   and	   parsimonious	  solutions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intermediate	  solutions	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  conduct	  additional	  statistical	  tests.	  	  	  The	  precise	  combination	  of	  conditions	  run	  in	  the	  minimizations	  was	  by	  trial	  and	  error.	   	  As	  a	  working	  rule	   for	   locating	  optimal	  configurations,	   I	   target	  any	   that	  produced	  solution	  consistency	  scores	   in	  excess	  of	  0.60.	   	  Consistency	  measures	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   the	   conditions,	   or	   configurations	   thereof,	   are	   subsets	   of	   the	  membership	  in	  the	  outcome.	   	  Coverage	  scores	  should	  be	  as	  close	  to,	  or	  equal	  to,	  1,	  which	   indicates	   a	   strong	   relationship	   between	   the	   conditions	   and	   the	   outcome.	  Ragin	   (2008,	  2006,	  2000)	   suggests	  a	   test	   for	   the	   sufficiency	  of	   configurations	  X	   in	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and	  where	  “min”	   refers	   to	   the	   lower	   of	   X	   and	   Y.	   	   This	   cutoff	   point	   for	   a	   configuration’s	  sufficiency	   is	   not	   a	   rule	   itself;	   lower	   consistency	   scores	   are	   acceptable	   but	   less	  desirable	   for	   interpretation	   of	   results.	   Stryker	   and	   Eliason	   (2009)	   argue	   that	   this	  particular	  measure	  of	  consistency	  is	  somewhat	  descriptive,	  and	  such	  cut-­‐off	  points	  might	   find	   typical	   use	   among	   researchers,	   but	   they	   are	   not	   entirely	   based	   on	  probabilistic	   causal	   relations.	   	   Remaining	   agnostic	   as	   to	   optimal	   benchmarks	   for	  consistency,	  but	  convinced	  of	  the	  need	  for	  minimal	  benchmarks,	  I	  resort	  to	  testing	  each	   configuration’s	   y-­‐consistency	   at	   the	   0.80	   level	   for	   the	   configurations	   of	   all	  practices,	   and	   whether	   these	   consistencies	   are	   significantly	   greater	   than	   their	   n-­‐consistencies	  (inclusion	  in	  the	  set	  1-­‐y),	  both	  at	  the	  0.05	  significance	  level.	  After	   calculating	   configurations’	   consistency	   with	   the	   above	   formula,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  measure	  how	  much	  coverage	  of	  the	  empirical	  cases	  is	  explained	  by	  such	  configurations	   by	   changing	   the	   denominator	   to	   yi! .	   	   Coverage	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   a	  metric	   of	   how	  much	   a	  path,	   or	   combination	  of	   conditions,	   covers	   the	   outcome.	   	  A	  path’s	  coverage	  has	  two	  components:	  raw	  and	  unique.	  	  Raw	  coverage	  indicates	  each	  path’s	   proportional	   membership	   in	   the	   outcome	   whereas	   unique	   coverage	   is	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  total	  of	  all	  paths’	  coverage	  per	  solution	  and	  the	  raw	  coverage	  of	   the	   competing	   paths,	   to	   adjust	   for	   the	   paths’	   union.	   	   Unique	   coverage	   merely	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adjusts	  the	  path’s	  coverage	  for	  overlapping	  paths	  in	  the	  solution.	  	  Total	  consistency	  and	  coverage	  scores	  refer	  to	  a	  solution,	  which	  can	  be	  composed	  of	  multiple	  paths.	  I	  provide	  the	  resulting	  configurations	  first	  as	  “complex	  solutions”	  along	  with	  those	   reduced	   according	   to	   the	   Quine-­‐McCluskey	   algorithm	   described	   in	   Ragin	  (1987),	  and	  briefly	  restated	  here	  in	  an	  example.	   	  When	  the	  configurations	  
! 
a•B •C 	  and	  
! 
a•b•C 	  are	   both	   sufficient	   to	   produce	   the	   outcome	  Y,	   they	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	  
! 
a•C .	  	  This	  follows	  Boolean	  logic	  that	  neither	  the	  presence	  nor	  absence	  of	  condition	  
B,	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  A	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  C,	  alters	  the	  outcome33.	  	  The	   first	  part	  of	   the	  minimization	  yields	  a	   “complex”	  solution,	   the	  second	  a	  “parsimonious”	   solution.	   	   The	   remainders,	   logically	   possible	   configurations	   of	  conditions	   lacking	   in	  empirical	   cases,	   are	  excluded	   from	   the	  minimization	  process	  for	  the	  complex	  solution,	  but	  included	  as	  “do	  not	  cares”	  in	  the	  reduction	  to	  produce	  the	  parsimonious	  solution.	  	  Added	  to	  the	  “do	  not	  care”	  configurations	  are	  those	  that	  I	   identify	   in	   the	   condition	   CUMR	   for	   those	   cases	   to	  which	   the	   condition	   does	   not	  apply.	   	   These	   cases	   have	   the	   condition	   noted	   as	   “dnc”,	   where	   applicable,	   in	   the	  following	   tables.	   	   Each	   configuration’s	   y-­‐consistency	   scores	   (inclusion	   in	   the	  outcome,	  Y)	   from	   the	   parsimonious	   and	   intermediate	   solutions	   are	   further	   tested	  against	   their	   inclusion	   in	   their	   “not-­‐y”	   consistency	   scores	   (1-­‐y,	   or	   negation)	   for	  statistical	  difference	  at	  the	  5%	  level.	  	  	  
                                                
33 Configurations	  of	  conditions	  are	  identified	  by	  several	  symbols.	  “•”	  is	  synonymous	  with	  “*”,	  the	  mathematical	  symbol	  for	  multiplication.	  	  In	  QCA,	  however,	  “•”	  actually	  refers	   to	   “and”	  meaning	   set	   intersection,	   or	   the	  minimum	  of	   a	   case’s	  membership	  score	   across	   a	   configuration	   of	   conditions.	   	   Paradoxically	   “+”	   in	   Boolean	   algebra	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  “and”,	  rather	  to	  “or”	  meaning	  set	  union,	  the	  maximum	  of	  a	  case’s	  membership	  scores	  across	  a	  configuration	  of	  conditions. 
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Another	  note	  on	  the	  terminology:	  the	  results	   in	  the	  following	  tables	  display	  the	   condition	   pneumonics	   from	   Table	   3.1	   in	   either	   uppercase	   or	   lowercase.	  	  Uppercase	   refers	   to	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   condition	   whereas	   lowercase	   refers	   to	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  condition	  in	  a	  particular	  path.	  	  The	  ordering	  of	  the	  conditions	  listed	  in	  a	  given	  path	   is	   irrelevant.	   	  What	  matters	  are	  which	   conditions	  appear,	   and	  whether	  they	   are	   included	   in	   the	   causal	   configuration,	   or	   path	   to	   regulation,	   as	   present	   or	  absent.	  	  The	  term	  “solution”	  refers	  to	  the	  level	  at	  which	  a	  path	  is	  reduced	  in	  the	  QCA,	  from	  complex	  to	  parsimonious,	  and	  intermediate.	  	  A	  solution	  can	  therefore	  comprise	  more	  than	  one	  path	  to	  regulation.	  
	  
3.2	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Specialized	  Board	  Committees	  	   Table	  3.2	  presents	   the	   scores	  of	   the	   causal	   conditions	   and	   the	  outcome	   for	  each	   country-­‐case	   as	   per	   the	   regulation	   of	   specialized	   board	   committees.	   	   These	  scores	  represent	  the	  values	  of	  conditions	  corresponding	  to	  the	  year	  of	  regulation	  in	  each	  country,	  or	  2008	  if	  there	  is	  no	  regulation.	   	  These	  scores	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  inputs	  for	  the	  minimization	  procedure	  in	  QCA	  to	  identify	  sufficient	  configurations	  of	  conditions	  leading	  to	  the	  outcome.	  	  Although	  each	  of	  these	  conditions	  demonstrates	  sufficiency	   and	   necessity	   through	   respective	   scores	   of	   at	   least	   0.569,	   which	  configurations	  of	  these	  conditions	  produce	  the	  outcome	  of	  regulation?	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Table	  3.2	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Specialized	  Board	  Committees	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necessary	  (their	  coincidence	  score	  is	  1.0).	  	  Thus	  either	  one	  of	  these	  conditions	  could	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  intermediate	  solution,	  but	  not	  both.	  	  To	  derive	  an	  intermediate	  solution,	   I	   run	   two	   models	   separately,	   both	   with	   the	   two	   conditions	   from	   the	  parsimonious	  solution,	  HIGH	  and	  CUMR,	  and	  each	  with	  either	  PRAC	  or	  SCAN.	  	  	  In	   the	   first,	   the	   conditions	   PRAC,	   HIGH,	   and	   CUMR	   are	   all	   returned	   in	   the	  intermediate	   solution.	   	   This	   path,	   PRAC•HIGH•CUMR,	   has	   a	   consistency	   score	   of	  0.999	  and	  a	  coverage	  score	  of	  0.462.	  	  	  In	  the	  second,	  the	  conditions	  SCAN,	  HIGH,	  and	  CUMR	   are	   likewise	   all	   returned	   in	   the	   intermediate	   solution.	   	   This	   path,	  SCAN•HIGH•CUMR,	  also	  has	  a	  consistency	  score	  of	  0.999	  but	  a	  lower	  coverage	  score	  of	   0.446.	   	   Both	   paths	   are	   subsets	   of	   the	   parsimonious	   solution	  HIGH•CUMR.	   	   The	  parsimonious	   solution,	   however,	   has	   the	   same	   consistency	   score	   but	   higher	  coverage	   than	   either	   path	   in	   the	   intermediate	   solution,	   explaining	   more	   of	   the	  outcome	  with	  one	   fewer	   condition.	   	  Because	   the	   addition	  of	  PRAC	  or	   SCAN	   in	   the	  intermediate	   solution	   actually	   lowers	   coverage,	   the	   parsimonious	   solution,	  HIGH•CUMR,	   is	   more	   indicative	   of	   causality	   of	   regulation.	   	   This	   combination	   of	  causal	   determinants	   in	   all	   three	   solutions	   is	   specific	   to	   Canada,	   France,	   and	   the	  United	  States.	  	  	  Because	  only	  one	  configuration	  is	  true	  in	  each	  solution,	  total	  coverage	  equals	  unique	  coverage	  and	  total	  consistency	  equals	  solution	  consistency.	   	   In	  the	  analysis	  of	  subsequent	  practices,	  multiple	  solutions	  appear	  per	  complex,	  parsimonious	  and	  intermediate,	   and	   total	   consistency	   and	   coverage	   of	   solutions	  will	   differ	   from	   the	  raw	  and	  unique	  values	  of	  each	  of	  their	  paths.	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The	  results	  in	  Table	  3.3	  indicate	  that	  for	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  of	  specialized	  board	   committees,	   voluntary	  practice	  by	   firms	   in	   countries	  with	  highly	  developed	  capital	   markets	   combines	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   two	   or	   more	   related	   corporate	  scandals	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  other	  countries’	  prior	  regulation	  of	  the	  same	  practice.	  	  India	  was	  first	  among	  its	  peers	  to	  regulate	  this	  practice,	   followed	  by	  Germany,	  but	  did	  not	  have	  a	  prevalence	  of	  specialized	  board	  committees	  among	  its	  firms	  prior	  to	  regulation,	  nor	  was	  considered	  highly	  developed	  in	  terms	  of	  capital	  markets	  at	  the	  time	  of	   their	  respective	  regulation.	   	   India’s	  regulation	  was,	  however,	   influential	  on	  the	  remaining	  three	  countries	  that	  subsequently	  regulated	  board	  committees,	  which	  I	  elaborate	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  These	  two	  conditions,	  voluntary	  practice	  and	  corporate	  governance	  scandals	  related	  to	  specialized	  board	  committees,	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  “supplemental”	  to	  the	  causal	  path	  because	  neither	  provides	  more	  explanatory	  coverage	  for	  the	  same	  three	  cases.	   	  Ultimately	  the	  shorter	  path	  of	  having	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  and	  following	  other	  countries	  regulating	  board	  committees	  –	  regardless	  of	  their	  paths	  to	  regulation	  –	  explains	  the	  majority	  of	  this	  particular	  outcome.	  
	  
3.3	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Director	  Independence	  Table	  3.4	  presents	  the	  scores	  of	  the	  six	  causal	  conditions	  and	  the	  outcome	  for	  each	  country-­‐case	  as	  per	  the	  regulation	  of	  director	  independence.	  	  Once	  again,	  these	  values	   are	   like	   inputs	   whereas	   the	   results	   of	   the	   minimization	   procedures	   are	  displayed	  in	  the	  subsequent	  table,	  Table	  3.5.	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Table	  3.4	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Director	  Independence	  	  
















B#3%&*52* CDDE F DGHHDC DGHIHF DGEEID DGEECJ :$- D
!*$*:* CDDK F DGHHHL DGEMEM DGEJKD DGLKJD F DGLK
!.2$* CDDI D F DGHIHF D DGIFEC D F
N&*$-) CDDL D DGHIED DGKKLL DGIIDJ DGECEH F DGLK
O)&?*$' CDDM D D DGEMEM DGJMLE DGMEJK F DGLK
P$:2* CDDE F DGHELJ DGIMKJ DGFLKJ DGEFDC :$- D
Q*8*$ CDDK D D DGKKLL F DGMDJI F F
R"&)* CDDE D D D D DGHMCM :$- D
S$2%):0R2$/:"? CDDL F F DGLJDJ DGMKCD DGHJMK F F













:;)9<=.>!<)!>?<9;@)<A;BA<!4C. DEFGH DEFGH DEHHI DEFGH DEHHI
=/26,#"-,"*6()"%*+,"-
=.>!<9;@)<!4C.J DEFKL DEDMF DEHNG
/
:;)9<!4C. DEOOD DEGLG DEHGK
/
;-+&2#&P,/+&()"%*+,"-













Scandals	   clearly	   play	   a	   diminished	   role	   from	   the	   complex	   to	   the	   parsimonious	  solution,	   so	   I	   eliminate	   this	   condition	   from	   consideration	   for	   an	   intermediate	  solution.	  	  Similarly,	  membership	  in	  the	  set	  of	  most	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  parsimonious	  solution,	  and	  is	  easily	  eliminated.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  the	   four	   remaining	   conditions	   yielded	   an	   intermediate	   solution	   with	   coverage	   of	  0.319	  and	  consistency	  of	  0.954	  for	  the	  same	  countries.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  regulation	  of	  board	   director	   independence,	   the	   three	   countries	   had	   listing	   rules	   among	   their	  respective	   stock	   exchanges	   that	   established	   criteria	   for	   director	   independence.	  	  They	   also	   had	   a	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   director	   independence	   criteria	   among	  companies	  domiciled	  in	  their	  jurisdictions,	  were	  in	  the	  set	  of	  countries	  with	  highly	  developed	   capital	  markets,	   and	   followed	   the	   lead	   of	   China.	   	   This	   last	   point	  might	  seem	  counterintuitive,	  but	  recall	  that	  China	  regulated	  this	  practice	  for	  other	  reasons	  than	  the	  ones	  hypothesized	  here.	  	  It	  was	  not	  considered	  in	  the	  set	  of	  countries	  with	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  nor	  was	  influenced	  by	  its	  peers	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  this	  governance	  practice.	   	  Although	  Germany	  and	   Japan	  also	  come	   to	  regulate	   this	  practice	   following	  China,	   they	  have	  no	   voluntary	   adoption	  of	   the	  practice	  prior	   to	  regulation	  nor	  are	  as	  clearly	  in	  the	  set	  of	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  as	  their	  peers	  in	  their	  respective	  years	  of	  regulation.	  	  	  A	   more	   intriguing	   point	   for	   the	   regulating	   countries,	   Canada,	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  that	  presence,	  not	  absence,	  of	   listing	  rules	  on	  their	   exchanges,	   that	   were	   part	   of	   the	   causal	   configurations.	   	   This	   potentially	  exacerbates	   the	   notion	   of	   voluntary	   firm	   practices,	   whereby	   stock	   exchanges	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similarly	   require	   what	   the	   countries	   eventually	   regulated.	   	   These	   points	   will	   be	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
	  
3.4	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Auditor	  Independence	  Table	  3.6	  presents	   the	   scores	  of	   the	   causal	   conditions	   and	   the	  outcome	   for	  each	   country-­‐case	   as	   per	   the	   regulation	   of	   auditor	   independence.	   	   The	   resulting	  complex	   solution	   includes	   two	  paths,	   one	  of	  which	  has	   low	   coverage	  despite	  high	  consistency:	  prac•scan•ties•LEFT•high,	  which	  applies	  only	  to	  Germany.	  
Table	  3.6	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Auditor	  Independence	  
	  The	   path	   with	   considerably	   higher	   coverage,	   PRAC•SCAN•TIES•LEFT•HIGH,	   is	  specific	  to	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  The	  path	  in	  the	  parsimonious	  solution	  likewise	   applies	   to	   these	   two	   countries.	   	   Table	   3.7	   indicates	   the	   complex,	  parsimonious,	  and	  intermediate	  solutions.	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Chapter	   4,	   I	   elaborate	   on	   the	   British	   and	   Canadian	   cases	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	  executive	  stock	  options.	  	   Repeating	  the	  thought	  experiment	  describe	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  section	  on	  executive	  stock	  option	  disclosure,	  I	  recode	  China’s	  legislature	  and	  found	  that	  in	  the	  disclosure	  of	  auditor	  independence,	  some	  modifications	  occur.	   	  The	  change	  occurs,	  however	   only	   when	   I	   recode	   China	   as	   0,	   meaning	   100%	   right-­‐leaning	   in	   its	  legislature.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  complex	  and	  intermediate	  solutions	  exclude	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  for	  Germany,	  but	  the	  paths	   in	  both	  solutions	  for	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  remain	  and	  with	  the	  same	  coverage	  and	  consistency	  scores.	  	  An	  additional	  path	   in	   the	   parsimonious	   solution	   occurs,	   LEFT•HIGH,	   for	   Canada	   and	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  again.	   	   The	  path	   to	   regulating	   the	  disclosure	  of	   auditor	   independence	   in	  this	  scenario,	  assuming	  China	  has	  an	  entirely	  right-­‐leaning	   legislature,	   is	  when	  the	  left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   of	   Canada	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   combine	   either	   with	  their	   stock	   exchanges	   being	   tied	   to	   others	   or	   when	   they	   have	   highly	   developed	  capital	   markets.	   	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   causal	   paths	   is	   not	   statistically	  significant,	   however,	   implying	   that	   regardless	   of	   the	   political	   leanings	   of	   China’s	  legislature,	  the	  paths	  to	  regulation	  of	  auditor	  independence	  in	  both	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  as	  per	  the	  original	  QCA.	  	  
3.5	  	  	  Summary	  of	  Causal	  Paths	  	   Table	  3.18	  recapitulates	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  fsQCA,	  namely	  the	  causal	  paths	  to	  regulation	  from	  the	  better	  of	  the	  intermediate	  and	  parsimonious	  solutions	  (or	  both)	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in	  the	  preceding	  sections.	   	  Prevalence	  of	  voluntary	  practice	  prior	  to	  regulation	  is	  a	  pervasive	   condition.	   	   This	   condition	  must	   be	   present	   in	   the	   paths	   for	   specialized	  board	   committees,	   director	   independence,	   and	   auditor	   independence.	   	   For	  specialized	   board	   committees	   and	   auditor	   independence,	   however,	   the	  parsimonious	   solutions	   exclude	   PRAC	   yet	   their	   remaining	   configurations,	  HIGH•CUMR	  and	  TIES•LEFT	  respectively,	  display	  slightly	  higher	  coverage	  scores	  for	  their	  same	  respective	  countries.	  Like	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	   voluntary	   practice	   among	   companies,	   stock	  exchange	  listing	  rules	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  director	  independence	  when	  present	   for	   three	   countries.	   	   Scandals	   related	   to	   board	   committees	   among	   US-­‐incorporated	   countries	   also	   play	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   path	   to	   regulation.	  Membership	   in	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   path	   to	  regulation	  of	  specialized	  board	  committees.	  	  Likewise,	  ties	  between	  stock	  exchanges	  run	  parallel	   in	   the	  path	   to	   regulation	  of	  auditor	   independence	  regulation.	   	  For	   the	  same	   countries,	   such	   ties	   are	   also	   integral	   to	   regulation	  of	  director	   independence.	  Lastly,	   the	  cumulative	  effect	  of	   regulation	   in	   some	  countries	  plays	  a	   causal	   role	   to	  the	   regulation	   of	   two	   practices	   in	   four	   countries.	   	   This	   condition	   is	   especially	  noteworthy	   for	   its	  cause	  among	  even	   those	  countries	   following	  divergent	  paths	   to	  regulation	  with	  similar	  effect	  among	  others	  countries.	  	  The	  role	  of	  these	  conditions	  in	  their	  respective	  paths	  will	  be	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Table	  3.8	  
	  	  	   Although	  all	  of	   the	  paths	  highlighted	   in	   the	  parsimonious	  and	   intermediate	  solutions	   have	   high	   consistency	   scores,	   coverage	   scores	   vary	   between	   0.319	   and	  0.576	   for	  paths	  specific	   to	  at	   least	   two	  cases.	   	  How	  much	  coverage	   is	  enough?	   	  To	  explain	  this	  much	  regulation	  in	  six	  out	  of	  ten	  countries,	  with	  between	  two	  and	  four	  conditions,	  attests	  to	  the	  novelty	  of	  this	  research.	  	  We	  would	  expect	  higher	  coverage	  scores	  when	  testing	  intuitive	  causal	  relationships	  or	  confirming	  previous	  research.	  	  However,	  the	  discovery	  of	  new	  conditions	  to	  explain	  roughly	  half	  of	  an	  outcome	  is	  a	  feat	  that	  deserves	  attention.	  	  	  	   In	   the	  next	  chapter,	   I	  elaborate	  on	  the	   findings	  of	  QCA,	  namely	  the	  paths	  to	  regulation	   for	   those	   countries	   that	   eventually	   regulated	   the	   focal	   corporate	  governance	   practices.	   	   I	   discuss	   the	   inter-­‐case	   comparison	   of	   relevant	   conditions,	  and	  their	  composite	  configurations—or	  paths—as	  well	  as	  the	  intra-­‐case	  specificities	  that	  plausibly	  account	  for	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  outcome	  unexplained	  in	  the	  QCA.	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Paths	  to	  Regulation	  Expanded	  
	  
4.1	  	  	  Review	  of	  Paths	  to	  Regulation	  The	   results	   of	   the	  Qualitative	  Comparative	  Analysis	   (QCA)	   identify	   the	  key,	  causal	  pathways	  of	  regulation	  of	  the	  select	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  that	  are	  specific	   to	   certain	   country-­‐cases.	   	   This	   chapter	   serves	   to	   elaborate	   on	   those	   cases	  with	   reference	   to	   their	   causal	   paths.	   	   Toward	   this	   end,	   a	   richer	   comparative	   case	  analysis	   is	   possible,	   especially	   when	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   manifest	  counterfactuals:	   those	  countries	   that	  never	  regulated	   these	  practices,	  and	  why	  not	  all	  of	  those	  countries	  that	  did	  regulate	  necessarily	  followed	  the	  paths	  of	  their	  peers.	  	  How	  does	  this	  qualitative	  data	  support	  the	  QCA?	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	   first	  review	  the	  paths	   to	   regulation	   of	   each	   corporate	   governance	   practice	   measured	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapter.	   	   These	   include	   specialized	   board	   committees,	   director	  independence,	   and	   auditor	   independence.	   	   Additional	   practices	   are	   found	   in	  Appendix	  C.	  	  I	   then	   discuss	   the	   pertinence	   of	   these	   conditions	   across	   cases,	   draw	   the	  practices	   together	  by	  country	  and	  entertain	  ways	   to	   improve	  on	   the	   limitations	  of	  this	   study.	   	   I	   conclude	   by	   offering	   some	   generalizations	   about	   the	   regulation	   of	  corporate	   governance	  practices	   and	  point	   to	   new	  areas	   of	   inquiry	   based	  on	   these	  findings.	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4.1.1	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Specialized	  Board	  Committees	  Canada,	   France,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   follow	   the	   causal	   path	   comprised	   of	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  and	  cumulative	  regulation	  by	  other	  countries,	  plus	  either	   of	   two	   other	   conditions	   prior	   to	   regulation:	   the	   prevalence	   of	   companies	  voluntarily	   adopting	   specialized	   board	   committees,	   or	   the	   occurrence	   of	   related	  corporate	  scandals.	   	  These	  paths	  account	  for	  nearly	  half	  the	  outcome	  of	  regulation.	  	  Below	   I	   elaborate	   on	   the	   causal	   conditions	   in	   all	   three	   countries	   and	   present	  additional	  conditions	  unique	  to	  each	  that	  may	  account	  for	  the	  remaining	  portion	  of	  the	  outcome	  unexplained	  by	  the	  QCA	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  The	   cumulative	   average	   shares	   traded	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   Canada’s	   GDP	  between	  1989	   and	   2005,	   the	   year	   it	   regulated	   specialized	   board	   committees,	  was	  55.5%.	   	  115	  of	  the	  116	  largest	  Canadian	  public	  companies	  had	  already	  established	  specialized	   board	   committees	   before	   regulation.	   	   One	   Canadian	   company,	  Bombardier	   Inc.,	   typifies	   its	   compatriots	   in	   having	   specialized	   board	   committees	  voluntarily.	  	  In	  1996,	  the	  earliest	  year	  for	  which	  the	  company’s	  data	  are	  available,	  its	  annual	   report	   lists	   four	   board	   committees—executive,	   compensation,	   audit,	   and	  pension	   fund—and	   their	   respective	   members,	   on	   one	   page	   in	   a	   section	   on	   the	  company’s	  contact	  information	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  report.	  	  By	  2005,	  Bombardier	  reported	  the	  addition	  of	  corporate	  governance	  and	  nominating	  committees,	  as	  well	  as	  more	   information	  on	  every	  committee,	  namely	   their	  responsibilities	  and	  chairs.	  	  Committee	  information	  is	  featured	  much	  more	  prominently,	  in	  a	  distinct	  section	  on	  corporate	  governance	  that	  appears	  much	  earlier	  in	  the	  annual	  report.	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In	   addition,	   five	   well-­‐publicized,	   related	   corporate	   scandals	   occurred	   in	  Canada	  within	  eight	  years	  prior	   to	  regulation.	   	  These	   included	  conflicts	  of	   interest	  among	   board	   committee	   members	   at	   BRE-­‐X	   Minerals	   in	   1997	   and	   Repap	  Enterprises	   in	   2002,	   lavish	   pay	   schemes	  without	   board	   oversight	   at	   Royal	   Group	  Technologies	  in	  2003	  and	  Conrad	  Black’s	  Hollinger	  International	  in	  2004.	  	  Canadian	  Imperial	  Bank	  of	  Commerce	  (CIBC)	  was	  also	  directly	  implicated	  in	  the	  Enron	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  concerned	  lax	  oversight	  among	  board	  committees35.	  Canadian	   regulation	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   government	   recommendation	   that	  listed	   companies	   adopt	   specialized	   board	   committees.	   	   In	   2005,	   the	   Canadian	  Securities	   Administrators	   issued	   National	   Policy	   (“NP”)	   58-­‐201,	   “Corporate	  Governance	  Guidelines”	  along	  with	  National	   Instrument	  (“NI”)	  58-­‐101,	   “Disclosure	  of	   Corporate	   Governance	   Practices,”	   which	   establish	   that	   listed	   companies	   should	  maintain	   specialized	   board	   committees	   from	   June	   200536.	   	   NP	   58-­‐201	   provides	  guidelines	   of	   corporate	   governance	   whereas	   NI	   58-­‐101	   sets	   forth	   reporting	  requirements.	  	  Boards	  should	  include	  a	  nominating	  committee	  composed	  entirely	  of	  independent	   directors	   (Guidelines	   3.10-­‐3.14)	   and	   a	   composition	   committee	  (Guideline	   3.15-­‐3.17).	   	   	   Further,	   required	   disclosure	   on	   the	  National	   Instrument’s	  related	  Form	  58-­‐101F1	  “Corporate	  Governance	  Disclosure”	  stipulates,	  “if	  the	  board	  
                                                35	  Only	  CIBC	  was	  featured	  among	  these	  scandals	  that	  was	  also	  on	  the	  list	  of	  Canada’s	  largest	  listed	  companies	  voluntarily	  reporting	  specialized	  board	  committees.	  	  36	  Had	   the	   wording	   of	   this	   regulation	   been	   “must”	   or	   “has	   to”,	   or	   other	   similar	  language	   indicating	   necessity,	   the	   fuzzy	   set	   coding	   for	   the	   Canadian	   regulation	  would	  have	  been	  1	  instead	  of	  0.75.	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has	   standing	   committees	   other	   than	   the	   audit,	   compensation	   and	   nominating	  committees,	  identify	  the	  committees	  and	  describe	  their	  function.”37	  Canadian	   regulation	   also	   followed	   initiatives	   by	   provincial	   securities	  regulators	  in	  2004.	  	  The	  Canadian	  Securities	  Administrators	  had	  solicited	  comments	  from	   19	   individuals	   representing	   companies,	   industry	   associations,	   pension	   fund	  managers,	   as	   well	   as	   TSX	   Group,	   the	   parent	   corporation	   of	   the	   Toronto	   Stock	  Exchange.	  	  Seven	  commenters	  specifically	  recommended	  national	  harmonization	  of	  corporate	   governance	   guidelines.	   	   One	   anonymous	   comment	   suggested	   that	  compensation	   committees	   be	   “responsible	   only	   for	   incentive-­‐compensation	   plans	  and	  equity-­‐based	  plans	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  board	  approval”	  (Comment	  number	  29	  in	  Schedule	  B	  of	  NP	  58-­‐201)	  with	  which	  the	  regulators	  ultimately	  disagreed.	  	  	  France’s	   cumulative	   average	   of	   shares	   traded	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   its	   GDP	  between	  1989	   and	   2008,	   the	   year	   it	   regulated	   specialized	   board	   committees,	  was	  76.3%.	  	  Of	  the	  79	  largest	  French	  public	  companies	  surveyed,	  71	  (89.9%)	  had	  already	  established	   specialized	   board	   committees	   before	   the	   2008	   implementation	   of	   the	  European	  Union	  directive	  into	  French	  law.	  	  The	  food	  company,	  Danone,	  was	  an	  early	  adopter	   of	   specialized	   board	   committees	   that	   featured	   prominently	   in	   its	   annual	  report.	   A	   section	   on	   corporate	   governance	   in	   the	   company’s	   1998	   annual	   report	  indicates	  the	  duties,	  membership,	  chairmanship,	  and	  fees	  associated	  with	  each	  of	  its	  
                                                37	  A	  related	  policy,	  Multilateral	  Instrument	  52-­‐110	  “Audit	  Committees,”	  established	  in	   January	   2004,	   as	   enacted	   or	   adopted	   by	   the	   securities	   regulatory	   authority	   in	  each	  province	  except	  British	  Columbia,	  requires	  that	  if	  a	  company	  does	  not	  have	  an	  audit	  committee,	  then	  audit	  committee	  criteria	  apply	  to	  the	  company’s	  entire	  board	  of	  directors. 
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three	  committees.	  	  Further	  information	  on	  each	  director	  includes	  birthdate,	  number	  of	   shares	   held	   in	   Danone,	   and	   membership	   on	   boards	   of	   other	   companies.	   	   The	  relevant	   section	   appear	   earlier	   in	   annual	   reports	   of	   subsequent	   years,	   and	   entire	  pages	  are	  devoted	  to	  each	  specialized	  committee	  even	  though	  this	  information	  was	  not	   yet	   regulated	   disclosure.	   	   The	   number	   of	   meetings	   held	   by	   the	   committees,	  attendance,	   items	   covered,	   are	   all	   disclosed	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   general	  responsibilities	  and	  membership	  of	   the	  committee	  of	  earlier	   reports.	   	  By	  2008,	  an	  additional	  committee,	  the	  “Social	  Responsibility	  Committee”	  appears	  as	  well.	  	  	  Unlike	  Danone,	   the	  French	  media,	  aerospace	  and	  automobile	  conglomerate,	  Lagardère	  Group,	  did	  not	  report	  any	  particular	  committees	  in	  its	  supervisory	  board	  prior	   to	   200038.	   	   Thereafter	   the	   company	   reports	   having	   four	   members	   of	   the	  supervisory	  board	  in	  an	  audit	  committee	  and	  their	  general	  duties	  and	  emoluments.	  	  There	  is	  no	  reference	  as	  to	  why	  the	  company	  only	  started	  reporting	  then,	  nor	  much	  other	   information	  as	   to	   its	  motive.	   	   In	  2005,	  no	  additional	   specialized	   committees	  appear.	   	  The	  board	  declared	  in	  the	  2003	  corporate	  governance	  report	  that	  despite	  the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   AFEP	   and	   MEDEF—two	   business	   associations	   that	  promoted	   corporate	   governance	   standards—the	   addition	   of	   a	   nominations	   or	   a	  remunerations	   committee	   was	   not	   “opportune,”	   a	   position	   the	   board	   maintained	  through	  2008.	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  French	  corporate	  scandal	  included	  in	  the	  causal	  path,	  the	  notorious	  ouster	  of	  chairman	  and	  chief	  executive	  of	  Vivendi,	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Messier,	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  corporate	  governance	  committee	  at	  the	  firm	  and	  tightening	  
                                                38	  The	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  French	  and	  English	  versions	  of	  the	  Danone	  and	  Lagardère	  annual	  reports	  are	  consistent	  with	  each	  other.	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of	   oversight	   by	   the	   other	   specialized	  board	   committees	   the	   company	  had	   since	   at	  least	  1997.	  	  	  French	   regulation	   results	   from	   the	   transposition	   of	   a	   European	   Union	  directive	   into	   national	   law	   that	   requires	   the	   presence	   of	   specialized	   board	  committees.	  	  Title	  VI,	  Article	  32	  of	  Act	  of	  July	  3,	  2008	  authorizes	  the	  government	  to	  use	   administrative	   orders	   to	   adopt	   the	   legislative	   measures	   for	   transposing	   EU	  Directive	  2006/43/EC	  of	  May	  17,	  2006,	  a.k.a.	  “Statutory	  Audit	  Directive,”	  Article	  41	  of	  which	  requires	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	  audit	  committee	  at	  listed	  companies,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  certain	  securities	  issuers	  and	  credit	  institutions.	  	  No	  other	  national	  French	   law	   requires	   specialized	   board	   committees	   at	   listed	   firms,	   nor	   prescribes	  responsibilities	  thereof	  for	  those	  companies	  that	  do	  have	  such	  committees.	  	  France	  has	  the	  particular	  characteristc	  of	  having	  its	  regulation	  stem	  from	  a	  supra-­‐national	  source,	  i.e.	  the	  European	  Union39.	  	  This	  characteristic,	  not	  shared	  by	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	   States,	   implies	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   condition	   that	   not	   only	   spans	   regulatory	  levels,	  but	  also	  plausibly	  accounts	  for	  the	  portion	  of	  the	  outcome	  that	  is	  unexplained	  by	  causal	  path	  found	  in	  the	  QCA.	  The	  United	  States	  was	  highest	  among	  the	  three	  cases	   in	   terms	  of	   its	  capital	  markets	  development.	  	  The	  cumulative	  average	  of	  shares	  traded	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  
                                                39	  Article	  41	   is	   transposed	   into	  French	   law	  at	   the	   end	  of	   the	   focal	   time	  period,	   i.e.	  2008.	  	  Implementation	  of	  Article	  41	  on	  audit	  committees	  of	  the	  EU’s	  Statutory	  Audit	  Directive	   occurs	   in	   Germany	   after	   2008	   (see	   §324	   of	   the	  
Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz	   of	   May	   25,	   2009).	   	   The	   United	   Kingdom	  implements	   the	   Directive	   for	   effect	   in	   late	   2008	   (see	   the	   Disclosure	   Rules	   and	  Transparency	   Rules	   article	   7.1	   of	   2008).	   	   Because	   the	   German	   and	   British	  regulations	   take	   effect	   after	   the	   focal	   time	   period,	   they	   are	   not	   included	   in	   the	  analysis.	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its	  GDP	  from	  1989	  to	  2006,	  the	  year	  it	  regulated	  specialized	  board	  committees,	  was	  191%.	   	   Proportionally	   to	   their	   Canadian	   and	   French	   counterparts,	   slightly	   fewer	  American	  public	  companies	  had	  disclosed	  specialized	  board	  committees	  before	  the	  2006	  regulation	  by	  the	  SEC:	  263	  out	  of	  316	  (83.2%)40.	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  clearly	  member	   in	   the	   set	   of	   countries	   with	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	  specialized	  committees	  for	  all	  years	  from	  1997	  onwards41.	  	  America’s	  iconic	  General	  Electric	   Company,	   for	   example,	   had	   specialized	   board	   committees	   since	   at	   least	  1993,	  well	   in	  advance	  of	   the	  2006	  regulation.	   	   Its	  1998	  annual	  report	   listed	  seven	  board	   committees:	   Audit,	   Management	   Development	   and	   Compensation,	  Nominating,	   Public	   Responsibilities,	   Finance,	   Operations,	   and	   Technology	   and	  Science,	  although	  these	  last	  three	  disappear	  by	  2008.	  The	   United	   States	   also	   had	   its	   share	   of	   corporate	   malfeasance.	   	   Dennis	  Kozlowski	   was	   to	   Tyco	   what	   Jean-­‐Marie	   Messier	   was	   to	   Vivendi:	   culprit	   of	  unauthorized	   bonuses	   and	   lavish	   spending	   on	   all	   things	   corporate	   and	   personal	  using	  company	  funds.	   	  Tyco	  had	  specialized	  board	  committees	  since	  at	   least	  1997,	  five	   years	   before	   the	   scandal	   gained	  media	   coverage.	   	  WorldCom’s	   chief,	   Bernard	  Ebbers,	  took	  corporate	  excess	  even	  further,	  driving	  the	  company	  out	  of	  business	  and	  drawing	  further	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  specialized	  board	  committees	  in	  oversight	  of	  management.	   	   The	   Enron	   scandal	   that	   came	   to	   light	   in	   2001	   implicated	   multiple	  
                                                40	  316	  American	  companies	  in	  2006	  had	  available	  data	  for	  analysis	  in	  2006,	  the	  year	  of	   regulation,	   although	  338	   companies	  were	   the	  maximum	  potential	   number	  over	  the	  entire	  time	  period,	  1989	  to	  2008.	  	  	  41	  Recall	  that	  the	  prevalence	  of	  voluntary	  practice	  is	  measured	  from	  1997	  onwards	  owing	  to	  data	  availability. 
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areas	   of	   corporate	   governance	   in	   addition	   to	   specialized	   board	   committees42 .	  	  HealthSouth	  and	  Cendant	  corporations	  also	  suffered	   from	  runaway	  CEO	  fraud	  and	  financial	   deception:	   board	  members	   failed	   to	   raise	   significant	   opposition	   to	   these	  untrammeled	   chief	   executive	   officers	   and	   renewed	   interest	   in	   board	   committee	  appeared	  among	  shareholders	  and	  regulators	  alike.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  17	  CFR	  §	  229.407(b)(2)	  stipulates	  that	  from	  2006,	  firms	  must	   disclose	  whether	   their	   boards	   have	   audit,	   nominating	   and	   compensation,	   or	  similar	   committees,	   and	   if	   so,	   must	   adhere	   to	   multiple	   requirements	   regarding	  shareholder	   communications	   and	   timeliness	   of	   disclosure.	   	   17	   CFR	   §	   240.10A-­‐3,	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  Act	  of	  2002,	  also	  establishes	  standards	  for	  the	  audit	  committee,	  namely	  members’	  independence,	  certain	  exemptions	  for	  foreign	  issuers	  (and,	   like	   French	   law,	   for	   certain	   securities	   issuers)43 ,	   and	   responsibility	   for	  retaining	   and	   remunerating	   external	   auditors.	   	   17	   CFR	   §	   229.407(b)(2)	   allows	  reporting	   of	   this	   requirement	   either	   in	   its	   annual	   proxy	   statement	   or	   on	   the	  company’s	  website.	  	  Section	  407(e)(1)	  further	  requires	  that	  where	  a	  compensation	  committee	  is	  absent	  from	  the	  company’s	  board,	  a	  statement	  identifying	  the	  directors	  that	  assume	  compensation	  committee	  functions	  be	  provided.	  	  	  The	   American	   regulation	   for	   disclosure	   of	   specialized	   board	   committees	   is	  more	   heavy-­‐handed	   than	   its	   Canadian	   counterpart,	   but	   like	   the	   Canadian	  
                                                42	  The	  events	  associated	  with	  Enron	  led	  directly	  to	  the	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  Act	  of	  2002,	  which	  sought	  to	  rectified	  related	  deficiencies	  in	  accounting	  deficiencies.	  	  43	  Further	  exemption	  to	  the	  audit	  committee	  requirement	  is	  provided	  by	  §	  270.32a-­‐4	  for	  management	  investment	  companies. 
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regulations,	   is	   rooted	   in	   domestic	   deliberation	   to	   a	   greater	   extent	   than	   similar	  French	  regulations.	   	  Four	  other	  countries—China,	  Germany,	  India,	  and	  Japan—also	  regulated	  the	  presence	  of	  audit	  committees	  at	  listed	  firms	  but	  each	  country	  followed	  its	  own	  path.	  	  None	  of	  these	  four	  were	  in	  the	  set	  of	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  countries	   in	   the	   years	  of	   their	   respective	   regulation,	   underscoring	   the	   importance	  this	   condition	   has	   for	   regulating	   this	   particular	   corporate	   governance	   practice.	  	  Among	   these	   four,	   only	   China	   had	   prevalence	   of	   companies	   voluntarily	   disclosing	  specialized	  board	  committees	  as	  well	  as	  the	  occurrence	  of	  related	  scandals.	  	  	  India	  and	   Japan	  did	  not	   follow	  the	  same	  causal	  path	  as	  did	  Canada,	  France,	  and	   the	  United	  States	   in	   the	   regulation	  of	   specialized	  board	   committees,	   but	   their	  regulatory	   actions	   form	   the	   third	   causal	   condition:	   cumulative	   regulation.	   	   The	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Board	  of	  India	   in	  1999	  established	  guidelines	   in	  response	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  employee	  stock	  option	  schemes.	  	  The	  1999	  SEBI	  guidelines	  specify	  
compensation	   committees	   were	   required	   on	   Indian,	   listed	   companies’	   boards.	  	  India’s	   Companies	   Act	   of	   1956,	   since	   revised,	   introduced	   a	   provision	   in	   its	   2000	  amendment	   for	   companies44	  to	  have	  an	  audit	   committee.	   	   Section	  292A	  of	   the	  Act	  allows	   Indian	   company	   boards	   to	   develop	   their	   own	   terms	   of	   reference	   for	   audit	  committees,	  it	  does	  stipulate	  a	  minimum	  of	  three	  directors	  in	  its	  membership,	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  which	  shall	  be	  other	  than	  executives.	  	  This	  regulation	  falls	  squarely	  in	  the	  realm	   of	   India’s	   corporate	   law,	   and	   points	   to	   related	   regulation	   at	   Indian	   stock	  exchanges	  by	  the	  Securities	  Exchange	  Board	  of	  India:	  
                                                44	  Both	   listed	   and	   unlisted	   companies	   with	   paid	   up	   capital	   of	   at	   least	   5	   crores	   of	  rupees,	  approximately	  US	  $1	  million.	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“It	  may	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  Listing	  Agreement	   of	   the	   Stock	  Exchanges	  also	   require	   Listed	   Companies	   to	   constitute	   an	  Audit	   Committee.	   As	  per	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Listing	   Agreement,	   the	   Audit	   Committee	  should	   have	   a	   minimum	   3	   Directors.	   The	   committee	   should	   consist	  only	   of	   Non	   -­‐	   Executive	   Directors	  with	  majority	   being	   Independent.	  	  However,	   in	  the	  Companies	  Act,	  the	  Audit	  Committee	  is	  permitted	  to	  have	  a	  maximum	  of	  one	  thirds	  as	  Executive	  /	  Whole	  Time	  Directors.”	  	  Japan’s	   commercial	   code	  was	  similarly	  amended	   to	   require	   the	   inclusion	  of	  nomination,	  compensation,	  and	  audit	  committees.	  	  From	  2003,	  Japanese	  companies	  had	  the	  choice	  of	  retaining	  their	  incorporation	  under	  either	  the	  traditional	  system	  of	  overlapping	  governance	  functions	  throughout	  the	  firm	  or	  converting	  into	  companies	  with	  distinct	  board	  committees	  and	  an	  external	  auditor,	  borrowing	  Western	  notions	  of	  separated	  board	  director	  and	  auditor	  functions.	  	  Two	  years	  later,	  the	  Companies	  Act	   consolidated	   into	   one	   legal	   document	   this	   and	   other	   provisions	   of	   the	  commercial	   code	   governing	   listed,	   or	   joint	   stock,	   companies.	   	   There	   is	   dissimilar	  language	   between	   the	   Indian	   and	   Japanese	   laws	   concerning	   specialized	   board	  committees,	   and	   only	   Japan’s	   requires	   the	   same	   three	   committees—nomination,	  compensation,	  and	  audit—as	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  came	  to	  require.	  	  
4.1.2	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Director	  Independence	  	  The	   path	   to	   regulation	   of	   director	   independence	   disclosures	   applies	   to	  Canada,	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   and	   the	  United	   States.	   	   It	   is	   described	   as	   having	   the	  presence	   of	   four	   causal	   conditions:	   stock	   market	   listing	   rule	   for	   companies	   to	  disclose	  their	  criteria	  and	  compliance	  with	  board	  director	  independence,	  combined	  with	  the	  prevalence	  of	  companies	  voluntarily	  disclosing	  their	  director	  independence	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in	  the	  absence	  of	  regulation,	  plus	  stock	  exchange	  ties,	  and	  cumulative	  regulation	  by	  peer	  countries.	  One	  year	  prior	  to	  the	  Canadian	  government’s	  regulation	  in	  2005,	  the	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange	  (TSX)	  began	  requiring	  companies	  to	  disclose	  whether	  a	  majority	  of	  its	  board	  directors	  were	  unrelated:	  “An	   unrelated	   director	   is	   a	   director	   who	   is	   independent	   of	  management	  and	  is	  free	  from	  any	  interest	  and	  any	  business	  or	  other	  relationship	   which	   could,	   or	   could	   reasonably	   be	   perceived	   to,	  materially	  interfere	  with	  the	  director’s	  ability	  to	  act	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  best	   interests	   of	   the	   corporation,	   other	   than	   interests	   and	  relationships	  arising	  from	  shareholding”	  (TSX	  Guideline	  2).	  	  The	  TSX	  also	  suggests	  optional,	  "enhanced"	  disclosures	  to	  describe	  in	  greater	  detail	  every	  relationship	  between	  the	  company	  and	  its	  director	  and	  each	  director’s	  status	  as	   unrelated	   or	   related	   to	   the	   company.	   	   Guideline	   12	   further	   recommends	  structural	   features	   of	   board	   independence,	   including	   separate	   board	   and	  management	   roles,	   and	   the	   inclusion	  of	   a	   corporate	  governance	  committee	  within	  the	   board.	   	   The	   TSX	   guidelines	   result	   from	   the	   Joint	   Committee	   on	   Corporate	  Governance	   sponsored	   by	   the	   Canadian	   Institute	   of	   Chartered	   Accountants,	   the	  Toronto	   Stock	   Exchange,	   and	   the	   Canadian	   Venture	   Exchange.	   	   	   Its	   2001	   Saucier	  Report	   (named	   for	   the	   committee’s	   chairwoman,	   Guylaine	   Saucier)	   built	   on	   the	  earlier	  recommendations	  of	  the	  1994	  Dey	  Committee	  report,	  precursor	  to	  the	  TSX’s	  first	  corporate	  governance	  guidelines.	   	  Like	   the	  Saucier	  Report,	   the	  TSX	  guidelines	  are	  not	  full	   listing	  rules	  because	  companies	  are	  recommended	  but	  not	  required,	  to	  comply.	   	   The	   Joint	   Committee	   advocated	   especially	   a	   non-­‐regulatory	   approach	   to	  Canadian	  corporate	  governance,	  in	  favor	  of	  corporate	  self-­‐regulation	  by	  disclosure:	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“While	  there	  may	  be	  a	  place	  for	  regulating	  some	  aspects	  of	  corporate	  governance,	   our	   view	   is	   that	   disclosure	   is	   a	   much	   better	   approach	  than	   attempting	   to	   regulate	   behaviour,	   if	   one	   is	   seeking	   to	   build	   a	  healthy	  governance	  culture	  (…)	  First,	  disclosure	  can	  provide	  examples	  of	   good	   practice	   that	   can	   assist	   boards	   that	   are	   looking	   for	  ways	   to	  become	   more	   effective.	   Second,	   a	   requirement	   to	   disclose	   against	  guidelines	  can	  modify	  behaviour	  by	  forcing	  boards	  to	  focus	  explicitly	  on	  their	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  and	  how	  they	  are	  being	  discharged”	  (Saucier	  Report	  2001:	  10).	  	  Further,	  the	  Saucier	  Report	  does	  not	  propose	  a	  test	  for	  director	  independence,	  like	  the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange,	   nor	   includes	   precise	   criteria	   for	   director	  independence	  like	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange.	  	  Earlier	  TSE45	  guidelines	  provided	  a	  director	   independence	   framework	  of	   “outside”	   and	   “unrelated”	   (synonymous	  with	  “independent”)	  directors,	  which	  the	  later	  Saucier	  Report	  revised.	  	  Although	  the	  Joint	  Committee	   refrained	   from	   recommending	   rules	   identical	   to	   those	   in	   the	   United	  States,	   it	   did	   cite	   specifically	   the	   United	   States,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   United	   Kingdom—though	   no	   other	   countries—as	   models	   for	   improvement	   of	   Canadian	   corporate	  governance.	  	  	  	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   TSX	   listing	   rule,	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   director	  independence	   was	   prevalent	   at	   Canadian	   companies.	   	   113	   out	   of	   116	   the	   largest	  public	  Canadian	  companies	  were	  disclosing	  director	  independence	  criteria	  prior	  to	  the	  government’s	  2005	  regulation.	   	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  third	  causal	  condition	  in	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  of	  director	  independence	  was	  also	  necessary:	  stock	  exchange	  ties.	  	  44	  of	  116	  Canadian	  companies	  (37.9%)	  listed	  on	  the	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange	  were	  
                                                45	  The	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange	  was	  abbreviated	  as	  TSE	  before	  it	  became	  a	  for-­‐profit	  company	  in	  2000.	   	  The	  following	  year,	   it	  acquired	  the	  Canadian	  Venture	  Exchange,	  and	  adopted	  the	  new	  abbreviation,	  TSX.	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cross-­‐listed	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  in	  2005,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  first	  regulation,	  and	  one	  year	   following	   the	  stock	  market	   listing	  rule.	   	  Canadian	  companies,	  among	  others	   in	   this	   study,	   have	   the	   most	   cross-­‐listings	   on	   the	   exchanges	   in	   the	   other	  countries,	  especially	  in	  the	  United	  States.	   	  This	  structural	  characteristic	  is	  enforced	  by	  the	  comments	  in	  the	  TSX	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  government’s	  regulations.	  The	   Canadian	   government’s	   regulation,	   found	   in	   National	   Policy	   58-­‐201,	  suggests	  under	  Guideline	  2.1	  that	  from	  2005	  listed	  companies	  disclose	  the	  identity	  of	  independent	  directors,	  and	  provide	  a	  description	  of	  those	  directors	  who	  are	  not	  independent46.	   	   Guideline	   3.1	   of	   the	   same	   Policy	   further	   recommend	   that	   the	  majority	  of	  the	  board	  be	  independent,	  especially	  the	  board’s	  chair	  as	  per	  Guideline	  3.2.	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   Policy	   is	   unabashedly	   influenced	   by	   foreign,	   namely	  American,	   sources,	   and	   reiterates	   the	   “comply	   or	   explain”	   principle	   to	   which	   the	  Policy	  adheres:	  “This	   Policy	   provides	   guidance	   on	   corporate	   governance	   practices	  which	  have	  been	  formulated	  to:	  achieve	  a	  balance	  between	  providing	  protection	  to	  investors	  and	  fostering	  fair	  and	  efficient	  capital	  markets	  and	  confidence	   in	  capital	  markets;	  be	  sensitive	  to	   the	  realities	  of	   the	  greater	  numbers	  of	  small	  companies	  and	  controlled	  companies	  in	  the	  Canadian	   corporate	   landscape;	   take	   into	   account	   the	   impact	   of	  corporate	  governance	  developments	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  around	  the	  world;	  and	  recognize	  that	  corporate	  governance	  is	  evolving.	   	  The	  guidelines	  in	   this	   Policy	   are	   not	   intended	   to	   be	   prescriptive.	   We	   encourage	  issuers	   to	  consider	   the	  guidelines	   in	  developing	   their	  own	  corporate	  governance	  practices.”	  	  
                                                46	  I	   coded	   these	  guidelines	  0.75	   instead	  of	  1.0	  because	   they	  are	  not	   fully	   required,	  rather	   encouraged,	   by	   the	   government:	   “The	   guidelines	   in	   this	   Policy	   are	   not	  intended	   to	   be	   prescriptive.	   	   We	   encourage	   issuers	   to	   consider	   the	   guidelines	   in	  developing	  their	  own	  corporate	  governance	  practices.”	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The	   official	   Canadian	   meaning	   of	   director	   independence	   stems	   from	   Multilateral	  Instrument	  52-­‐100	  regarding	  audit	  committees,	  and	  refers	  to	  “any	  direct	  or	  indirect	  relationship	  which	  could,	   in	  the	  view	  of	  the	   issuer’s	  board	  of	  directors,	  reasonably	  interfere	  with	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  member’s	  independent	  judgement”	  including	  former	  employees,	  executives,	  auditors,	  and	  other	  paid	  consultants	  to	  the	  company,	  or	  the	  immediate	  family	  members	  thereof.	  	  	   I	   discuss	   later	   in	   this	   section	   the	   role	   of	   the	   fourth	   causal	   condition,	  cumulative	   regulation,	   as	   it	   applied	   to	   all	   three	   cases.	   	   Next,	   I	   turn	   to	   the	   causal	  path—comprising	   the	   stock	   exchange	   listing	   rule,	   voluntary	   practice,	   and	   stock	  exchange	   ties—and	   the	   outcome	   of	   regulation	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  The	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  adopted	  in	  November	  2003	  the	  Combined	  Code	  on	   Corporate	   Governance,	   Section	   A.3.1	   of	   which	   identifies	   board	   independence	  criteria	  and	  disclosure	  that	  boards	  should	  have,	  including	  previous	  employment	  or	  other	  material	  relationship	  with	  the	  company,	  significant	  shareholdings,	  or	  familial	  ties	  to	  the	  company,	  or	  “has	  served	  on	  the	  board	  for	  more	  than	  nine	  years	  from	  the	  date	  of	  their	  first	  election.”	  	  The	  Combined	  Code	  further	  recommends	  that	  boards	  of	  large	  companies,	  defined	  as	   those	  being	   in	   the	  FTSE	  350	   index,	  be	  composed	  of	  at	  least	  50%	  independent	  directors.	  	  Further,	  at	  least	  one	  independent,	  non-­‐executive	  director	   of	   all	   boards	   should	   be	   senior	   independent	   director.	   	   British	   companies	  with	   a	   primary	   listing	   on	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   must	   comply	   with	   the	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Combined	   Code	   on	   Corporate	   Governance	   or	   explain	   why	   they	   do	   not,	   taking	   an	  approach	  like	  that	  of	  the	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange.	  This	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle	  originates	  in	  the	  1992	  Financial	  Aspects	  of	  Corporate	   Governance	   Report,	   or	   “Cadbury	   Report”	   named	   for	   the	   authoring	  committee’s	   chairman,	   Adrian	   Cadbury47.	   	   Although	   less	   elaborate	   than	   the	   latter	  day	   recommendation	   of	   the	   Combined	   Code,	   the	   basic	   definitions	   of	   director	  independence	  of	  the	  Cadbury	  Report	  are	  clear:	  	  “We	   recommend	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   non-­‐executives	   on	   a	   board	  should	   be	   independent	   of	   the	   company.	   This	  means	   that	   apart	   from	  their	  directors’	  fees	  and	  shareholdings,	  they	  should	  be	  independent	  of	  management	   and	   free	   from	   any	   business	   other	   relationship	   which	  could	   materially	   interfere	   with	   the	   exercise	   of	   their	   independent	  judgement.	   	   It	   is	   for	   the	  board	   to	  decide	   in	  particular	   cases	  whether	  this	   definition	   is	   met.	   	   Information	   about	   the	   relevant	   interests	   of	  directors	   should	   be	   disclosed	   in	   the	   Directors’	   Report”	  (Recommendation	  4.12	  of	  the	  1992	  Cadbury	  Report).	  	  	   As	  for	  voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  director	  independence,	  fully	  100%	  of	  the	  137	  British	   companies	   were	   likewise	   disclosing	   their	   compliance	   with	   board	   director	  criteria	  by	  the	  2007	  regulation	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	   	  That	  they	  were	  doing	  so	  is	  testimony	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  corporate	  and	  market	  norm-­‐making	  prior	  to	  the	  British	  government’s	   regulation	   of	   the	   same	   corporate	   governance	   practice.	   	   Two	  British	  companies	  exemplify	  voluntary	  disclosures	   regarding	  director	   independence	  prior	  
                                                47	  The	   Combined	   Code	   also	   includes	   recommendations	   from	   other	   government-­‐commissioned	  reports,	  including	  the	  Hampel	  and	  Greenbury	  reports.	  	  These	  focused	  on	   directors’	   remuneration,	   however,	   not	   director	   independence.	   	   Conversely,	   the	  report	  from	  Derek	  Higgs	  does	  include	  recommendations	  on	  director	  independence	  that	  figure	  in	  the	  2003	  Combined	  Code.	  	  The	  Combined	  Code	  was	  amended	  in	  2005,	  2006	  and	  2008,	  but	  did	  not	  alter	  guideline	  A.3.1	  regarding	  director	  independence.	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to	   regulation48.	   	   British	   bank,	   Barclays,	   began	   reporting	   director	   independence	   in	  2001.	  	  In	  earlier	  reports,	  since	  1997,	  no	  mention	  of	  director	  independence	  appears	  despite	   reference	   to	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Cadbury	   and	   Greenbury	   Codes,	  which	  were	  yet	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  Combined	  Code,	  concerning	  other	  features	  of	  Barclays’	   corporate	   governance	   apart	   from	   director	   independence.	   	   In	   a	   section	  entitled	  “Corporate	  Governance	  Report”	  (page	  24	  of	  316)	  of	  its	  2005	  annual	  report,	  however,	  the	  bank	  discloses	  that	  ten	  of	  sixteen	  of	   its	  directors	  are	  independent,	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐executive.	   	   It	  also	  reported	   that	   the	  board	  gave	  particular	  attention	   to	  one	  director	  for	  having	  served	  the	  longest	  among	  his	  peers,	  nine	  consecutive	  years,	  and	  decided	  to	  retain	  him	  as	  independent	  director.	  	  The	  company	  refers	  specifically	  to	   the	   Combined	   Code,	   described	   earlier,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   its	   own	   “Charter	   of	  Expectations,”	   which	   provides	   additional	   measures	   to	   help	   ascertain	   director	  independence.	   	  These	  measures	  are	  entirely	  subjective,	  such	  as	  whether	  a	  director	  challenges	   others	   and	   defends	   their	   viewpoints	   for	   the	   good	   the	   organization,	   or	  whether	   a	   director	   can	   evaluate	   the	   information	   provided	   by	  management.	   	   This	  section	  within	  the	  2005	  annual	  report	  is	  more	  prominent	  than	  in	  the	  2001	  version,	  which	   appears	   much	   later	   and	   provides	   less	   detail,	   i.e.	   compliance	   with	   the	  Combined	  Code	  but	  without	  further	  detail	  of	  each	  director’s	  independence.	  Another	  illustrative	  example	  of	  a	  British	  company	  disclosing	  that	  it	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  Combined	  Code’s	  director	  independence	  criteria	  and	  explaining	  how	  so,	  is	  
                                                48	  Examples	   of	   Canadian	   and	   American	   companies	   voluntarily	   adopting	   director	  independence	   criteria	   before	   their	   related	   regulations	   are	   similar	   to	   those	   in	   the	  aforementioned	  sub-­‐section	  on	  specialized	  board	  committees.	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engine	  maker,	  Rolls-­‐Royce.	   	  An	  early	  adopter	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure,	  the	  company	  has	  been	  reporting	  its	  compliance	  with	  the	  Combined	  Code	  since	  1998.	  	  In	  2006,	  the	  first	  year	  of	  regulation	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Rolls-­‐Royce	  disclosed	  that	  it	  was	  not	  fully	   compliant	   with	   the	   Combined	   Code’s	   criteria	   for	   director	   independence.	   	   A	  particular	   director	   had	   been	   serving	   on	   the	   board	   for	   ten	   consecutive	   years,	   one	  more	  than	  suggested	  in	  the	  Combined	  Code.	  	  The	  company	  acknowledged	  this	  fact,	  identified	   other	   areas	   in	   which	   the	   director	   was	   considered	   independent,	   and	  justified	  the	  lengthy	  tenure:	  “The	   Board	   believes	   strongly	   that	   in	   a	   long-­‐term,	   complex	   and	  technologically	   advanced	   business,	   it	   is	   essential	   that	   non-­‐executive	  directors	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  acquire,	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  the	  experience	   and	   knowledge	   of	   the	   business	   and	   the	   sectors	   within	  which	  the	  Group	  operates.”	  	  Fifteen	  of	   the	  137	  British	  companies	   (10.9%)	  had	  cross-­‐listings	  outside	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  2007,	  albeit	  none	  on	  the	  Toronto	  exchange	  and	  only	  two	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange.	  	  Among	  exchanges	  in	  other	  countries	  in	  this	  study	  were	  nine	   companies	   cross-­‐listed	   in	   Frankfurt,	   three	   in	   Tokyo,	   and	   one	   in	   Paris.	   	   That	  London	  is	  a	  capital	  markets	  magnet	  is	  no	  surprise;	  however,	  the	  fact	  that	  relatively	  few	  British	  companies	  list	  outside	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  has	  a	  counterintuitive	  effect	  on	  the	  regulation.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  quantity	  of	  cross-­‐listings	  of	   British	   companies	   matters	   less	   for	   influencing	   national	   regulation	   than	   which	  companies	   those	   are	   or	   their	   target	  markets	   for	   additional	   capital.	   	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   it	   is	   also	   plausible	   that	   these	   cross-­‐listings	   matter	   not	   only	   for	   influencing	  British	   regulation	   but	   also	   for	   those	   of	   the	   countries	   in	  which	   these	   cross-­‐listings	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occur.	  	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  ties	  to	  Frankfurt	  reinforce	  claims	  by	   the	   author’s	   of	   Germany’s	   corporate	   governance	   code	   that	   British	   practice—regulated	  and	  otherwise—directly	  influenced	  German	  corporate	  governance.	  The	   British	   regulation	   is	   found	   in	   Chapter	   46,	   section	   173	   of	   the	   2006	  Companies	   Act	   (for	   effect	   in	   2007),	   which	   sets	   out	   the	   duty	   for	   companies	   to	  exercise	   independent	   judgment:	   “(1)	   A	   director	   of	   a	   company	   must	   exercise	  independent	   judgment.	   (2)	   This	   duty	   is	   not	   infringed	   by	   his	   acting—(a)	   in	  accordance	  with	  an	  agreement	  duly	  entered	  into	  by	  the	  company	  that	  restricts	  the	  future	   exercise	   of	   discretion	   by	   its	   directors,	   or	   (b)	   in	   a	   way	   authorised	   by	   the	  company's	  constitution.”	  	  The	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  also	  established	  in	  2008	  the	  Disclosure	  and	  Transparency	  Rule	  7.1,	  which	   requires	  at	   least	  one	  member	  of	  audit	   committee	   to	   be	   independent49.	   	   Compared	   to	   the	   Canadian	   and	   American	  regulations,	   the	   British	   regulation	   of	   director	   independence	   is	   the	   most	   broadly	  defined.	  In	   the	  United	   States,	   the	  New	  York	   Stock	   Exchange’s	   Listing	   Rule	   303A.01,	  applicable	   to	   listed	   companies	   from	   2004,	   states	   simply:	   “Listed	   companies	  must	  have	  a	  majority	  of	  independent	  directors.”	  	  Rule	  303A.02	  elaborates	  in	  much	  greater	  detail	  several	  tests	  for	  director	  independence:	  “(a)	   No	   director	   qualifies	   as	   "independent"	   unless	   the	   board	   of	  directors	   affirmatively	   determines	   that	   the	   director	   has	   no	  material	  
                                                49	  The	   added	   requirement	   that	   audit	   committee	  members	   be	   independent	   earned	  the	   United	   Kingdom	   the	   corresponding	   coding	   of	   1	   for	   the	   outcome.	   	   Had	   this	  additional	   requirement	   not	   been	   made	   by	   the	   Financial	   Services	   Authority,	   the	  coding	  would	  have	  been	  0.75,	  commensurate	  with	  the	  2006	  Companies	  Act	  deferral	  to	  companies	  to	  prescribe	  their	  own	  director	  independence	  criteria.	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relationship	  with	  the	   listed	  company	  (either	  directly	  or	  as	  a	  partner,	  shareholder	  or	  officer	  of	  an	  organization	  that	  has	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	   company).	   Companies	   must	   identify	   which	   directors	   are	  independent	  and	  disclose	  the	  basis	  for	  that	  determination.”	  	  Subsections	   (b)(i)	   to	   (b)(v)	   stipulate	   further	   when	   a	   director	   is	   not	   considered	  independent,	   i.e.	  when	  employed—or	  when	  a	   family	  member	   is	  employed—by	  the	  company	   within	   the	   previous	   three	   years,	   or	   received	   compensation	   in	   excess	   of	  $120,000	  in	  the	  previous	  twelve	  months	  from	  the	  company,	  or	  is	  employed	  by	  the	  company’s	  internal	  or	  external	  auditor,	  or	  has	  been	  an	  executive	  officer	  of	  another	  company	  while	  being	  on	   that	   company’s	   compensation	   committee	   in	   the	  previous	  three	   years,	   or	  has	  made	  payments	   to	   the	   company	   in	   excess	   of	   the	   greater	   of	   $1	  million	  or	  2%	  of	  revenues.	  The	   NYSE	   listing	   rule	   followed	   the	   2002	   recommendations	   of	   its	   own	  Corporate	   Accountability	   and	   Listing	   Standards	   Committee,	   the	   creation	   of	  which	  was	   suggested	   by	   then	   SEC	   Chairman,	   Harvey	   Pitt.	   	   Other	   organizations	   voiced	  similar	   prescriptions	   for	   director	   independence,	   but	   none	   were	   combined	   into	   a	  single	  code	  as	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  The	  Conference	  Board	  Commission	  on	  Public	  Trust	   and	   Private	   Enterprise50 	  went	   further	   than	   the	   NYSE’s	   commission,	   for	  example,	  by	  proposing	  in	  2003	  that	  not	  just	  a	  majority	  of	  directors	  be	  independent,	  “substantial	   majority”.	   	   The	   Business	   Roundtable,	   conversely,	   has	   traditionally	  offered	  a	  more	  tepid	  attitude	  toward	  formalized	  rules	  and	  regulations,	  deferring	  to	  
                                                50 	  The	   commission,	   composed	   of	   industry,	   academic,	   and	   political	   leaders,	   is	  independent	  of	  the	  Conference	  Board	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  Pew	  Charitable	  Trusts.	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companies	  and	  their	  boards	  the	  primary	  judgment	  of	  director	  independence	  criteria	  and	  compliance:	  “If	   a	   particular	   director	   is	   not	   deemed	   sufficiently	   independent,	   the	  board	   may	   nevertheless	   conclude	   that	   the	   individual’s	   role	   on	   the	  board	  remains	  highly	  desirable	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  inside	  director)	  in	  the	   context	   of	   a	   board	   composed	  of	   a	  majority	   of	   directors	  with	   the	  requisite	  independence.	  The	  overall	  result	  should	  be	  a	  board	  that,	  as	  a	  whole,	   represents	   the	   interests	   of	   stockholders	   with	   appropriate	  independence”	   (Statement	   on	   Corporate	   Governance,	   September	  1997).	  	  The	   Business	   Roundtable’s	   position	   remained	   unchanged	   in	   its	   subsequent	  statement	   on	   corporate	   governance	   in	   2002.	   	   These	   two	   organizations	   represent	  contesting	   opinions	   of	   board	   independence	   criteria	   that	   did	   not	   successfully	  influence	  the	  final	  listing	  rules	  at	  the	  NYSE	  in	  either’s	  favor.	  262	   out	   of	   316	   American	   companies	   voluntarily	   disclosed	   their	   director	  independence	   before	   the	   2006	   regulation51.	   	   Fourteen	   of	   these	   companies	   (4.4%)	  had	   cross-­‐listings	   outside	   the	   United	   States	   in	   2006,	   including	   eleven	   companies	  cross-­‐listed	  in	  Toronto,	  and	  one	  each	  in	  Frankfurt,	  London,	  and	  Tokyo.	  	  Importantly	  all	   of	   these	   exchanges	   are	   in	   countries	   that	   regulated	   director	   independence,	   of	  which	  two	  had	  corresponding	  stock	  exchanges	  listing	  rules	  as	  well.	  	  	  
                                                51	  Although	   I	   did	   not	   formally	   model	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   compliance	   and	  disclosure	  with	  director	   independence	  as	  a	  precedent	   to	  stock	  market	  listing	  rules,	  voluntary	   practice	   is	   still	   pervasive	   prior	   to	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	   listing	   rules	   in	  every	   focal	   case.	   	   105	   of	   116	   Canadian	   companies	   voluntarily	   had	   independent	  directors	  by	  2004,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange’s	  related	  listing	  rule.	  	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  125	  out	  of	  137	  companies	  behaved	  likewise	  in	  2003,	  the	  year	  the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   formerly	   adopted	   the	   Combined	   Code’s	  recommendations	   as	   listing	   rules.	   	   Over	   85%	   of	   American	   companies	   were	   also	  voluntarily	   disclosing	   their	   director	   independence	   in	   2004,	   two	   years	   before	   the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  requirement.	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The	   same	   regulation	   that	   applied	   to	   specialized	   board	   committees	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  17	  CFR	  §	  229.407,	  applies	  to	  director	  independence.	  	  Article	  (a)(1)(i)	  allows	  a	  public	  company	  to	  establish	  its	  own	  “definition	  of	  independence	  that	  it	  uses	  for	  determining	  if	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  is	  independent	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  listing	  standards	  applicable.”	   	  So	  although	  companies	  may	  have	  their	  own	  criteria	   for	  director	   independence,	   the	  regulation	  defers	   to	   the	  stock	  exchange,	   i.e.	  the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange,	   which	   does	   have	   related	   independence	   criteria52.	  	  The	  article	  extends	  the	  director	  independence	  criteria	  to	  companies	  with	  or	  without	  specialized	  board	  committees.	  	  Exemptions	  can	  be	  made,	  but	  must	  be	  disclosed,	  for	  companies	   required	   to	   have	   a	  majority	   of	   independent	   directors	   on	   the	   board	   or	  meet	  independence	  criteria	  on	  specialized	  board	  committees.	  Four	  other	  countries	  influenced	  Canada,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  condition	  to	  which	  I	  refer	  as	  cumulative	  regulation.	   	  This	  condition	  of	  cumulative	   regulation	   includes	   only	   those	   countries	   having	   regulated	   director	  independence	   regardless	   of	   their	   causal	   paths	   to	   regulation.	   	   They	   comprise,	   in	  reverse	   chronological	  order:	   the	  effect	  of	  German	  and	  American	   regulation	  on	   the	  United	   Kingdom;	   the	   effect	   of	   Canadian	   and	   Japanese	   regulations	   on	   the	   United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom;	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  China	  on	  Canada,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  
                                                52	  If	   this	   study	   included	   companies	   listed	   on	   other	   American	   exchanges	   than	   the	  New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange,	   or	   included	   other	   corporate	   forms,	   I	   would	   have	   to	  modify	   the	   fuzzy	   set	   coding	   of	   this	   outcome	   to	   accommodate	   additional,	   related	  independence	  criteria,	  according	  to	  each	  corporate	  form	  and	  exchange.	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China	   was	   first	   to	   regulate	   director	   independence	   in	   2003.	   	   The	   China	  Securities	   Regulatory	   Commission	   (CSRC)	   issued	   Notice	   116,	   Article	   3	   of	   which	  stipulates	   broad	   independence	   criteria,	   especially	   for	   separate	   board	  director	   and	  executive	  positions53.	  	  Its	  subsections	  5	  and	  6	  also	  separate	  the	  roles	  between	  board	  directors	  and	  company	  executives.	   	  Article	  4	   requires	  a	  minimum	  one-­‐third	  of	   the	  board	   to	   be	   independent.	   	   Additional,	   negative	   qualifications	   of	   independent	  directors	   are	   also	   part	   of	   the	   CSRC’s	   Code	   of	   Corporate	   Governance,	   including	  limitations	  on	  share	  ownership.	   	  Article	  123	  of	  the	  Company	  Law,	  revised	  in	  2005,	  also	  formalized	  the	  requirement	  for	  independent	  directors:	  “A	  listed	  company	  shall	  have	   independent	   directors.	   	   The	   concrete	   measures	   shall	   be	   formulated	   by	   the	  State	  Council.”	  	  	  China	  bypasses	  the	  path	  that	  the	  other	  countries	  in	  this	  study	  take	  but	  is	  still	  the	  first	  to	  regulate	  this	  practice.	  	  One	  argument	  is	  that	  Chinese	  policymakers	  have	  an	   objective	   to	   use	   monitoring	   by	   the	   capital	   markets	   to	   transform	   governance	  structures	   of	   listed	   Chinese	   companies	   (Chen	   2007).	   	   Another	   argument	   takes	   a	  different	   view:	   “The	   Chinese	   government	   has	   never,	   however,	   had	   much	   faith	   in	  market	  solutions.	   	   Its	  approach	  to	  corporate	  governance	  has	  been	  no	  different	  (…)	  
                                                53	  This	   noticed	   applied	   to	   all	   securities	   companies,	   asset	  management	   companies,	  and	   all	   companies	   launching	   initial	   public	   offerings	   (IPO).	   	   “As	   from	   January	   1st,	  2004,	  an	   issuer	  applying	   for	   IPO	  shall	  be	  a	   joint	   stock	   limited	  company	  of	  at	   least	  three	  years	  from	  the	  day	  it	  was	  established.	  	  Waivers	  will	  be	  granted	  to	  a	  joint	  stock	  limited	  company	  restructured	  from	  a	  state-­‐owned	  enterprise	  on	  an	  integral	  basis,	  a	  joint	  stock	  limited	  company	  derived	  from	  a	  limited	  liability	  company	  on	  an	  integral	  basis,	   or	   an	   issuer	   approved	   by	   the	   State	   Council	   to	   be	   exempted	   for	   the	   term	  requirement	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraph.”	  	  It	  also	  followed	  a	  CSRC	  opinion	  issued	  in	  2001	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  independent	  board	  directors.	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Now	   it	   is	   requiring	   independent	   directors	   without	   any	   real	   effect”	   (Clarke	   2006:	  217).	  	  An	  UNCTAD	  2006	  survey	  of	  80	  Chinese	  listed	  companies	  reported	  that	  98%	  of	  the	   board	   directors	   were	   independent	   compared	   to	   88%	   of	   the	   sample	   OECD	  countries’	   boards.	   	   Nevertheless,	   concentrated	   ownership,	   particularly	   by	   Chinese	  various	   state	   agencies,	   persists	   despite	   the	   required	   introduction	   of	   independent	  directors	   into	  Chinese	  boards	   (Clarke	  2006,	   Feinerman	  2007).	   	   The	  problem	  with	  supposedly	  outside	  directors	  is	  that	  some	  are	  just	  retired	  senior	  executives	  of	  other	  SOEs54.	  	  	  	   A	   legal	   advisor	   at	   the	   China	   Corporate	   Governance	   Program	   in	   the	  International	   Finance	   Corporation’s	   Beijing	   office,	   formerly	   a	   legal	   adviser	   to	  mainland	   companies	   listing	   in	   Hong	   Kong,	   concurs:	   director	   independence	   is	  “window	   dressing.”	   	   The	   CSRC	   can	   check	   up	   on	   how	   board	   members	   vote	  “anonymously”,	   even	   an	   abstention,	   and	   pressure	   them.	   	   Few	   members	   veto	  anything	  the	  chairman	  wants	  either.	  	  Further,	  companies	  will	  do	  anything	  to	  get	  an	  IPO	  including	  the	  pursuit	  of	  separate	  ownership	  and	  management,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  controlled	  by	  the	  state.	  	  	  Absent	   from	  the	  Chinese	  qualifications	  however,	  are	   limits	  on	  related	  party	  transactions	  of	   the	  board	  directors	   found	   in	   the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange’s	  2003	  corporate	   governance	   rules,	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   the	   Chinese	   rules	   (Wang	   2008).	  American	  director	  independence	  qualifications,	  although	  unregulated	  at	  first	  in	  the	  
                                                54 	  Based	   on	   interview	   with	   a	   senior	   representative	   of	   the	   China	   Corporate	  Governance	  Center	  in	  Beijing,	  an	  organization	  similar	  to	  the	  IRRC/ISS	  of	  the	  United	  States.	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United	   States,	   were	   imported	   and	   adapted	   into	   the	   Chinese	   regulation,	   and	   “re-­‐exported.”	   	   The	   particular	   motives	   by	   Chinese	   policymakers	   and	   companies	   may	  help	   explain	   how	   China	   chartered	   its	   own	   path	   to	   regulation	   of	   director	  independence.	  	  	  The	  next	   two	  countries	   to	  regulate	  were	  Canada	  and	   Japan	   in	  2005.	   	  Recall	  that	  Canada’s	  regulation	  is	  treated	  as	  an	  outcome,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  causal	  condition	  for	  other	  countries’	  regulation.	  	  In	  Japan,	  the	  Company	  Act	  2005	  Article	  400	  requires	  a	  minimum	  of	  three	  members	  per	  committee,	  all	  of	  which	  must	  be	  "outside	  directors,"	  the	  definition	  of	  which	  is	  found	  in	  Article	  2(xv):	  "’Outside	   Director’	   means	   a	   director	   of	   any	   Stock	   Company	   who	   is	  neither	  an	  Executive	  Director	  (hereinafter	  referring	  to	  a	  director	  of	  a	  Stock	   Company	   listed	   in	   any	   item	   of	   Article	   363(1),	   and	   any	   other	  director	  who	  has	  executed	  operation	  of	  such	  Stock	  Company)	  nor	  an	  executive	  officer,	  nor	  an	  employee,	  including	  a	  manager,	  of	  such	  Stock	  Company	  or	  any	  of	  its	  Subsidiaries,	  and	  who	  has	  neither	  ever	  served	  in	   the	   past	   as	   an	   executive	   director	   nor	   executive	   officer,	   nor	   as	   an	  employee,	   including	  a	  manager,	  of	   such	  Stock	  Company	  or	  any	  of	   its	  Subsidiaries.”	  	  The	   distinction	   between	   “outside”	   and	   “independent”	   has	   historically	   been	   more	  than	  semantic	  in	  the	  Japanese	  case,	  but	  since	  the	  corporate	  governance	  reforms	  that	  took	  effect	  in	  2003,	  “outside	  directors	  are	  expected	  to	  play	  a	  role	  more	  akin	  to	  that	  expected	  of	   independent	  directors	   in	   the	  U.S.	   federal	  securities	   law”	  (Clarke	  2006:	  165).	   Next	  to	  regulate	  were	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  2006.	   	  In	  Germany,	  the	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code’s	  article	  5.4.2	  states:	  “To	   permit	   the	   Supervisory	   Board's	   independent	   advice	   and	  supervision	   of	   the	   Management	   Board,	   the	   Supervisory	   Board	   shall	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include	   what	   it	   considers	   an	   adequate	   number	   of	   independent	  members.	  A	  Supervisory	  Board	  member	  is	  considered	  independent	  if	  he/she	  has	  no	  business	  or	  personal	  relations	  with	  the	  company	  or	  its	  Management	  Board	  which	  cause	  a	  conflict	  of	  interests.	  Not	  more	  than	  two	  former	  members	  of	  the	  Management	  Board	  shall	  be	  members	  of	  the	   Supervisory	   Board	   and	   Supervisory	   Board	   members	   shall	   not	  exercise	   directorships	   or	   similar	   positions	   or	   advisory	   tasks	   for	  important	  competitors	  of	  the	  enterprise.”	  	  The	  term	  “shall”	  include	  implies	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle	  described	  earlier.	  	  France	  was	  cotemporaneous	  with	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  director	  independence	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	   included	  in	  the	  cumulative	  regulation	  condition	  for	  the	  three	  cases	  that	  followed	  the	  causal	  path.	  	  	  	   China,	   France,	   Germany,	   and	   Japan	   also	   regulated	   director	   independence	  disclosures	   but	   did	   not	   follow	   the	   same	   causal	   path	   as	   did	   Canada,	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   	   China	   was	   not	   a	   member	   in	   the	   set	   of	   highly	  developed	   capital	   markets	   when	   it	   regulated	   in	   2003	   nor	   did	   its	   main	   stock	  exchange	   have	   a	   corresponding	   listing	   rule.	   	   It	   did,	   however,	   have	   prevalence	   of	  disclosing	  this	  practice	  prior	  to	  regulation.	  	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Japan	  all	  regulated	  and	   were	   susceptible	   to	   influence	   by	   other	   regulating	   countries.	   	   None	   of	   these	  three,	   however,	   had	   related	   listing	   rules,	   and	   only	   France	   had	   prevalence	   of	  voluntary	  practice	   and	  was	   clearly	   in	   the	   set	   of	   highly	   developed	   capital	  markets.	  	  This	  highlights	  the	  point	  that	  the	  QCA	  does	  not	  offer	  the	  final	  word	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  conditions,	  but	  points	  to	  the	  causal	  paths	  that	  cut	  across	  different	  cases.	  	  	  Stock	  exchanges	  in	  Toronto,	  London,	  and	  New	  York	  came	  to	  predict—rather	  than	   pre-­‐empt—regulation	   of	   board	   director	   independence.	   	   The	   Toronto	   and	  London	   exchanges	   require	   that	   companies	   disclose	  whether	   their	   board	   directors	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meet	   independence	   criteria,	   or	   explain	  why	   they	  do	  not,	  whereas	  New	  York	  has	  a	  firm	   requirement.	   	   Companies	   in	   all	   three	   countries	  had	  prevalence	  of	   voluntarily	  disclosing	  information	  about	  their	  directors’	  independence	  in	  advance	  of	  regulation	  in	  each	  country.	  	  Several	  companies	  were	  also	  tied	  to	  exchanges	  outside	  their	  home	  country	  of	   incorporation,	  meaning	   that	   they	  are	   listed	  on	  at	   least	  one	  of	   the	  other	  exchanges	   among	   the	   focal	   countries.	   	   Almost	   40%	   of	   Canadian	   companies	   were	  cross-­‐listed	   in	   New	   York	   in	   2005,	   representing	   the	   strongest	   unidirectional	   tie	  among	  the	  exchanges.	  	  Canada,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  regulated	  director	  independence	  between	  2005	  and	  2007,	  by	  which	  time	  four	  other	  countries	  had	  also	  regulated,	  albeit	  through	  different	  causal	  paths	  each.	  	  The	  stock	  exchanges	  listing	   rules	   and	   ties	   compound	   the	   firms’	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   director	  independence	  criteria	  as	  a	  condition	  preceding	  regulation	   in	  these	  countries.	   	  This	  underscores	   the	   fact	   that	   private	   actors	   in	   the	   markets	   set	   the	   standard	   for	   this	  particular	   governance	   practice,	   unsurprisingly	   in	   three	   institutionally	   similar	  countries—Canada,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States—but	   more	  surprisingly,	  their	  regulation	  was	  influenced	  by	  other	  regulating	  countries	  that	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  markets	  in	  the	  same	  causal	  path,	  nor	  are	  institutionally	  similar.	  	   I	  do	  not	  elaborate	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  having	  independent	  directors	  on	  boards,	  a	  related	   debate	   in	   other	   literatures.	   	   Share	   performance,	   for	   example,	   is	   inversely	  correlated	   with	   the	   proportion	   of	   independent	   directors	   on	   boards	   of	   financial	  institutions	  (Erkens	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  Shipilov	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  find	  that	  Canadian	  companies	  variably	  adopt	  director	   independence	  between	  1999	  and	  2005,	   the	  year	   I	  observe	  
 140 
the	   arrival	   of	   regulation	   (0.75	   in	   Canada	   for	   both	   practices).	   	   This	   coincides	  with	  their	   first	   wave	   of	   diffusion	   of	   the	   underlying	   institutional	   logic,	   followed	   by	   a	  second	  wave	  comprising	  specific	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  director	  independence.	  	  	  “The	  fundamental	  mechanism	  driving	  mimetic	  adoption	  in	  the	  second	  stage	   of	   diffusion	   is	   uncertainty,	   i.e.	   later	   adopters	   rely	   on	   the	   clues	  received	   from	   early	   adopters	   to	   reduce	   their	   uncertainty	   about	   the	  merits	   of	   this	   practice.	   This	   model	   explains	   diffusion	   of	   a	   single	  practice,	   or	   a	   group	   of	   practices	   that	   spread	   simultaneously,	   but	   it	  does	   not	   explain	   the	   drivers	   of	   diffusion	   for	   multiple	   waves	   of	  practices	   that	   are	   connected	   by	   the	   same	   institutional	   logic.	   Our	  theory	   and	   findings	   show	   that	   such	   practices	   extent	   the	   hold	   of	   an	  institutional	   logic	   through	   path-­‐dependent	   adoption”	   (Shipilov	   et	   al.	  2009:	  875).	  	  	  	  Their	   analysis	   stops	   short	   of	   explaining,	   however,	   the	   shift	   from	   the	   adoption	   of	  practice,	  and	  attendant	   institutional	   logics,	   to	  regulation.	   	   I	  welcome	  their	   findings	  that	  board	  interlocks	  insufficiently	  predict	  voluntary	  adoption	  of	  independent	  board	  directors	  in	  a	  second	  wave,	  and	  that	  cross-­‐listing	  of	  Canadian	  companies	  on	  the	  New	  York	   Stock	   Exchange	   plays	   a	   causal	   role	   in	   the	   adoption	   of	   American	   practice	   at	  Canadian	  firms,	  but	  I	  challenge	  their	  inclusion	  of	  the	  multi-­‐wave	  diffusion	  to	  add	  the	  role	   of	   regulation	   in	   defining	   or	   altering	   the	   institutional	   logic.	   	   Canada	   regulated	  director	   independence	   just	   prior	   to	   the	   United	   States,	   albeit	   at	   a	   slightly	   lower	  degree	  of	   criteria-­‐setting,	   allowing	  Canadian	   companies	   to	   comply	  with	   their	   own	  director	  independence	  criteria.	  The	  Canadian	  and	  British	  exchanges	  adopt	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  approach,	  while	  the	  American	  approach	  is	  discernibly	  more	  rules-­‐based.	   	  TSX	  and	  NYSE	  both	  had	   listing	   rules	   on	   director	   independence	   by	   2004;	   Canada	   regulated	   board	  independence	  only	  one	  year	  later,	  the	  United	  States	  by	  2006.	  	  The	  United	  Kingdom	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took	   the	   longest—three	   years—from	   LSE’s	   first	   adoption	   of	   the	   Combined	   Code’s	  recommendation	   for	   director	   independence	   criteria	   to	   state-­‐based	   regulation.	  	  There	   is	   patent	   overlap	   of	   stock	   exchange	   criteria	   for	   board	   independence	   and	  specialized	  board	  committees.	  	  	  
	  
4.1.3	  	  	  Regulation	  of	  Auditor	  Independence	  The	   presence	   of	   voluntary	   practice,	   combined	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   stock	  exchange	  ties	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures,	  is	  the	  causal	  path	  specific	  to	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  	  The	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   practices	   among	   the	   companies	   of	   these	   two	  countries	   again	   figures	   as	   a	   causal	   condition	   as	   part	   of	   the	   path	   to	   regulation.	   	   In	  Canada,	   88	   out	   of	   116	   companies	   had	   already	   adopted	   auditor	   independence	  criteria	  and	  were	  disclosing	  these	  prior	  to	  the	  2005	  regulation.	  	  Research	  in	  Motion,	  the	   Canadian	   company	   that	   manufactures	   the	   BlackBerry,	   referred	   to	   its	  “independent	  auditors”	  in	  its	  2001	  annual	  report	  without	  any	  specific	  qualification	  to	   their	   independence.	   	   The	   company’s	   2002	  management	   information	   circular	   is	  the	  first	  to	  disclose	  auditor	  independence:	  “The	  Audit	  Committee	  has	  discussed	  with	  the	  Company’s	  co-­‐auditors,	  Zeifman	  &	  Company	  LLP	  and	  Ernst	  &	  Young	  LLP,	  issues	  about	   independence	   and	   have	   received	   written	   disclosures	   from	   these	   firms	  confirming	  such.”	  	   As	   I	   describe	   in	   the	   earlier	   subsection	   on	   director	   independence,	   stock	  market	   ties	   play	   a	   causal	   role	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	   auditor	   independence	   as	   well.	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Again,	   the	   ties—in	   terms	   of	   home	   country	   of	   companies’	   incorporation—are	  unbalanced	  between	  the	  Toronto	  and	  London	  stock	  exchanges.	  	  Only	  two	  Canadian	  companies	  were	   cross-­‐listed	   on	   the	   London	   Stock	  Exchange	   in	   2005,	   the	   year	   the	  path	  was	  modeled	  on	  Canada’s	  regulation.	   	  These	  companies	  were	  CIBC	  (Canadian	  Imperial	   Bank	   of	   Commerce)	   and	   Thomson	   Reuters,	   the	   same	   two	   Canadian	  companies	   with	   London	   listings	   identified	   in	   the	   path	   to	   regulation	   of	   director	  independence.	  	  Just	   two	   Canadian	   companies	   were	   listed	   on	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	  while	  no	  British	  companies	  were	  listed	  in	  Toronto.	  	  This	  points	  to	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  role	  of	  this	  condition.	  	  The	  Canadian	  companies	  plausibly	  adhere	  more	  to	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  where	   they	  have	  a	   stronger	  presence,	  measured	  by	  cross-­‐listing.	   	   It	   is	   also	   possible	   that	   the	   two	   key	   Canadian	   companies	   influence	  enough	  of	  the	  behavior	  of	  their	  compatriots.	  	  One	  shortcoming	  of	  the	  stock	  exchange	  ties	  condition	  is	  that	  it	  might	  not	  explain	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ties	  on	  other	  exchanges	  is	  causal.	   	  If	  two	  Canadian	  companies	  cross-­‐list	  on	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange,	  are	  their	   ties	   equally	   strong	   to	   produce	   a	   meaningful	   bond	   in	   coproducing	   the	  regulation,	   as	   do	   twenty	   Canadian	   companies	   on	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange?	  	  With	  real,	  not	  just	  estimated,	  data,	  we	  might	  better	  explore	  the	  strength	  of	  specific	  ties.	   Again	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  outcome	  yet	  for	  other	  cases	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  this	  practice.	  	  In	  Canada’s	  2004	  House	  of	  Commons,	  the	  left	  held	   the	  majority	  according	   to	   the	   following:	   the	  Liberal	  Party	  held	  135	  seats,	   the	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Bloc	   Québecois	   held	   54,	   and	   the	   New	   Democratic	   Party	   held	   19.	   	   Meanwhile	   the	  Conservatives	  held	  99	  seats.	  	  	  	   In	   Canada,	   National	   Policy	   52-­‐110	   sets	   auditor	   independence	   criteria.	   	   A	  "Companion	   Policy",	   52-­‐110CP,	  was	   amended	   in	   2005	   to	   expand	   the	   definition	   of	  auditor	   independence	   and	   includes	   the	  derivation	   of	   the	   rule	   as	   directly	   from	   the	  SEC	  and	  the	  NYSE	  listing	  requirement.	   	  	  All	   137	   British	   companies	   were	   likewise	   disclosing	   their	   compliance	   with	  auditor	   director	   criteria	   by	   the	   2006	   regulation	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   	   British	  retailer,	   Tesco,	   has	   been	   a	   longtime	   provider	   of	   information	   on	   its	   auditor’s	  independence.	   	  As	  early	  as	  1999,	  the	  company’s	  auditors	  furnished	  information	  on	  its	  independence	  criteria	  in	  Tesco’s	  annual	  report	  that	  year:	  “Our	  responsibilities,	  as	  independent	  auditors,	  are	  established	  by	  statute,	   the	  Auditing	  Practices	  Board,	   the	  Listing	  Rules	  of	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  and	  our	  profession’s	  ethical	  guidance.”55	  	  By	  2005	  the	  company	  reported:	  “The	  engagement	  and	  independence	  of	  external	  auditors	  is	  considered	  annually	   by	   the	   Audit	   Committee	   before	   they	   recommend	   their	  selection	   to	   the	   Board.	   	   The	   Committee	   has	   satisfied	   itself	   that	  PricewaterhouseCoopers	  LLP	  are	  independent	  and	  there	  are	  adequate	  controls	  in	  place	  to	  safeguard	  their	  objectivity.	  Such	  measures	  include	  the	  requirement	  to	  rotate	  audit	  partners	  every	  five	  years.”	  	  
                                                55	  The	  statue	  to	  which	  the	  auditors	  make	  reference	  here,	  however,	  do	  not	  relate	  to	  independence	   criteria.	   	   The	   mention	   here	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   only	   that	   auditor	  independence	  was	  a	  disclosed	   item	   in	   the	   company’s	   annual	   report.	   	  Reference	   to	  auditor	   independence	   was	   made	   by	   both	   Tesco	   and	   its	   auditor,	  PriceWaterhouseCoopers.	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None	  of	   the	  British	  firms	  in	  the	  population	  were	  cross-­‐listed	  on	  the	  Toronto	  Stock	  Exchange56.	  	  As	  per	  the	  final	  condition	  in	  this	  path,	  left-­‐leaning	  legislature,	  the	  2005	  British	  House	  of	  Commons	  was	  majority	   left:	   the	  Labor	  Party	  held	  355	  of	   the	  372	  leftist	   seats	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   269	   seats	   held	   by	   various	   right-­‐leaning	   parties,	   the	  largest	  number	  of	  which,	  198,	  held	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party.	  Regulation	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   stems	   from	   the	   Companies	   Act	   (2006)	  Section	   1151	   identifies	   auditor	   independence	   requirements.	   	   An	   auditor	   is	  considered	  independent	  if:	  “he	   is	   not	   an	   officer	   or	   employee	   of	   the	   company,	   or	   a	   partner	   or	  employee	  of	  such	  a	  person,	  or	  a	  partnership	  of	  which	  such	  a	  person	  is	  a	   partner;	   he	   is	   not	   an	   officer	   or	   employee	   of	   an	   associated	  undertaking	   of	   the	   company,	   or	   a	   partner	   or	   employee	   of	   such	   a	  person,	   or	   a	   partnership	   of	   which	   such	   a	   person	   is	   a	   partner;	   and	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  between	  the	  person	  or	  an	  associate	  of	  his,	  and	  the	  company	  or	  an	  associated	  undertaking	  of	   the	  company,	  a	  connection	  of	   any	   such	  description	   as	  may	  be	   specified	  by	   regulations	  made	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State.”57	  	  	   Two	  other	  countries,	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  regulated	  this	  practice	  following	  different	  paths.	   	  Germany’s	  path	   is	   found	   in	   the	   intermediate	  solution	  of	  the	  QCA	  but	  has	  low	  coverage,	  reducing	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  path	  for	  this	  case.	  	  In	  Germany,	  it	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  both	  voluntary	  practice	  and	  stock	  market	  ties	  that	   combines	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   to	   regulate	   in	   2001.	  	  
                                                56	  Nine	  were	  cross-­‐listed	  in	  Frankfurt,	  three	  in	  Tokyo,	  two	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  one	  in	  Paris.	   	  BP	  was	  the	  British	  company	  with	  the	  most	  cross-­‐listings	  outside	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  	  	  57 	  The	   Secretary	   of	   State	   is	   authorized	   to	   registered	   auditors	   who	   qualify	   as	  independent	  and	  make	  this	  information	  publicly	  available	  under	  sections	  1239	  and	  1240	  of	  the	  Act. 
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Although	   the	   United	   States	   has	   presence	   of	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   auditor	  independence	  criteria,	   it	  did	  not	  have	  a	   left-­‐leaning	   legislature	   in	  the	  year	  prior	  to	  regulation.	   	   Further,	   its	  main	   stock	   exchange,	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange,	   was	  more	  the	  target	  of	  other	   listed	  firms	  than	  a	  base	  from	  which	  American	  firms	  cross	  list	  on	  exchanges	  outside	  the	  United	  States.	  An	   alternative	   conceptualization	   of	   stock	   exchange	   ties	   could	   refer	   to	   the	  joint	   ownership	   of	   the	   exchanges	   themselves.	   	   Although	   I	   did	   not	   employ	   this	  concept	   for	   this	   study,	   future	   research	  on	   stock	  exchange	   ties	  might	   explore	  what	  appears	   to	   be	   a	   growing	   trend	   in	   exchange	   mergers.	   	   The	   New	   York	   Stock	  Exchange’s	   2006	   merger	   with	   Euronext	   (which	   includes	   the	   exchanges	   of	  Amsterdam,	   Brussels,	   and	   Paris)	   may	   have	   portended	   further	   consolidation	   of	  global	   stock	   exchanges.	   	   In	   early	   February	   2011,	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	  announced	   its	   merger	   with	   the	   Toronto	   Stock	   Exchange	   only	   to	   be	   outdone	   by	  Deutsche	  Börse’s	  announcement	  to	  merge	  with	  NYSE	  Euronext.	  	  Of	   the	   originally	   selected	   audit-­‐related	   governance	   practices,	   only	   the	  disclosure	  of	   auditor	   independence	   returned	  a	   conclusive	  path	   to	   regulation.	   	  The	  other	   audit-­‐related	   practices,	   disclosure	   of	   fees	   paid	   to	   auditor	   for	   both	   audit-­‐related	  and	  extraneous	  services,	  are	  regulated	   for	  causes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   this	  study.	  	  Further,	  there	  was	  little	  comparison	  to	  make	  among	  the	  cases	  for	  fees	  paid	  to	  the	  external	  auditor	  for	  non-­‐audit	  fees:	  only	  China	  regulated	  this	  disclosure	  among	  the	   other	   countries.	   	   For	   the	   regulation	   of	   audit	   fee	   disclosures,	   both	   Canada	   and	  China	   regulate	   this	   practice	   by	   2008.	   	   The	   lack	   of	   conclusive	   paths	   in	   the	   QCA,	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however,	   suggests	   a	   likely	   overlap	   with	   areas	   of	   regulation	   beyond	   corporate	  governance,	   especially	   tax	   and	   accounting	   law.	   	   Even	   if	   the	   compilation	   of	  regulations	   in	   these	  areas	  were	   feasible	   for	   this	   study,	  we	  cannot	  assume	   that	   the	  same	   conditions	   used	   to	  measure	   the	   path	   to	   regulation	   of	   corporate	   governance	  practices	   would	   apply	   to	   that	   for	   regulation	   of	   the	   disclosure	   of	   auditor	   fees	   in	  accounting	   standards	   and	   tax	   laws.	   	   For	   these	   reasons,	   a	   separate	   study	   of	   the	  causes	  to	  regulation	  of	  audit	  fee	  disclosures	  is	  warranted.	  	  
4.2	  	  	  Discussion	  	  The	  causal	  conditions	  used	  to	  trace	  the	  paths	  to	  regulation	  of	  these	  corporate	  governance	   practices	   highlight	   phenomena	   across	   diverse	   cases.	   	   Although	   the	  conditions	   cannot	  be	   considered	   independently	   causal,	   nor	   should	   their	   relevance	  be	   overplayed	   outside	   their	   configurations,	   several	   observations	   about	   them	   each	  stand	  out.	  	  	  The	   presence	   of	   stock	   market	   listing	   rules	   is	   an	   especially	   important	  condition	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	   director	   independence	   in	   Canada,	   the	   United	  Kingdom	   and	   the	  United	   States.	   	   These	   rules	   are	  market	   based,	   developed	   by	   the	  exchanges,	   and	   are	   additional	   to	   the	   basic	   requirements	   set	   previously	   by	   the	  securities	   regulators	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   listing	   on	   the	   exchange.	   	   Importantly,	   the	  exchanges	   required	   director	   independence	   disclosures	   prior	   to	   the	   American,	  British,	  and	  Canadian	  governments	  requiring	  the	  same	  disclosures.	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Voluntary	  practice	  is	  the	  most	  pervasive	  and	  actor-­‐oriented	  condition	  across	  the	  regulatory	  paths.	   	   Its	  presence	  was	  part	  of	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  of	  specialized	  board	   committees,	   director	   independence,	   auditor	   independence,	   and	   general	  corporate	   governance	   disclosures	   in	   five	   countries:	   Canada,	   China,	   France,	   the	  United	   Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   	   This	   demonstrates	   the	   pervasiveness	   of	  voluntary	   corporate	   practice	   preceding	   regulation	   across	   countries	   of	   dissimilar	  institutions,	  historical	  capital	  market	  development	  and	  political-­‐legal	  makeup.	  	  	  The	  
absence	  of	  voluntary	  practice	  was	  part	  of	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  of	  the	  disclosure	  of	  two	  types	  of	  executive	  compensation,	  base	  pay	  and	  stock	  options,	  in	  both	  Germany	  and	   the	  United	  States.	   	  This	  highlights	   the	  point	   that	  QCA	  offers	  over	  comparative	  methods,	   e.g.	  multivariate	   regression,	  by	   including	   the	  absence	  of	  a	   condition	  as	  a	  co-­‐factor	  in	  the	  outcome58.	  	  Although	  the	  other	  conditions	  that	  I	  hypothesized	  would	  join	   in	   configurations	   that	   led	   to	   regulation—and	   they	   are	   indeed	   partially	   causal	  across	  select	  practices—only	  voluntary	  practice	  by	  firms	  appears	  in	  the	  paths	  for	  all	  regulated	  practices	  analyzed.	  The	  presence	   of	   scandals	   related	   to	   specialized	   board	   committees	   similarly	  played	  a	  causal	  role	   in	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  not	   in	  other	  countries.	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  presence	  of	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  scandal	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  regulation	   of	   the	   other	   governance	   practices.	   	   This	   finding	   directly	   challenges	   the	  hypothesis	  that	  scandals	  are	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  regulation:	  the	  opposite	  holds	  
                                                58	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets,	   stock	   exchange	   ties,	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures,	  and	  cumulative	  regulation	  are	  also	  conditions	  that	  are	  notably	  present	  in	  any	  causal	  path	  in	  which	  they	  occur,	  never	  absent.	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true	   for	   the	  majority	  of	  governance-­‐related	  practices.	   	  One	   implication	   is	   that	  only	  systemic	  crises,	  not	  the	  accumulation	  of	  scandals	  at	  individual	  firms,	  might	  prompt	  regulatory	   response.	   	   Another	   is	   that	   regulation	   is	   not	   the	   government’s	   only	  response	   to	   scandals,	   but	   that	   criminal	   law	   or	   other	   legal	   remedies	   suffices	   as	   a	  response.	  	  As	   for	   the	   coding	   of	   the	   scandals,	   I	   did	   not	  mark	   an	   end	   time	  per	   se.	   	   It	   is	  possible,	   therefore,	   that	   a	   scandal	   loses	   salience	   before	   regulatory	   response.	   	   The	  potential	  limitation	  is	  not,	  however,	  that	  I	  may	  have	  overcompensated	  for	  the	  role	  of	  scandals	   on	   regulation,	   rather	   that	   I	  might	   have	   under-­‐accounted	   for	   the	   damage	  done	   to	   particular	   actors,	   which	   in	   turn	   might	   be	   an	   additional	   condition	   for	  regulation.	  	  Further,	  collusion	  between	  government	  officials	  and	  market	  actors	  may	  be	   masked	   in	   the	   path	   to	   regulation.	   	   Other	   outcomes	   from	   scandals	   apart	   from	  regulation,	   or	  modifications	   to	   regulation,	   are	   certainly	   plausible:	   removal	   of	   key	  culprits	   from	  their	   responsibilities,	  punitive	  measures,	   retribution	   for	  victims,	  and	  similar	   sanctions.	   	   The	   reporting	   of	   scandals	   in	   some	   countries	  without	   a	   strong,	  vibrant,	   independent	  media,	   e.g.,	   China,	   could	   also	   compromise	   the	   quality	   of	   this	  condition.	   	  A	  narrower	   selection	  of	   cases,	   or	   an	   in	  depth	   analysis	   of	   a	   single	   case,	  could	   reveal	   greater	  detail	   of	   scandals	   and	  any	   causality	   to	   subsequent	   regulation	  better	  than	  a	  macro-­‐level	  comparison	  like	  this	  one	  can.	  	  	  Stock	  exchange	  ties	  were	  another	  important,	  market-­‐based	  ingredient	  to	  the	  regulation	   of	   director	   independence	   and	   auditor	   independence.	   	   Companies	   with	  cross-­‐listings	  on	  stock	  exchanges	  in	  Toronto,	  London,	  and	  New	  York	  were	  the	  focal	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point	   for	   this	   condition.	   	   Ties	   were	   not	   balanced	   among	   these	   three	   exchanges,	  however.	   	   Canadian	   companies	   were	   largely	   cross-­‐listed	   on	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	  Exchange	   in	   the	   path	   to	   regulation	   of	   director	   independence,	   but	   few	   American	  firms	   listed	   in	   Toronto	   or	   London.	   	   Nor	   were	   transatlantic	   ties	   particularly	  important	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  auditor	  independence:	  just	  two	  Canadian	  firms	  were	  cross-­‐listed	   in	   London	   yet	   no	   British	   firms	   were	   cross-­‐listed	   in	   Toronto.	   	   The	  condition	  measures	   the	   cross	   listings	  of	   firms	   form	  one	   country	  on	   the	   exchanges	  from	  all	  the	  other	  countries.	  	  As	  such,	  Canadian	  firms	  unsurprisingly	  have	  among	  the	  highest	  cross-­‐listings	  outside	  Toronto.	  	  So,	  too,	  do	  Australian	  firms	  outside	  Sydney,	  yet	  Australia	  did	  not	   regulate	  director	   independence.	   	  The	   findings	   from	  the	  stock	  exchange	  ties	  reflect	  more	  than	  just	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  London	  and	  New	  York	   are	   premier	   capitals	   of	   finance,	   but	   that	   both	   these	   stock	   exchanges	   have	  profound	  influence	  on	  governing	  finance.	   	  The	  exchanges	  act	  not	  only	  as	  agents	  on	  behalf	  of	   securities	  regulators	   to	  require	  minimum	  standards	   for	   listed	  companies	  set	   forth	   by	   extant	   regulation,	   but	   also	   acts	   as	   author	   of	   additional	   government	  regulations.	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  stock	  exchange	  ties	  are	  part	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	   the	   two	   forms	  of	   independence—director	  and	  auditor—and	  that	   this	  notion	  of	  such	  independence	  is	  an	  American	  governance	  export.	  The	  lack	  of	   full	  panel	  data	  on	  the	  stock	  exchange	  ties	   is	  a	  glaring	  limitation,	  even	   though	   I	   was	   able	   to	   use	   the	   adjusted	   data	   to	   ascertain	   year-­‐specific	   cross	  listings,	   and	   found	   that	   at	   least	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	   director	   independence	   in	  Canada,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   auditor	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independence	   in	  Canada	  and	   the	  United	  Kingdom,	   the	  presence	  of	   stock	  exchange	  ties	  was	   a	   necessary	   condition	   in	   the	   causal	   path.	   	   I	   raise	   an	   important	   point	   for	  future	  research:	  that	  not	  only	  the	  ties	  of	  the	  exchanges	  via	  the	  cross-­‐listings	  of	  firms	  as	  I	  have	  analyzed	  here,	  but	  also	  the	  mergers	  of	  stock	  exchanges	  themselves,	  could	  precipitate	  the	  homogenization	  of	  listing	  rules	  as	  well	  as	  financial	  regulatory	  reform.	  	  	  The	   political	   party	   composition	   in	   British	   and	   Canadian	   legislatures,	  particularly	   the	   left-­‐leaning	   parties,	   is	   crucial	   in	   the	   regulation	   auditor	  independence	   disclosures.	   	   The	   key	   observation	   about	   this	   condition	   is	   that	   its	  absence,	  i.e.	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  right-­‐leaning	  legislature,	  does	  not	  combine	  with	  other	  conditions	   to	   cause	   the	   regulation	  of	  any	  of	   these	  corporate	  governance	  practices.	  	  One	   would	   not	   expect	   that	   countries	   with	   right-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   to	   be	  particularly	  enthusiastic	  about	  regulating	  markets,	  especially	  when	  the	  behavior	  is	  already	  normative	  or	  sanctioned	  by	  other	  market	  actors.	  	  This	  finding	  might	  initially	  appear	  as	  intuitive,	  but	  at	   least	  one	  caveat	  and	  one	  major	  implication	  are	  in	  order.	  	  The	   caveat	   is	   that	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   did	   not	   regulate	   the	   compensation	   and	  auditor	   independence	   disclosures	   without	   other	   key	   conditions.	   	   Therefore	   the	  application	   of	   this	   condition	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   other	   regulations	   must	   weight	  carefully	  the	  configurations	  of	  other	  conditions	  that	  bear	  upon	  left-­‐leaning	  parties	  in	  legislatures.	  	  The	  major	  implication	  is	  that	  politics	  indeed	  matters	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  market	  behavior,	  especially	  amidst	  contemporary	  debates	  in	  Western	  economies	  about	  financial	  regulatory	  reform	  as	  well	  as	  in	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes	  like	  China.	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Other	  political	  characteristics	  could	  advance	  these	   initial	   findings	  about	   the	  interplay	   between	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   and	   regulation.	   	   Insulation	   of	   political	  influence	   among	   the	   regulators	   would	   be	   a	   worthwhile	   measurement.	  	  Appointments	  and	  advancement	  in	  the	  ranks	  of	  regulatory	  agencies	  are	  not	  immune	  to	   political	   influence.	   	   Likewise	   are	   the	   pressures	   to	   regulate—or	   not	   regulate—when	   new	   legislation	   does	   not	   directly	   require	   state	   agencies	   to	   act.	   	   Which	   key	  actors	  make	  key	  regulatory	  changes	  within	  these	  state	  agencies,	  and	  their	  individual	  political	   leanings,	  are	  other	   refinements	   to	   regulatory	  processes	   that	   could	  extend	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Tangentially	  related	  as	  well	  is	  the	  political	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  which	  was	  beyond	  this	  study’s	  focus,	  could	  also	  reinforce	  or	  repeal	  certain	  regulatory	  measures.	  	  Despite	  the	  findings,	  we	  lack	  greater	  insight	  as	  to	  the	  legislative	   or	   regulatory	   history	   that	   an	   entirely	   qualitative	   study	   of	   archived	  documents	  and	  firsthand	  interviews	  with	  legislators	  and	  regulators	  could	  impart.	  	  A	  single	   case	   study	   or	   a	   two-­‐case	   comparison	   might	   explore	   in	   greater	   detail	   the	  individual	  paths	   that	   regulation	   took	   in	  a	  particular	  governance	  practice.	   	   It	   could	  also	   include	   the	   role	   of	   law	   in	   extra-­‐regulatory	  mechanisms	   that	   still	   bear	   on	   the	  regulation	   and	   its	   potential	   repeal,	   limited	   application,	   and	   other	   unintended	  consequences.	  	  	   Membership	   in	   the	   set	   of	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets	   was	   another	  crucial	  condition	  on	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  for	  Canada,	  France,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  It	  should	  come	  as	  little	  surprise	  that	  a	  significantly	  high	  portion	  of	  a	  country’s	  GDP	  coming	   from	   the	   capital	   markets	   is	   key	   for	   regulating	   corporate	   governance	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practices.	   	  However,	  more	   informative	   is	   the	   finding	   that	   this	   condition	  applies	   to	  countries	   that	   are	   dissimilar	   is	   many	   traditional	   accounts	   of	   their	   governance	   of	  market	   behavior.	   	   Like	   the	   other	   conditions,	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets	  cannot	   be	   read	   as	   independently	   causal,	   but	   its	   causal	   role	   across	   institutionally	  disparate	  countries	  demonstrates	  the	  influence	  of	  markets	  on	  regulation.	  	  The	  major	  implication	  of	  this	  condition	  is	  that	  when	  combined	  with	  others,	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  markets	  on	  making	  regulation.	  Similarly,	   the	   cumulative	   regulation	  by	   some	  countries	  has	  an	  effect	  on	   the	  regulation	  of	  others.	   	  The	  effect	   is	  evident	  only	   in	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  two	  board-­‐related	   practices:	   specialized	   committees	   and	   director	   independence.	   	   Canada,	  France,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   are	   discernibly	   influenced	   by	  regulations	  of	  like	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  in	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  China,	  India,	   and	   Japan.	   	   This	   finding	   demonstrates	   the	   importance	   of	   conceptualizing	  alternative	   governance	   structures	   in	  which	   the	   aggregate	   conditions	   precedent	   to	  regulation	   may	   vary	   across	   cases,	   but	   the	   common	   factor	   of	   regulation	   itself—versus	   the	   absence	   of	   regulation—is	   itself	   a	   cause	   of	   some	   countries’	   eventual	  regulation.	  	  	   Corporate	   governance	   codes	   were	   another	   possible	   causal	   condition,	   but	  only	  three	  countries	  have	  corporate	  governance	  codes	  that	  concern	  specifically	  the	  focal	  practices.	  	  One	  can	  refer	  to	  these	  codes	  as	  “national”	  but	  they	  are	  not	  so	  much	  an	   extension	   of	   state	   policy,	   as	   they	   are	   occasionally	   commissioned	   by	   the	  government	  and	  directly	  implicate	  the	  stock	  exchanges	  within	  national	  borders	  and	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without	   necessarily	   coinciding	   with	   state	   regulation.	   	   In	   China	   and	   Germany,	   the	  government	   sponsored	   national	   commissions	   whereas	   in	   France,	   it	   was	   business	  associations	   that	   drafted	   earlier	   corporate	   governance	   reports	   that	   eventually	  merged	  into	  a	  single	  code.	  	  The	  addition	  of	  a	  national	  corporate	  governance	  code	  as	  a	   separate	   causal	   condition	   would	   have	   posed	   several	   problems.	   	   The	   first	   is	  potential	   duplication	  with	   regulation,	   in	  which	   case	   there	   is	   a	   conflation	  of	   causal	  condition	   and	   outcome	   of	   regulation.	   	   The	   second	   is	   that	   I	   already	   include	   the	  specific	   role	   of	   each	   code	   as	   supplemental	   cause	   of	   regulation	   where	   plausible.	  	  Another	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  codes,	  or	  specific	  provisions	  thereof,	  occasionally	  form	  the	   stock	   exchange	   listing	   rule.	   	   In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   for	   example,	   there	   is	   an	  explicit	   overlap	   between	   the	   listing	   rules	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   and	   the	  Combined	  Code.	   	  Beyond	  the	  national	   level	  of	  corporate	  governance	  codes,	   the	  EU	  has	   no	   specific	   code	   of	   corporate	   governance	   and	   EU	   directives	   are	   considered	  separately	   under	   regulation	  when	   transposed	   into	   national	   law.	   	  Nor	   is	   there	   is	   a	  truly	  international	  code	  of	  corporate	  governance	  that	  countries	  have	  agreed	  to	  and	  instated	  into	  national	  law	  somehow.	  	  The	  OECD	  Principles	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  come	  close	  to	  such	  an	  international	  code,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  regulation,	  or	  any	  other	  specific	   policy	   per	   se,	   rather	   an	   agglomeration	   of	   member	   countries’	   respective	  standards,	   including	   some	   regulations,	   and	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   coordinated	   policy,	  deliberated	   and	   agreed	   to	   as	   principles	   in	   the	  OECD.	   	   It	  was	   for	   this	   coordination	  that	   I	   employed	   the	   OECD	   Principles	   in	   part	   as	   a	   case	   selection	   tool,	   both	   for	  countries	  and	  for	  corporate	  governance	  practices.	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I	  did	  not	  include	  shareholder	  groups,	  or	  their	  agents,	  as	  a	  causal	  condition	  for	  lack	   of	   available	   data.	   	   Moreover,	   shareholder	   advocacy	   groups	   tend	   to	   exert	  corporate	   governance	   standards	   via	   proxy	   voting,	   which	   has	   traditionally	   been	   a	  particular	   feature	   of	   American	   institutional	   investing,	   and	   limited	   to	   those	   listed	  firms	  with	  dispersed	  ownership.	   	   Shareholder	  proxy	  proposals	   are	  non-­‐binding	   in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  although	  legally	  binding	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  much	  of	  Europe,	  minus	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  They	  are	  far	  less	  frequent	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and,	   in	   Continental	   Europe,	   pertain	   specifically	   to	   corporate	   governance	   matters,	  and	   not	   other	   matters	   such	   as	   asset	   allocation,	   capital	   structure,	   and	   general	  meeting	  items	  found	  in	  American	  proposals	  (Cziraki	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  	  There	  might	  be	  yet	  other	  conditions	  that	  functionally	  equate	  to	  the	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  I	  traced	  along	  paths	  to	  regulation.	  	  For	  comparative	  cases	  such	  as	   these,	   the	   challenge	   is	   to	   locate	   those	   that	   are	   indeed	   comparative,	   or	   provide	  strong	  exceptions	  to	  single	  cases	  that	  warrant	  a	  different	  analytical	  lens	  for	  seeking	  causality.	  	  In	   this	   study	   I	   show	   that	   the	   selected	   conditions	   still	   configure	   in	   precise	  ways	  that	  explain	  between	  a	  third	  and	  a	  half	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  regulation,	  based	  on	  coverage	   scores,	   for	   the	   six	   target	   governance	   practices	   in	   seven	   of	   the	   countries	  analyzed.	   	  Despite	   that	  diversity,	   I	   can	  offer	  no	  explanation	  as	   to	   the	  regulation	  of	  specialized	  board	  committees	  and	  director	  independence	  in	  Japan.	  	  Its	  approach	  to	  corporate	   governance	   reforms	   of	   the	   past	   decade	   can	   be	   described	   as	   selective	  adaptation	   of	   American	   practices	   (Nakamura	   2010).	   	   This	   uneven	   approach	   to	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adopting	   imported	   governance	   practices	  might	   explain	   the	   low	   rates	   of	   voluntary	  practice	   at	   Japanese	   firms,	   precluding	   it	   from	   the	   causal	   path	   that	   explains	   the	  outcome	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  The	  Japanese	  government’s	  recent	  reform	  of	  corporate	  law,	  moving	  away	  from	  bank-­‐centric	  governance	  to	  a	  slightly	  more	  Anglo-­‐American,	  dispersed	  ownership	  structures,	  might	  be	  too	  early	  to	  be	  conclusive.	  	  	  The	   point	   of	   locating	   the	   causal	   paths	   to	   regulation	   is	   not	   to	   explain	   the	  outcome	   of	   regulation	   in	   every	   country	   that	   ultimately	   regulated.	   	   Rather,	   it	   is	   to	  make	   better	   causal	   inference	   for	   those	   that	   did.	   	   Like	   Vogel	   (1996),	   I	   consider	  differences	   among	   regulatory	   regimes	   not	   just	   in	   kind,	   but	   in	   degree.	   	   Fuzzy	   sets	  captured	   the	   nuance	   between	   compulsory	   regulation	   and	   regulation	   that	   allows	  companies	   leeway	   to	   comply	   with	   regulation	   or	   explain	   their	   non-­‐compliance.	  	  Although	   I	   do	   not	   evaluate	   the	   degree	   of	   corporate	   compliance	   nor	   regulatory	  enforcement,	   tasks	   best	   left	   to	   policy	   analysts,	   I	   do	   take	   comparative	   regulation	  research	  forward.	  I	   selected	   the	   largest	   of	   capital	   markets	   over	   the	   past	   twenty	   years.	   	   An	  extended	   temporal	  period	  would	  not	  necessarily	   improve	   the	   research	  because	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  accelerated	  development	  of	  the	  capital	  markets	  since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  compensation	   in	  the	  United	  States	  notwithstanding.	   	   In	  fact,	   at	   least	   two	   cases,	   China	   and	   India,	   would	   not	   have	   appeared	   among	   the	  selected	  cases	  because	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  developed	  capital	  markets	  in	  an	  earlier	  time	  spans.	  	  Of	  course	  had	  I	  expanded	  instead	  the	  number	  of	  country-­‐cases,	  even	  over	  the	  chosen	  temporal	  period,	  I	  would	  likely	  capture	  even	  greater	  diversity	  of	  regulatory	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paths.	   	  Countries	  on	   the	   initial	   list	  of	   candidate	   cases,	   such	  as	  Brazil,	  China,	  Czech	  Republic,	   Indonesia,	   Italy,	   South	   Africa,	   Spain	   and	   Turkey	   to	   highlight	   but	   a	   few,	  would	   provide	   even	   greater	   diversity	   to	   the	   comparative	   analysis.	   	   However,	  feasibility	  was	   the	  crucial	   factor	   in	   limiting	   the	  cases	   to	   ten	  countries,	  which	  were	  home	  to	  more	  than	  1500	  listed	  companies	  that	  required	  substantial	  time	  to	  code	  for	  evidence	   of	   voluntary	   practice	   over	   the	   twenty-­‐year	   horizon.	   	   Thirty	   potential	  additional	   countries	   would	   have	   more	   than	   doubled	   the	   additional	   companies	   to	  code	   for	   evidence	   of	   voluntary	   practice,	   plus	   the	   additional	   causal	   conditions	   and	  regulations.	  I	   selected	   companies	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   their	   home	   jurisdictions,	   so	   I	  may	  not	  have	   captured	   the	   corporate	   governance	   reporting	   requirements	   of	   all	   foreign	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  exchanges	  in	  countries	  I	  examined	  here.	  	  Requirements	  can	  run	  in	  two	  directions:	  of	  companies	  listed	  abroad	  to	  report	  to	  their	  home	  country	  of	  incorporation	   which	   governance	   codes	   they	   comply	   with	   (CSRC),	   exemptions	   for	  foreign	   incorporated	   companies	   listed	   locally	   (NYSE,	  UK	  Combined	  Code).	  The	  EU	  Directive	   2006/46	   sought	   to	   coordinate	   compliance	   with	   at	   least	   one	   corporate	  governance	   code	   for	   companies	   listed	   on	   any	   regulated	   exchange	   in	   the	   EU	  otherwise	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  have	  dual	  requirements	  or	  none	  at	  all.	  	  	  As	  per	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  outcomes,	   there	   is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  I	  overlooked	   statutes	   and	   regulations	   that	   apply	   to	   only	   one	   industry	   or	   subset	   of	  firms,	   e.g.	   banking,	   energy,	   or	   utilities.	   	   Despite	  my	   search	   for	   voluntary	   practices	  transformed	   into	   regulations	   that	   apply	   broadly	   across	   industries,	   any	   industry-­‐
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5.1	  	  	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  The	   regulatory	   variety	   of	   capitalism	   proposed	   here	   demonstrates	   how	  market	   actors	  move	  beyond	  mere	   self-­‐regulation	   to	   influencing	   formal	   regulation.	  	  	  Firms	  are	  crucially	  important	  on	  this	  path	  by	  voluntarily	  practicing	  behavior	  before	  it	   becomes	   regulated.	   	  When	   firms	  do	  not	   voluntarily,	   or	   self-­‐regulate,	   lawmakers	  can	  successfully	  push	  regulation	  if	  their	  legislatures	  are	  composed	  predominantly	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  political	  parties.	  	  Firm	  scandals	  play	  a	  similar,	  but	  less	  pervasive	  role,	  as	  voluntary	  practice.	  	  They	  occasionally	  nudge	  countries	  along	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  but	  their	  absence	  does	  not	  impede	  left-­‐leaning	  lawmakers	  from	  regulating.	  In	   addition,	   the	   stock	   exchanges	   on	  which	   firms	   list	   shares	   establish	   rules	  that	   also	   influence	   regulation.	   	   These	   rules	   are	   either	   prewritten	   regulations	   in	  countries	   traditionally	   considered	   lenient	   to	   free	   markets.	   	   The	   lack	   of	   certain	  exchange	   rules,	   conversely,	   is	   among	   the	   catalysts	   to	   regulation	   in	   more	   state-­‐centric	  economies.	  The	   aforementioned	   conditions	   pertain	   to	   market	   actors,	   yet	   market	  attributes	   also	   help	   the	   evolutionary	   process	   of	   regulation.	   	   Stock	   exchange	   ties,	  measured	  as	  aggregate	  cross-­‐listings,	  matter	  especially	  for	  regulation	  of	  two	  related	  practices	  of	  American	  origin.	  	  Capital	  market	  development,	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  total	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shares	  traded	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  is	  commensurate	  with	  regulators’	  deferral	  to	  market	  actors	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  rules	  that	  regulators	  subsequently	  formalize.	  	  	  Last	   among	   the	   causal	   conditions,	   the	   cumulative	   regulation	   in	   certain	  countries	  affects	  the	  later	  regulation	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  This	  condition	  is	  especially	  noteworthy	  for	  stemming	  from	  countries	  that	  may	  ultimately	  follow	  divergent	  paths	  to	   regulation.	   	   Many	   paths—precise	   combinations	   of	   conditions—across	   all	   the	  cases	  were	  indeed	  possible,	  but	  only	  few	  led	  to	  the	  observed	  regulations.	  	  	  As	   expected	   of	   research	   in	   previously	   unexplored	   terrain,	   this	   study	   has	  particular	  limitations.	  	  First,	  there	  are	  no	  well-­‐established	  models	  for	  measuring	  and	  comparing	  determinants	  of	  regulation	  beyond	  small	  numbers	  of	  cases.	  	  I	  chose	  QCA	  for	  its	  ability	  to	  approximate	  large	  N	  comparisons	  of	  multivariate	  regression	  while	  preserving	  some	  of	  the	  richness	  that	  smaller	  N,	  qualitative	  research	  offers.	  	  	  Second,	   the	   coding	   of	   the	   conditions	   and	   outcomes	   presented	   specific	  challenges.	  	  Whether	  sets	  were	  binary,	  as	  in	  the	  stock	  exchange	  listing	  rules	  and	  left-­‐leaning	   legislatures,	   or	   fuzzy	   transformations	  of	   either	  original	  data,	   i.e.	   voluntary	  practice,	   scandals,	   exchange	   ties,	   or	   of	   secondary	   data,	   i.e.	   capital	   markets	  development,	   I	   demonstrate	   the	   versatility	   of	   coding	   and	   calibration	   based	   on	  theoretical	   knowledge.	   	   Although	   I	   do	   not	   measure	   regulatory	   enforcement	   or	  corporate	  compliance	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  regulations,	  I	  do	  measure	  the	  difference	  in	  degree	   of	   a	   regulation’s	   origin—state	   or	  market—while	   avoiding	   the	   extremes	   of	  crisp	   sets	   and	   fine-­‐grained	   degrees	   of	   fuzzy	   sets.	   	   Leuz	   (2010)	   similarly	   assesses	  differences	   between	   rules-­‐based	   and	   principles-­‐based	   standards,	   the	   latter	   giving	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more	  discretion	  to	  firms,	  such	  as	  what	  I	  found	  in	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle.	  	  Schneiberg	   &	   Bartley	   (2008)	   likewise	   recommend	   modifying	   simple	   binary	  outcomes	   of	   practice	   or	   policy	   adoption	   to	   account	   for	   local	   framing	   and	  interpretation.	   	  Toward	   this	  end,	  my	  analysis	  of	  evolutionary	  regulation	  answered	  their	  call	  for	  research	  that	  “considers	  the	  interplay	  of	  multiple	  regulatory	  dynamics	  and	   forms,	   including	   the	   possibility	   that	   there	   are	   mixed	   and	   contradictory	  dynamics	   in	   play	   (…)	   Furthermore,	   multiple	   forms	   of	   regulation	   often	   intersect,	  raising	   questions	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   undermine	   or	   reinforce	   one	  another”	   (Schneiberg	  &	  Bartley	  2008:	  51).	   	   Further,	   I	   included	  both	   temporal	   and	  sequential	  characteristics	  of	  the	  data	  directly	  into	  the	  models,	  a	  major	  contribution	  to	   QCA.	   	   Together,	   the	   data	   and	   analytical	   method	   offer	   replicability	   and	  opportunities	  to	  extend	  this	  study’s	  findings	  to	  additional	  countries	  and	  markets.	  	  	  Third,	  other	  changes	  in	  corporate	  governance	  are	  unfolding	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Some	  companies	  may	  eschew	  public	  listing	  entirely	  and	  opt	  for	  private	  ownership,	  shedding	  disclosure	  of	  their	  governance	  attributes.	  	  The	  rise	  of	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises,	   particularly	   in	   recently	   emerged	   and	   emerging	  economies,	   are	   swinging	   the	  pendulum	  back	   from	  privatization	   to	  nationalization.	  	  The	   findings	  might	   thus	  be	   limited	   in	   application	   to	   certain	  other	   corporations	  or	  other	  governance	  arrangements	  like	  hedge	  funds	  or	  private	  equity.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  findings	  are	  salient	  for	  explaining	  the	  diversity	  of	  voluntary	  practices	  that	  could	  be	  regulated	  in	  other	  areas	  apart	  from	  corporate	  governance.	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Plato	  argued	  that	  morality	  comes	  from	  full	  disclosure,	  and	  although	  I	  would	  not	   rely	   on	   corporate	   disclosure	   as	   evidence	   of	   morality,	   I	   did	   rely	   on	   them	   for	  evidence	   of	   voluntary	   practice.	   	   I	   hesitate	   to	   argue	   that	   disclosures	   can	   prevent	  corporate	   malfeasance	   or	   that	   corporate	   disclosures	   can	   be	   taken	   at	   face	   value.	  	  However,	  they	  are	  the	  most	  feasible	  and	  comparable	  data	  when	  assessing	  over	  1500	  companies	   for	   which	   I	   provide	   original	   statistics	   on	   the	   voluntary	   adoption	   of	  corporate	   governance	   practices.	   	   Further,	   regulators	   are	   among	   other	   organized	  groups	   that	   are	   interested	   in	   companies	   disclosing	   more	   of	   their	   governance	  practices,	   among	   other	   disclosures.	   	   The	   findings	   of	   this	   study	   should	   therefore	  inspire	  similar	  examinations	  into	  other	  areas	  of	  corporate	  disclosures.	  As	   to	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   regulated	   governance	   practices	   analyzed	   here,	  several	   related	   questions	   arise.	   	   Did	   specialized	   board	   committees	   and	   director	  independence	   requirements	   fundamentally	   change	   board	   deliberation?	   	   What	  explains	   the	   increase	   in	   executive	   compensation	   levels?	   	   Did	   new	   types	   of	  compensation	  result	  once	  disclosures	  of	  other	  types	  became	  regulated?	  	  	  Despite	  the	  salience	  of	   the	   corporate	   governance	  practices	   I	   examined,	  which	  others	  merit	   an	  analysis	  of	  causation?	   	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  examine	  companies’	  compliance	  with	  the	  regulations,	   nor	   do	   I	   offer	   a	   policy	   analysis,	   I	   do	   elucidate	   a	   social	   process	   that	  perhaps	  eludes—or	  perhaps	  encourages—actors	  in	  both	  states	  and	  markets.	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5.2	  	  	  Significance	  and	  Implications	  In	  response	  to	  the	  title	  question	  of	  this	  dissertation—corporate	  governance	  or	   corporate	   governments—I	   argue	   that	   the	   evidence	   indicates	   prominent	  corporate	   influence	   of	   regulation.	   	   In	   this	   manner,	   governments	   appear	   more	  corporate	   in	   that	   they	   merely	   duplicate	   regulation	   of	   extant	   business	   practice.	  	  Precise	  configurations	  of	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  this	  outcome	  vary	  across	  practice,	  but	   the	   general	   finding	   is	   that	   different	   countries	   can	   follow	   similar	   paths	   to	   this	  type	  of	  regulation.	  	  	  Yet	  another	  answer	  is	  possible.	  	  Governments	  are	  perhaps	  not	  the	  harbingers	  of	   regulation	   that	   legal	   systems	   have	   historically	   served.	   	   Rather	   corporate	  governance	  is	  expanding	  in	  definition	  from	  traditional	  notions	  of	  control	  related	  to	  separate	   ownership	   and	   management	   to	   control	   beyond	   corporate	   and	   political	  boundaries.	  	  This	  expanded	  notion	  of	  corporate	  governance	  possibly	  includes	  what	  Hunter	   refers	   to	   as	   “a	   conceptualization	   of	   power	   that	   is	   circular	   rather	   than	  subject-­‐verb	   object	   unidirectional,	   networked	   rather	   than	   hierarchical,	   and	  multi-­‐dimensional	   beyond	   the	   state,	   encompassing	   nonjuridical	   zones	   such	   as	   market	  forces	  or	  culture”	  (Hunter	  2008:	  6).	   	  The	  most	  important	  implication	  of	  this	  study,	  therefore,	   is	   that	   corporate	   governance	   no	   longer	   refers	   simply	   to	   governance	   of	  firms,	  but	  also	  governance	  by	  firms.	  	  	  This	   dissertation	   is	   a	   cautionary	   tale	   in	   regulation	   more	   broadly	   as	   well.	  	  Regulatory	   reform	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   “institutional	   change	   explicitly	  mandated	   or	  endorsed	  by	  governments”	  (Hall	  and	  Thelen	  2009:	  20).	   	  The	   findings	  of	   this	  study	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corroborate	   regulatory	   reform	   as	   indeed	  mandated	   or	   endorsed	   by	   governments,	  and	  extends	  the	  origin	  of	  that	  reform	  to	  other	  institutions	  and	  to	  firms	  in	  particular.	  	  Further,	   the	   reconceptualized	   notion	   of	   corporate	   governance	   has	   more	   serious	  implications.	   	   There	   is	   increased	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   global	   regulatory	  architecture—perhaps	   created	  purposefully—from	  which	  private	  actors	  who	  have	  sufficient	   resources	   can	   benefit	   and	   deploy	   the	   resulting	   uncertainties	   created	   in	  asymmetric	  regulation	  to	  their	  advantage.	  	  Regulators	  caught	  in	  this	  game	  might	  be	  further	  torn	  between	  conflicting	  demands	  of	  their	  own	  constituents,	  e.g.	  companies	  versus	  consumers.	  	  	  This	   point	   overlaps	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   governance	   failure,	   whereby	   the	  dialogue	  of	  corporate	  governance	  has	  been	  too	  narrowly	  focused,	  or	  that	  regulatory	  networks	   fail	   to	   regulate	   holistically.	   	   Framing	   regulatory	   response	   as	   a	   response	  only	   to	  market	   failure,	   and	  not	   also	   to	   the	   failure	  of	   governance	  masks	  both	   risks	  and	  benefits	  that	  gaps	  in	  governance	  structures	  can	  provide	  	  (Whitford	  and	  Schrank	  2011).	   	   Although	   I	   have	   exposed	   a	   particular	   form	   of	   regulatory	   capture	   in	   this	  study,	   it	  would	  misleading	  to	  think	  that	  private	  parties	  are	  the	  sole	  agents	   in	  such	  capture.	  	  For	   Sabel	   &	   Zeitlin,	   regulation	   “increasingly	   takes	   the	   novel	   form	   of	  contestable	   rules	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   rebuttable	  guides	   to	  action	  even	  when	   they	  are	   also	   taken	   as	   enforceable	   sovereign	   commands.	   	   By	   the	   same	   token,	   these	  developments	  challenge	  the	  related	  assumption	  that	  deliberative	  processes	  produce	  at	   most	   a	   monitory,	   ‘soft’	   complement	   to	   ‘hard’	   state-­‐made	   law”	   (Sabel	   &	   Zeitlin	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2010:	  5).	  	  This	  form	  of	  governance,	  what	  they	  term	  “directly	  deliberative	  polyarchy”	  in	  which	  diversity	  is	  a	  micro-­‐level	  learning	  source	  and	  means	  for	  achieving	  certain	  objectives,	   is	   evident	   in	   my	   findings	   that	   corporations,	   foremost	   among	   market	  actors,	   provide	   regulators	   the	   template	   for	   formal	   rules.	   	   Likewise,	   this	   form	   of	  corporate	  governance	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  polyarchic	  system	  that	  Sabel	  &	  Zeitlin	  consider	  “as	   a	   form	  of	   experimentalist	   governance	   in	   the	  pragmatic	   sense”	   (Sabel	  &	  Zeitlin	  2010:	  6).	   	  Clearly	  no	  single	  corporation	  or	  regulator	  writes	  the	  focal	  regulations	  in	  any	   of	   the	   regimes	   I	   examined,	   but	   each	   can	   use	   uncertainty	   in	   governance	  structures	  strategically	  (Stark	  2009).	  	  	  I	  show	  that	  voluntary	  firm	  practice	  is	  on	  the	  one	   hand	   a	   response	   to	   uncertainty:	   adopting	   certain	   governance	   practices	   either	  deliberately	  pre-­‐empts	  regulation	  or	  anticipates	  regulation	  of	  the	  same	  practice.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  failing	  regulatory	  pre-­‐emption,	  firms	  can	  provide	  regulators	  the	  template	   for	   future	   regulation.	   	   Firms	   can	   have	   perhaps	   other	   incentives,	   but	   the	  previous	   institutional	   isomorphic	   accounts	   do	   not	   suffice.	   	   I	   also	   show	   that	  regulators	  likewise	  utilize	  uncertainty	  strategically	  when	  regulating	  before	  or	  after	  other	  regulators.	  Several	   contributions	   to	   the	   comparative	   institutionalist	   and	   regulatory	  research	  also	  emerge	  from	  this	  study.	  	  First,	  this	  study	  avoids	  both	  under-­‐socialized	  accounts	  of	  individual	  firms,	  and	  over-­‐socialized	  accounts	  of	  countries.	   	  The	  classic	  VoC	  typologies	  suffer	  from	  several	  problems	  that	  I	  identify	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	   	  A	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  traditional	  country	  clustering	  using	  time-­‐series	  data	  from	  1980-­‐2005	  in	   21	   OECD	   democracies	   reveals	   flaws	   in	   the	   operationalization	   of	   corporate	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governance	  by	  Hall	  and	  Gingerich	  (2004)	   (Ahlquist	  &	  Breunig	  2009).	   	  My	   findings	  support	  the	  dynamism	  of	  economic	  institutions	  aggregated	  at	  the	  country-­‐level	  over	  a	   similar	   time	   frame,	   which	   also	   contests	   the	   notion	   that	   institutions	   must	   be	  stabilized	  in	  order	  to	  be	  recognized.	   	  I	  eschewed	  ex	  ante	  clustering	  of	  countries	  by	  their	   institutional	   attributes,	   favoring	   instead	   a	   selection	   of	   countries	   for	  comparison	   based	   on	   the	   size	   of	   their	   capital	   markets,	   itself	   determined	   by	   the	  capitalization	   of	   listed	   companies.	   	   This	   research	   challenges	   the	   notion	   that	   the	  aggregation	  of	  institutional	  factors	  can	  be	  neatly	  grouped	  into	  the	  classic	  LME/CME	  types,	  while	  holding	  that	  politics	  and	  history	  are	  still	  necessary—though	  not	  always	  sufficient—for	  institutional	  change.	   	  The	  regulatory	  variety	  of	  capitalism	  I	  propose	  cuts	   both	   ways:	   it	   comprises	   paths	   to	   common	   outcomes	   despite	   variety,	   and	  different	  outcomes	  despite	  common	  conditions.	  	  	  Second,	   I	   redress	   the	   VoC	   literature	   by	   identifying	   causal	   mechanisms	   in	  institutional	   change,	   including	   a	   range	   of	   causal	   factors	   of	   capitalist	   variety	   both	  between	  and	  within	  regulatory	  regimes.	  	  The	  use	  of	  QCA	  builds	  on	  the	  comparative	  capitalism	   literature	   and	   advances	   the	   method	   for	   use	   in	   future	   comparative	  research	   across	   the	   social	   sciences.	   	   In	   it,	   I	   examine	  mechanisms,	   both	   exogenous	  and	   endogenous,	   for	   regulatory	   change,	   while	   underpinning	   that	   corporate	  governance—as	  traditionally	  understood—as	  subject	  to	  constant	  negotiation.	  	  Third,	   I	   advance	   a	   reconceptualization	   of	   corporate	   governance.	   The	  implications	  of	  this	  new	  corporate	  governance	  have	  far	  reaching	  implications	  than	  simply	  the	  disclosure	  of	  board	  attributes	  and	  what	  executives	  and	  auditors	  are	  paid.	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Another	   implication	   of	   this	   research	   therefore	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  states	  directly	  regulate	  economic	  activity	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  regulation	  is	  a	  symbiosis	  between	  state	  and	  market	  actors.	  	  Within	  that	  relationship,	  regulation	  can	   arise	   following	   diverse	   paths.	   	   I	   have	   identified	   paths	   to	   regulation	   of	   a	  particular	   form	   of	   economic	   behavior,	   corporate	   governance,	   as	   traditionally	  conceptualized,	  but	  the	  implication	  hardly	  resides	  in	  this	  area	  of	  inquiry	  alone.	  	  	  This	  study	  patently	  reflects	  Zumbansen’s	  view	  of	  corporate	  governance	  and	  regulation	  through	  a	  transnational	  lens:	  	  “The	  transnational	  lens	  allows	  us	  to	  study	  [regulatory]	  regimes	  not	  as	  entirely	   detached	   from	   national	   political	   and	   legal	   orders,	   but	   as	  emerging	   out	   of	   an	   reaching	   beyond	   them.	   	   The	   transnational	  dimension	   of	   new	   actors	   and	   newly	   emerging	   forms	   of	   norms	  radicalizes	   their	   semi-­‐autonomous	   nature	   in	   the	   following	   way:	  regulatory	  spaces	  are	  marked	  by	  a	  dynamic	  and	  often	  problematically	  instrumentalized	  tension	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  norm-­‐making	  processes”	  (Zumbansen	  2009:	  31).	  	  	  	  He	   further	   argues	   that	   in	   lieu	   of	   a	   coherent	   set	   of	   regulation	   theories,	   various	  concepts	   of	   self-­‐regulation,	   soft	   law,	   best	   practice—among	   others—suggests	   “an	  irreversible	   trend	   away	   from	   ‘government’	   to	   ‘governance’”,	   to	   which	   I	   offer	  corroborating	  evidence.	  Further,	  practices	  may	  diffuse	  faster	  when	  mandated	  by	  single	  sources,	  such	  as	   states,	   than	   when	   legitimated	   by	   social	   influence.	   	   The	   spread	   of	   corporate	  governance	   practices	   has	   causes	   in	   both	   legitimacy	   and	   efficiency	   (Aguilera	   and	  Cuervo-­‐Cazurra	   2004).	   	   Indeed	   I	   make	   no	   claim	   that	   all	   voluntary	   practices	  necessarily	   lead	   to	   regulation,	   nor	   do	   I	   attempt	   a	   normative	   argument	   that	   they	  should.	   	   Besides,	   regulation	   of	   originally	   voluntary	   practices	   may	   not	   lead	   to	   the	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intended	   outcomes.	   	   Further,	   we	   also	   have	   evidence	   of	   the	   necessary	   absence	   of	  voluntary	   practice	   as	   a	   causal	   condition	   for	   regulations	   concerning	   executive	  compensation	  disclosures.	  	  Seen	  through	  a	  wider	   lens	   in	  sociology,	   this	  research	   informs	   inquiries	   into	  expertise:	   how	   it	   is	   developed,	   spread,	   and	   contested	   among	   regulators	   and	  corporate	   chieftains.	   	   An	   incipient	   inquiry	   specifically	   on	   expertise	   and	   how	   its	  implications	  for	  governance	  arrangements	  (Quack	  2010),	  will	  grow	  on	  the	  empirical	  findings	   of	   this	   study.	   	   In	   a	   similar	   inquiry	   into	   power	   structures,	   the	   socio-­‐linguistics	  of	  corporate	  communication	  stands	  to	  benefit	  from	  this	  study’s	  data.	  	  	  I	   share	  with	   political	   scientists	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   regulations	   analyzed	  here	   as	   a	   perpetual	   nexus	   of	   contestation	   between	   states	   and	   firms,	   and	   that	   the	  social	  processes	   that	  define	   this	  nexus	   implicate	  comparative	  political	   science	  and	  international	   political	   economy.	   	   Like	   Vogel	   (1996),	   I	   show	   that	   national	   patters	  matter	  for	  policy	  formation,	  although	  I	  stop	  short	  of	  policy	  analysis.	  	  	  Lastly,	   I	   have	   given	   particular	   attention	   to	   an	   evolving	   form	   of	   legal	  regulation	   theory	   that	   accounts	   for	   extra-­‐juridical	   sources	   of	   law.	   	   I	   focused	  specifically	   on	   the	   overlap	   of	   corporate	   law,	   securities	   law,	   and	   corporate	  governance.	   	   My	   contribution	   joins	   that	   of	   (Shaffer	   2009),	   among	   others,	   that	  business	   shapes	   law	   through	   both	   public	   ordering,	   including	   legislatures,	   and	  private	   ordering.	   	   Future	   research	   on	   lex	  mercatoria	   will	   surely	   benefit	   from	   this	  analysis.	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5.3	  	  	  New	  Regulations,	  New	  Paths	  	  New	   questions	   that	   arise	   from	   this	   study	   include:	   under	   which	   conditions	  should	   firms	  pre-­‐empt	   regulation	  and	  what	  degrees	  of	   self-­‐regulation	   can	  prevent	  imposed	  regulation?	   	  From	  a	  corporate	  strategy	  angle,	  one	  might	  analyze	  how	  can	  firms	  better	  write	  their	  own	  rules.	  	  From	  a	  public	  policy	  angle,	  conversely,	  how	  can	  regulatory	  agencies	  better	  anticipate	  firms’	  self-­‐regulation,	  or	  the	  enactment	  of	  new	  regulation,	   as	   well	   as	   firm	   compliance?	   	   Similarly	   how	   can	   policy	   analysts	   better	  evaluate	   extant	   regulation	   and	  propose	  new	   regulation	   given	  my	   insight	   as	   to	   the	  regulatory	  process?	  Regulation	   is	  ultimately	  a	  social	  process.	   	  The	  choices	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors	   in	   the	   economy	   to	   control	   others—to	   govern—have	   political,	   legal	   and	   of	  course,	  economic	  characteristics.	  	  Yet	  we	  cannot	  owe	  an	  account	  of	  their	  behavior	  to	  institutions	  or	  structures	  alone.	  	  We	  must	  instead	  unpack	  the	  process	  of	  regulation	  at	   different	   levels	   and	   by	   different	   actors.	   	   This	   study	   attempted	   to	   explain	   such	  regulatory	  process	  and	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  future	  research.	  	  Comparative	  case	  studies	  with	  additional	  countries	  and	  additional	  governance	  practices	  are	  one	  extension	  of	  this	   study.	   	   Another	   is	   to	   compare	   regulation	   of	   other	   practices,	   such	   as	  environmental	   sustainability	   and	   consumer	   protection,	   or	   corporate	   social	  responsibility	   more	   broadly.	   	   Analyses	   of	   single	   cases	   or	   many	   more	   could	   both	  further	   enhance	   the	   findings	   from	   QCA,	   and	   compare	   the	   method	   itself	   to	   other	  methods.	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There	   is	  a	  silver	   lining	  to	  this	  cautionary	  tale.	   	  Policymakers	  and	  regulators	  are	  not	  bereft	  of	  a	  significant	  role	   to	  play	   in	   the	  new	  corporate	  governance.	   	  They	  need	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   same	   opportunities	   that	   transforming	   governance	  structures	   in	   the	   global	   landscape	   present	   to	   corporations:	   deployment	   of	  uncertainty	   as	   a	   resource,	   experimentation,	   and	   non-­‐hierarchic	   routes	   to	   the	  development	   and	   enforcement	   of	   regulation.	   	   If	   corporations	   are	   increasingly	  assuming	   more	   authorship	   of	   the	   very	   formal	   rules	   to	   which	   they	   will	   abide,	  regulators	  can	  at	  the	  least	  assume	  more	  editorship.	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Appendix	  A:	  Coding	  of	  Firm	  Practices	  
	  Five	   of	   the	   ten	   selected	   countries	   are	   non-­‐Anglophone,	   yet	   the	  majority	   of	  their	   companies	   publish	   annual	   reports	   and	   similar	   items	   in	   English.	   	   Given	   this	  linguistic	  diversity,	  I	  adopted	  a	  mixed	  language	  approach	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  source	  data,	  to	  the	  extent	  feasible.	  	  I	  primarily	  used	  the	  English	  language	  versions	  of	  French	  and	   German	   annual	   reports.	   	   To	   avoid	   the	   possibility	   that	   more	   governance	  information	  might	  be	  disclosed	  in	  one	  version	  over	  another,	  I	  randomly	  alternated	  reports	   in	   the	  native	   language	  and	  English	  and	   found	  no	  discernible	  differences	   in	  the	   disclosures59.	   	   I	   relied	   exclusively	   on	   the	   English	   versions	   of	   Japanese	   annual	  reports,	   which	   were	   widely	   available	   for	   the	   companies	   and	   years	   sought	   after.	  	  Seventeen	  companies	  out	  of	  355	  had	  reports	  in	  Japanese	  only	  and	  were	  excluded.	  	  In	  the	   case	   of	   Chinese	   annual	   reports,	   however,	   I	   deferred	   foremost	   to	   the	   original	  simplified	   Mandarin	   versions,	   which	   almost	   always	   contained	   more	   information	  than	  the	  English	  translations.	  	  39	  out	  of	  93	  Korean	  companies	  had	  reports	  available	  in	  Korean	  only.	  	  I	  enlisted	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  native	  Korean	  speaker	  for	  translation	  and	   coding	   of	   these	   and	   for	   comparison	   with	   the	   English	   versions.	   None	   of	   the	  Indian	   companies	   required	   knowledge	   of	   Hindi	   as	   their	   reports	  were	   available	   in	  English-­‐only	   or	   dual-­‐language	   versions.	   	   Canadian	   filings	   were	   also	   available	   in	  English,	   even	   if	   French	   versions	   were	   occasionally	   available.	   	   All	   American,	  
                                                59	  Two	   French	   companies	   had	   minor	   discrepancies	   between	   their	   original	   and	  translated	   versions	   of	   their	   annual	   reports:	   Dassault	   Systèmes	   and	   Essilor	  International.	   Specifically,	   audited	   financial	   statements	   appeared	   in	   the	   original	  French	  versions,	  which	  contain	  more	  detailed	  information	  than	  in	  the	  translations.	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Australian,	   and	   British	   annual	   reports	   and	   similar	   items	   were	   unquestionably	  available	  in	  English.	  Translations	  typically	  include	  a	  note	  that	  only	  the	  original	  language	  versions	  are	   legally	   binding,	  which	   for	   purposes	   of	   this	   research	  matter	   less	   than	  whether	  disclosures	   about	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   at	   a	   given	   firm	   are	  made	   at	   all.	  	  Where	  there	  was	  a	  conflict	   in	  disclosures	  between	  Korean	  and	  translated	  versions	  of	  Korean	  company	  reports,	  the	  Korean	  version	  prevailed60.	  	  	  Linguistic	  issues	  aside,	  four	  companies	  were	  misreported	  in	  Thomson	  ONE	  as	  being	   registered	   in	   their	   respective	   home	   countries	   when	   in	   fact	   only	   the	  headquarters	  were,	   but	   the	   legal	   seats	   were	   elsewhere61.	   	   	   Other	   companies	   that	  may	   have	   merged	   with,	   or	   were	   acquired	   by,	   other	   companies	   or	   were	  reincorporated	  within	  their	  original	   jurisdiction,	  reappear	  under	  their	  new	  names.	  When	   a	   company’s	   fiscal	   year	   ends	   on	   a	   date	   other	   than	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   calendar	  year,	   i.e.	  December	  31,	   I	  still	  code	  its	  report	   in	  the	  same	  calendar	  year.	   	  An	  annual	  report	  or	  other	   source	  document	  dated	   June	  30,	  2003,	   for	   example,	   is	   included	   in	  2003	   as	   is	   a	   report	   dated	   December	   31,	   2003.	   	  Most	   American	   companies’	   proxy	  statements	   are	   filed	   in	   the	   calendar	  years	   following	   their	   company’s	   fiscal	   year.	   	   I	  
                                                60	  Mergent	  occasionally	  provided	  Korean	  “auditor	  reports”	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  company’s	  annual	   report.	   	   In	   case	   of	   any	   shortcomings	   in	   disclosures	   or	   discrepancies,	   the	  longer,	  more	  complete	  annual	  report	  prevailed.	  	  61	  These	  exceptions	  included	  Lihir	  Gold	  Ltd.	  And	  Oil	  Search	  Ltd.,	  both	  New	  Zealand	  companies	   listed	   in	   Australia;	   Deutsche	   Pfandbrief	   Bank	   was	   a	   German	   company	  that	   reincorporated	   in	   Ireland	   and	   did	   not	   have	   at	   least	   five	   years	   of	   market	  capitalization	   data	   while	   still	   a	   German	   company;	   Amdocs	   of	   the	   United	   States	  likewise	  did	  not	  appear	  as	  being	  registered	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  rather	  in	  Bermuda.	  These	  four	  companies	  were	  therefore	  excluded.	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ensure	  that	  I	  code	  disclosures	  in	  their	  related	  fiscal/calendar	  years,	  not	  the	  years	  of	  the	  filing	  dates.	  	  	  Occasionally	  in	  Mergent,	  companies	  in	  earlier	  years	  appear	  that	  do	  not	  match	  those	   on	   my	   firm	   list.	   	   For	   example,	   Challenger	   Financial	   Services	   Group,	   an	  Australian	   company,	   appears	   in	   my	   firm	   selection	   list	   as	   having	   market	  capitalization	  data	  available	  on	  Thomson	  ONE	  Banker	  from	  2004	  to	  2008	  inclusive.	  	  Mergent,	   however,	   provides	   annual	   reports	   from	   this	   time	   period	   in	   addition	   to	  earlier	   years.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   company	   name	   is	   the	   same,	   I	   report	   these	  earlier	  years	  in	  my	  coding	  of	  firm	  practices.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  this	  company,	  I	  recorded	  the	  last	  available	  year,	  2002,	  of	  data	  while	  it	  was	  supplied	  under	  the	  same	  corporate	  name.	   	   Reports	   for	   the	   years	   1998	   to	   2001	   were	   also	   available,	   but	   under	   now	  inactive	  corporate	  entities	  of	  different	  names.	   	  As	  these	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  initial	  firm	  selection,	  I	  exclude	  this	  extraneous	  data.	  When	   a	   company’s	   annual	   report	  was	  missing	   for	   an	   interim	  year,	   i.e.	   data	  was	  available	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  preceding	  and	  following	  the	  missing	  year,	  I	  copied	   the	   values	   of	   the	   previous	   year’s	   disclosures.	   	   Rarely	   does	   a	   company’s	  disclosure	  in	  its	  annual	  report	  or	  proxy	  statement	  appear	  in	  one	  year	  but	  disappear	  in	  the	  following.	  	  If	  the	  disclosure	  resumes	  in	  the	  subsequent	  year,	  however,	  I	  treat	  the	   omission	   as	   an	   anomaly	   and	   count	   if	   as	   it	  were	   disclosed	   in	   the	   interim	  year.	  	  Occasionally	   annual	   reports	   and	   proxy	   statements	   were	   available	   in	   years	   even	  when	  Thomson	  ONE	  indicated	  no	  market	  capitalization	  data	  available.	  	  In	  such	  case,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  code	  and	  include	  per	  company/year	  the	  available	  data.	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Executive	  Compensation:	  Base	  Salary,	  Shareholdings	  and	  Stock	  Options	  Remuneration	   is	   synonymous	   with	   salary,	   pay,	   compensation,	   and	  emoluments.	   	   In	   Canadian	   companies,	   the	   tendency	   is	   to	   refer	   remuneration	  with	  directors	   and	   compensation	   with	   senior	   management	   and	   executives.	   	   In	   Korean	  companies,	  the	  salary	  and	  pay	  (월급,	  wolgeup	  and	  봉급,	  bonggeup	  respectively)	  are	  
used	  interchangeably.	  	  Disclosures	  of	  executive	  remuneration	  are	  found	  in	  notes	  to	  the	   financial	   statements	  of	   annual	   reports,	   in	   separate	   “Remuneration	  Reports”	   in	  more	  recent	  Australian	  and	  British	  reports,	  or	  as	  a	  “Summary	  Compensation	  Table”	  in	   the	   reports	   of	   US	   firms.	   	   Among	   Indian	   companies	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   total	  remuneration	   for	  all	  directors	  –	   including	  executives	  –	  were	  occasionally	  reported	  in	   annexes	   to	   financial	   statements;	   these	   are	   not	   counted.	   	   Only	   disclosures	   of	  separate	   totals	   for	   executives	   and	   (senior)	   managers	   were	   coded	   as	   1	   when	  disclosed.	  Many	   Australian	   and	   Chinese	   companies	   in	   earlier	   years	   report	  compensation	   in	   bands	   for	   top	   executives.	   	   The	   bands	   indicate	   upper	   and	   lower	  levels	  of	  compensation	  and	  include	  the	  number	  of	  executives	  earning	  compensation	  within	   each	   band;	   I	   coded	   these	   as	   1.	   	   Another	   earlier	   compensation	   reporting	  technique	   across	   all	   countries,	   except	   Australia	   and	   the	   US,	   is	   to	   disclose	   total	  compensation	  for	  all	  top	  executives.	  	  Likewise	  I	  coded	  these	  as	  1.	  	  France,	  Germany	  and	   India	   occasionally	   report	   the	   same	   for	   the	   executive	   shareholdings	   and	   all	  countries	  at	  one	  time	  did	  the	  same	  for	  executive	  stock	  options.	  	   Shares,	  or	  equity-­‐based,	  compensation	  can	  be	  awarded	  as	  part	  of	  both	  short-­‐	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and	  long-­‐term	  incentive	  plans.	  	  I	  include	  as	  disclosed	  any	  reports	  that	  no	  shares	  or	  equity-­‐linked	  compensation	  was	  awarded	  to	  executives.	   	  The	  same	  holds	   for	  stock	  options,	  Stock	  Appreciation	  Rights	  (or	  Proprietary	  Rights	  in	  Australia),	  and	  in	  many	  US	  Long	  Term	   Incentive	  Plans,	   for	   inclusion	   in	   this	  practice	  as	  well.	   	  An	   imported	  compensation	  mechanism	  to	  China,	  stock	  options	  (长期权,	  chángqī quán)	  and	  stock	  appreciation	  rights	  (股票增值权,	  gǔpiào zēngzhíquán)	  were	  translated	  literally	  from	  English	   into	   Chinese	   whereas	   stock	   options	   were	   phonetically	   transcribed	   into	  Korean	  as	  seutok	  opsyeon	  (스톡	  옵션).	  
In	  many	  companies	  across	  the	  different	  countries	  and	  years,	  there	  is	  mention	  in	  the	  financial	  reports	  of	  aggregate	  shares	  or	  options	  granted	  to	  all	  employees,	  or	  just	  to	  board	  directors.	   	  This	  disclosure	  does	  not	  warrant	  inclusion	  in	  my	  analysis;	  the	   grant	   of	   shares	   or	   options	   must	   be	   clearly	   indicated	   as	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	  executives,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  hold	  board	  membership.	  	  In	  the	  coding	  procedure,	  I	  count	  either	  numbers	  of	  shares	  and	  options	  granted	  or	  their	  nominal	  or	  marked-­‐to-­‐market	  (reported)	  value.	   	  Other	  forms	  of	  compensation,	  e.g.,	  bonuses	  company	  car,	  retirement	  benefits,	  loans,	  etc.,	  are	  not	  included.	  	  For	  both	  shares	  and	  options:	  board	  or	   shareholder	   approvals	   for	   grants,	   allocations,	   deferred	   payments,	   and	   other	  reserve	   funds	   for	   shares	   and	   options	   for	   executives	   are	   not	   counted	   unless	   the	  specific	  benefits	  and	  recipients	  are	  identified	  in	  a	  particular	  year.	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Auditor’s	  Remuneration	  	   Often	   referred	   to	   as	   auditor	   remuneration	   in	  Australian,	  British	   and	   Indian	  companies,	  as	  auditor	  fees	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  auditor	  compensation	  in	  Japanese	  companies,	  and	  as	  honoraires	  des	  commissaires	  aux	  comptes	  in	  French	  companies	  or	  as	   Honorar	   für	   Dienstleistungen	   des	   Abschlussprüfers	   in	   German	   companies.	  	  Occasionally	  included	  as	  a	  distinct	  item	  with	  any	  corporate	  governance	  section	  but	  more	   often	   included	   as	   a	   note	   to	   the	   financial	   statements.	   When	   a	   Canadian	  company	   indicates	   that	   auditor	   remuneration	   details	   are	   available	   upon	   written	  request,	  then	  I	  code	  as	  0.	  	  
General	  Corporate	  Governance	  In	   France,	   corporate	   governance	   is	   sometimes	   called	   “gouvernement	  
d’entreprise”	  instead	  of	  “gouvernance	  d’entreprise.”	  	  In	  Germany,	  the	  terms	  Corporate	  
Governance	   Vergütungsbericht	   or	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Compliance	  (Entsprechenerklärung)	   with	   the	   German	   Corporate	   Governance	   Code	  interchangeably	  appear.	  	  See	  Chapters	  3	  	  and	  4	  for	  discussion	  of	  this	  coding	  scheme	  particular	  to	  Germany.	  	  	  Even	   though	   I	   mention	   in	   a	   footnote	   in	   Chapter	   1	   about	   not	   avoiding	  conflation	   of	   corporate	   governance	   with	   corporate	   social	   responsibility,	   several	  Japanese	  companies	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  2000s	  did	  just	  that.	  	  The	  exact	  descriptions	  of	   the	   board	   structures,	   i.e.	   presence	   of	   committees,	   would	   be	   relabeled	  within	   a	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year.	   	   On	   some	   occasions,	   these	   sections	   of	   reports	   were	   even	   entitled	  “CSR/Corporate	  Governance.”	  In	   the	  US,	   companies	   in	   the	  earlier	  years	   coded	  here	  occasionally	  disclosed	  having	   a	   governance	   committee	   on	   the	   board.	   	   That	   disclosure	   counts	   only	   for	  specialized	   committee,	   not	   for	   general	   governance	   disclosure	   unless	   there	   is	   an	  attendant	  governance	  statement	  that	  specifies	  the	  company’s	  corporate	  governance	  actions	   taken	  by	   the	   committee.	   	  This	   statement	  must	  also	   refer	   to	   the	   company’s	  corporate	   governance	   principles,	   policies,	   charter,	   guidelines,	   or	   those	   of	   another	  body,	   stock	   exchange,	   etc.,	   to	   which	   the	   company	   specifically	   adheres.	   	   In	   earlier	  years,	   American	   annual	   reports	   occasionally	   entitle	   sections	   on	   the	   board	   of	  directors	  and	  executives	   “corporate	  governance.”	   	   If	  no	   substance	   is	  given	  beyond	  this	  labeling	  convention,	  I	  do	  not	  count	  this	  is	  a	  disclosure	  of	  corporate	  governance.	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Appendix	  B:	  Coding	  of	  Legislatures	  
	   	  Table	   B.1	   lists	   the	   legislative	   chambers	   per	   country	   analyzed	   and	   how	  bicameral	   legislatures	   were	   weighted	   in	   the	   coding	   for	   left-­‐right	   political	   party	  composition.	  

























Table	   B.2	   lists	   the	   codebook	   for	   political	   parties	   in	   all	   legislatures	   and	   their	  corresponding	  QCA	  crisp	  scores.	  
Table	  B.2	  	  Political	  Party	  Codes	  















Table	  B.3	  lists	  the	  political	  party	  composition	  of	  all	  ten	  legislatures,	  weighted	  by	  chamber,	  and	  their	  corresponding	  crisp	  set	  scores.	  
Table	  B.3	  	  Composition	  of	  Legislatures	  and	  Scores	  
 
  






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 	  	  	  	   	  

































































Appendix	  C:	  Additional	  Corporate	  Governance	  Practices	  
	  
Regulation	  of	  Executive	  Base	  Pay	  Table	  C.1	  presents	   the	   scores	  of	   the	   causal	   conditions	   and	   the	  outcome	   for	  each	  country-­‐case	  as	  per	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  base	  pay,	  which	  has	  five	  causal	  determinants.	  
Table	  C.1	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Executive	  Base	  Pay	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  What	   this	  path	   reveals	   is	   that	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures,	   in	   countries	  without	  the	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   practice,	   are	   fairly	   determinant—almost	   40%—in	  regulating	   executive	   compensation	   disclosures.	   	   Consider	   the	   two	   countries	   to	  which	  this	  path	  applies:	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States.	   	  These	  countries	  had	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  in	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  their	  respective	  regulation.	  	  Membership	  in	  the	  set	  of	  countries	  with	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  at	  the	  time	  of	  regulation	  is	  irrelevant.	  	  More	  on	  each	  of	  these	  countries’	  paths	  is	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  Two	  countries	   that	   eventually	   regulated	   executive	   base	   pay	   disclosures,	   Australia	   (a	  highly	  developed	  capital	  market	  with	  a	  related	  listing	  rule)	  and	  India	  (a	  not	  highly	  developed	   capital	  market	  without	   a	   related	   listing	   rule),	   did	   not	   have	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	   just	  before	   their	   regulation	  of	   this	  practice62.	   	  Another	   two,	  China	  and	  France,	   both	   had	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   base	   pay	   disclosures	   and	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  prior	  to	  regulation,	  but	  none	  of	  the	  other	  causal	  conditions	  as	  produced	  in	  the	  complex,	  parsimonious,	  or	  intermediate	  solutions.	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Germany’s	  regulation	  increases	  modestly	  from	  0.75	  in	  2001	  to	  1	  in	  2006,	  so	  I	  rerun	   the	  minimization	  with	   its	   later	   scores,	   only	   two	  of	  which	   change.	   	  Germany	  moves	  from	  outside	  the	  set	  of	  countries	  with	  prevalence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosures	  of	  executive	  base	  pay	  among	  its	  firms	  (0)	  to	  those	  that	  do	  (0.8619);	  it	  also	  moves	  into	  the	  set	  of	  countries	  with	  highly	  developed	  capital	  markets	  (from	  0.3262	  to	  0.6845).	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  same	  complex,	  parsimonious	  and	  intermediate	  solutions	  return	  from	  this	  minimization,	  only	  with	  slightly	   lower	  coverage.	   	  The	  complex	  solution’s	  coverage	  decreases	  to	  0.143,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  parsimonious/intermediate	  solution	  to	  0.221,	   albeit	   at	   higher	   consistency	   of	   1.	   	   Germany	   is	   still	   off	   the	   causal	   path	   that	  includes	   corporate	   scandals,	   failing	  now	   to	  appear	   in	  any	  of	   the	   revised	   solutions,	  leaving	  the	  low	  coverage	  scores	  of	  these	  paths	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  United	  States	  alone.	  	  	  This	   path	   that	   applies	   to	   Germany	   and	   the	   United	   States	   introduces	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   conditions	   in	   configurations.	   	   It	   is	   when	   voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  base	  pay	  is	  absent	  that	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  in	  Germany	  and	   the	   United	   States	   regulate	   the	   disclosure	   of	   executive	   base	   pay.	   	   This	  demonstrates	   a	   key	   advantage	   of	   QCA	   over	  multivariate	   regression,	   which	  would	  have	  not	  captured	  as	  readily	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  ‘missing’	  variable.	  Germany’s	   2000	   Bundestag	   was	   composed	   of	   a	   majority	   of	   right-­‐leaning	  parties	   from	   1990	   until	   1997.	   	   Although	   left-­‐leaning	   parties	   regained	   majority	  control	   of	   the	   Bundestag	   from	   1998	   to	   2008,	   the	   composition	   of	   interest	   for	   the	  causal	   condition	   was	   in	   2000:	   36	   seats	   were	   held	   by	   the	   Party	   of	   Democratic	  Socialism,	   47	   by	   the	   90	  Alliance/Greens,	   and	   the	   Social	  Democratic	   Party	   had	   the	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largest	   number,	   298,	   seats	   of	   any	   party	   in	   the	   Bundestag	   that	   year63.	   	   The	   right-­‐leaning	  parties	   split	   43	   seats	   between	   the	   Free	  Democratic	   Party	   and	  245	   for	   the	  Christian	   Social	   Democrats.	   	   The	   legislature	   held	   this	   composition	   from	   1998	   to	  2001.	  	  	  The	   German	   Corporate	   Governance	   Code	   maintained	   article	   4.2.4	   that	  executive	  base	  pay,	  as	  all	  forms	  of	  executive	  compensation,	  “shall”	  be	  disclosed.	  	  “The	  recommendations	  of	   the	  Code	  are	  marked	   in	   the	   text	  by	  use	  of	  the	   word	   "shall".	   	   Companies	   can	   deviate	   from	   them,	   but	   are	   then	  obliged	   to	   disclose	   this	   annually.	   	   This	   enables	   companies	   to	   reflect	  sector	   and	   enterprise-­‐specific	   requirements.	   Thus,	   the	   Code	  contributes	  to	  more	  flexibility	  and	  more	  self-­‐regulation	  in	  the	  German	  corporate	   constitution.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Code	   contains	   suggestions	  which	  can	  be	  deviated	  from	  without	  disclosure;	  for	  this	  the	  Code	  uses	  terms	  such	  as	  “should”	  or	  “can”.	  	  The	  remaining	  passages	  of	  the	  Code	  not	   marked	   by	   these	   terms	   contain	   provisions	   that	   enterprises	   are	  compelled	   to	   observe	   under	   applicable	   law”	   (Foreword,	   German	  Corporate	  Governance	  Code	  of	  2001).	  	   This	  2001	  coding	  coincides	  with	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle	  in	  force	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  for	  which	  the	  causal	  path	  is	  determined.	  	  That	  article	  changes	  in	  2006,	  however,	  to	  reflect	  statutory	  requirements	  for	  disclosure:	  “The	  total	  compensation	  of	  each	  member	  of	  the	  Management	  Board	  is	  to	  be	  disclosed	  by	  name,	  divided	  into	  non-­‐performance-­‐related,	   performance-­‐related	   and	   long-­‐term	   incentive	  components,	   unless	   decided	   otherwise	   by	   the	   General	   Meeting	   by	   three-­‐quarters	  majority.”	  The	  principle	  for	  disclosure	  effectively	  changes	  from	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  to	  simply	  “comply.”	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  the	  earlier,	  2001,	  coding	  that	  I	  use	  as	  the	  first	  regulation	   for	   executive	   base	   pay	   disclosures	   because	   the	   Corporate	   Governance	  
                                                63	  The	   2000	   party	   alignment	   in	   the	   Bundestag	   is	   a	   causal	   condition	   of	   the	   2001	  regulation.	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Code,	   although	   not	   statutory	   law,	   was	   the	   result	   of	   a	   government	   commission.	  	  There	   exists	   a	   legal	   foundation	   to	   the	   Code,	  made	   by	   an	   amendment	   to	   the	   Stock	  Corporation	   Act	   (article	   161),	   which	   refers	   directly	   to	   the	   Code’s	   provisions,	   but	  which	   does	   not	   force	   companies	   to	   explain	   when	   they	   are	   non-­‐compliant	   with	  provisions	  in	  the	  Code,	  only	  to	  disclose	  any	  non-­‐compliance.	  A	  prominent	  professor	  of	  corporate	  law	  at	  Frankfurt	  University,	  and	  author	  of	  the	  2001	  Report	  of	  the	  Government	  Commission	  on	  Corporate	  Governance,	  which	  documents	   the	   official	   recommendations	   to	   the	   government,	   provides	   key	   insight	  into	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  code.	   	  Prior	  to	  his	  commission	  to	  draft	  the	  recommendations,	  there	  were	  two	  previous	  corporate	  governance	  codes:	  the	  ‘Frankfurt	  Code’	  and	  the	  ‘Berlin	   Code’,	   reflecting	   a	   mix	   of	   public	   and	   private	   interests.	   	   Then	   Chancellor	  Gerhard	   Schröder	   wanted	   to	   install	   a	   government	   commission	   for	   corporate	  governance	   by	   consolidating	   these	   earlier	   initiatives.	   	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   unified	  Code,	  according	  to	  the	  professor,	  was	  to	  explain	  they	  two-­‐tiered	  board	  structure	  and	  co-­‐determination	  to	  foreigners.	  	  An	  important	  goal	  was	  less	  to	  regulate	  and	  more	  to	  explain.	   	  The	   inclusion	  of	  both	  suggestions	  and	  recommendations	  was	  added	   later	  by	  the	  Commission,	  a	  compromise	  among	  dissenting	  members.	  	  	  This	  professor	  sees	  the	  Code	  now	  attempting	  to	  do	  things	  that	  are	  best	  left	  to	  the	  law:	  “disclosure	  doesn’t	  belong	  in	  the	  Code.”	  	  It	  also	  tries	  to	  achieve	  things	  under	  market	   pressure	   as	   if	   there	  were	  mandatory	   law,	   according	   to	   him.	   	   Nor	   does	   he	  believe	  that	  big	  supervisory	  boards,	  usually	  composed	  of	  twenty	  people,	  are	  good	  at	  setting	   pay	   levels.	   	   Such	   laws	   in	   Europe	  will	  work	   less	   effectively	   than	   in	   the	   US,	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according	   to	   the	   professor,	   because	   countries	   can	   change	   home	   jurisdiction.	   	   A	  current	  member	   of	   the	   Commission	   for	   the	   Corporate	   Governance	   Code,	   contests	  this	  point.	   	  Disclosure	  of	  executive	  pay,	   for	  example,	   changed	   in	   the	  Code’s	  Article	  4.2.4	   from	   “should”	   to	   “shall”	   even	   though	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   thirty	   DAX	  companies	  did	  not	  want	  to	  see	  this	  change.	  	  Politicians	  found	  it	  easy	  to	  target	  these	  companies.	   	   Another	   Commission	   member,	   and	   Chief	   Executive	   of	   Porsche,	  threatened	  the	  Commission	  that	  if	  disclosure	  were	  to	  be	  required,	  he	  would	  call	  his	  friend	   “Gerhard”	   (as	   in	   then	   chancellor,	   Gerhard	   Schröder).	   	   Disclosure	   was	  therefore	   not	   to	   be	   required	   initially.	   	   For	   the	   professor,	   disclosure	   had	   to	   be	  required	  by	  law	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  transparency.	  	  	  The	   two	   agree	   that	   some	   elements	   of	   the	   Code	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	  legally	  binding.	  	  Article	  161	  of	  the	  Stock	  Corporation	  Act	  is	  one	  example.	  	  Another	  is	  Article	   289	   of	   the	  Handelsgesetzbuch	   (HGB),	  which	   as	   of	  May	   2009	   increased	   the	  disclosure	   requirements	   of	   listed	   companies’	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   and	  executive	   compensation,	   albeit	   following	   the	   temporal	   period	   of	   this	   study.	   	   The	  OECD	  Principles,	  though	  non-­‐binding,	  are	  also	  being	  cited	  in	  German	  courts.	  	   EU	   rules	   could	   plausibly	   transform	   corporate	   legal	   forms,	   but	   no	   big	  companies	   are	   thinking	   of	   doing	   this,	   according	   to	   the	   professor.	   	   The	   corporate	  form,	   Societas	   Europaea,	   for	   example,	   does	   not	   do	   away	   with	   Germany	   co-­‐determination,	   but	   would	   create	   a	   smaller	   supervisory	   board.	   	   Allianz	   AG	  reincorporated	   as	   Allianz	   SE,	   which	   reduced	   the	   number	   of	   supervisory	   board	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members	   from	   twenty	   to	   fourteen,	   and	   gave	   foreign	   members,	   particularly	   from	  France	  and	  Italy,	  voting	  rights	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  consultative	  roles.	  	  Another	  original	  member	  of	   the	   commission,	   currently	  of	   the	  Hans	  Böckler	  Stiftung	   in	  Düsseldorf,	   and	   formerly	  on	   the	  Mannesmann	  Supervisory	  Board	   since	  1994	  (and	  then	  of	  Vodafone	  Deutschland,	  after	  its	  acquisition,	  until	  June	  30,	  2007),	  believes	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  force	  companies	  to	  comply	  with	  these	  provisions	  is	  to	  make	   them	   binding	   under	   law;	   the	   Code	   does	   not	   necessarily	   enforce.	   	   This	  commissioner	   disagrees	   with	   a	   questionnaire	   format	   to	   assess	   companies’	  compliance,	   criticizing	   the	   check-­‐box	   style	   of	   the	   questionnaire	   and,	   more	  importantly,	   that	   the	   Vorstand	   and	   the	   Aufsichtsrat	   can	   agree	   together	   to	   not	  disclose.	  	  He	  says	  there	  are	  some	  clauses	  where	  companies	  simply	  lie.	  	  The	  markets	  do	  not	  always	  sanction	  non-­‐compliance	  either.	  In	   2009,	   this	   changed	   in	   German	   corporate	   law	   based	   on	   an	   EU	   directive	  discussed	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   chapter.	   	   Currently	   shareholders,	   including	   employee	  representatives,	   approve	   executive	   compensation,	   but	   there	   is	   disproportionate	  voting	   structure.	   Vodafone’s	   parent	   company	   basically	   set	   the	   standard	   for	  Germany.	  According	   to	   the	   author	   of	   “Corporate	   Governance	   in	   Deutschland	   und	  
Großbritannien,”	   based	   on	   a	   2007	   dissertation	   that	   focuses	   primarily	   on	  comparative	  legal	  history	  and	  board	  structure,	  there	  is	  a	  development	  of	  divergent	  systems	  of	  corporate	  governance	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Germany.	  	  	  Two	  recent	   bills	   have	   been	   introduced	   that	   refer	   to	   the	   Code’s	   Article	   4.2.2	   regarding	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executive	  compensation.	   	  This	   is	  currently	  done	  with	  the	  remuneration	  committee	  of	   the	  management	  board	   (Vorstand).	   	  This	  author	  asserts	   that	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  Code	   is	   simply	   to	   explain	   German	   corporate	   governance	   to	   foreigners,	   not	   to	  actually	   require	  much	  of	  German	   firms,	   and	   that	   there	   is	   persistent	   divergence	   of	  corporate	  governance	  in	  Europe	  because	  there	  are	  too	  many	  systems.	  	  “Stabilization	  does	  not	  require	  standardization.”	  	  He	  favors	  more	  legal	  changes	  because	  the	  Code	  has	  not	  often	  had	  a	  positive	  effect,	  whereas	  the	  law	  would	  be	  more	  effective	  than	  a	  voluntary	  code.	  	  He	  also	  does	  not	  think	  there	  is	  much	  differentiation	  among	  political	  parties	  regarding	  the	  Code.	  	  At	  best,	  the	  SPD	  might	  make	  laws	  faster.	  	  	  A	  similar	  path	  occurs	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  From	  1988	  to	  1990	  the	  Democrats	  held	  a	  majority	  of	  seats	  in	  the	  United	  States	  House	  of	  Representatives	  with	  260	  out	  of	  435	  seats.	  	  Senate	  Democrats	  also	  held	  a	  majority	  during	  that	  time	  with	  55	  out	  of	  100	   seats.	   	   The	   overall	   left-­‐leaning	   majority	   (57.4%)	   in	   the	   American	   federal	  legislative	   branch	   was	   used	   to	   calculate	   the	   1991	   “first”	   regulated	   disclosure	   of	  executive	  base	  pay	  in	  the	  United	  States.	   	  The	  caveat	  in	  the	  coding	  of	  this	  condition,	  like	  that	  for	  the	  outcome,	  is	  that	  the	  history	  of	  regulated	  compensation	  disclosures	  predates	   this	   study	   by	   several	   decades.	   	   In	   the	   72nd	   Congress	   (1931	   to	   1933),	  Republicans	  held	  a	  slim	  majority	  of	  48	  Senate	  seats	  while	  the	  Democrats	  held	  47.	  	  In	  the	   73rd	   (1933	   to	   1935),	   however,	   the	   Democrats	   regained	   control	   of	   the	   Senate	  with	   59	   seats,	   reducing	   the	   Republicans’	   seats	   to	   36.	   	   In	   the	   House	   of	  Representatives,	   Republicans	   held	   a	   slim	   majority	   of	   218	   seats	   against	   the	  Democrats’	  216	  in	  the	  72nd	  Congress.	  	  As	  in	  the	  Senate,	  the	  Democrats	  regained	  the	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majority	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  the	  73rd	  Congress	  with	  313	  seats	  while	  the	  Republicans	  held	  11764.	   	  This	  political	  shift	   is	   indivisible	  from	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	   Great	   Depression	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   New	   Deal,	   which	   created	   the	   US	  Securities	   Exchange	   Commission	   and	   executive	   compensation	   disclosure	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  	  Although	  the	  1991	  figures	  were	  used	  in	  the	  QCA,	  the	  results	  would	  be	  unchanged	  if	  the	  1933	  figures	  were	  used	  instead.	  	  The	   United	   States	   has	   a	   longer	   history	   of	   regulating	   the	   disclosure	   of	  executive	  base	  pay,	  among	  other	  forms	  of	  compensation,	  than	  any	  of	  the	  other	  cases.	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  lone	  exception	  to	  regulating	  executive	  compensation	  disclosures	  before	  the	   focal	   time	   period	   of	   this	   study.	   	   Although	   basic	   executive	   compensation	  disclosure	  has	  been	  required	  since	  1933,	  substantially	  revised	  rules	  did	  not	  appear	  until	   1992.	   	   Schedule	   A,	   item	   14	   of	   the	   original	   1933	   Securities	   Act	   required	   the	  disclosure	  of	  remuneration	  paid	  to	  officers	  of	  the	  company,	  “naming	  them	  wherever	  such	  remuneration	  exceeds	  $25,000”	  during	  the	  current	  or	  preceding	  year.	  	  In	  1938	  the	   Securities	   Exchange	   Commission	   had	   promulgated	   its	   first	   requirements	   for	  executive	   compensation	   disclosures	   in	   proxy	   statements.	   	   Over	   the	   years,	   several	  mandates	  have	  appeared	  that	  continued	  to	  add	  or	  modify	  executive	  compensation	  disclosure.	   	   In	   1992,	   the	   SEC	   made	   sweeping	   changes	   to	   the	   forms	   of	   such	  disclosures	  by	  requiring	  detailed	  contents	  of	  summary	  compensation	  tables	  paid	  to	  executives	  during	  the	  three	  previous	  fiscal	  years.	  	  These	  tables	  required	  companies	  
                                                64	  The	   left-­‐leaning	  Farmer-­‐Labor	  party	  held	  one	   seat	   in	  both	   chambers	  during	   the	  72nd	   Congress,	   and	   one	   seat	   in	   the	   Senate	   plus	   five	   seats	   in	   the	   House	   of	  Representatives	  during	  the	  73rd	  Congress.	  
 237 
to	  disclose,	  of	  course,	  more	  than	  just	  executive	  base	  pay	  and	  shareholdings.	  	  The	  re-­‐baptized	  regulation,	  17	  CFR	  §	  229.402	  requires	  “clear,	  concise	  and	  understandable	  disclosure	  of	  all	  plan	  and	  non-­‐plan	  compensation	  awarded	  to,	  earned	  by,	  or	  paid	  to	  the	  named	  executive	  officers”	  of	  the	  principal	  (chief)	  executive	  officer,	  the	  principal	  financial	  officer,	  the	  other	  three	  most	  highly	  compensated	  officers	  of	  the	  company.	  	  The	  regulation	  was	  revised	  again	  in	  2006	  and	  2008,	  but	  not	  to	  materially	  affect	  the	  coding	  of	  the	  outcome	  in	  this	  study.	  Australia,	  China,	  France,	  and	  India	  also	  regulated	  the	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  base	   pay	   but	   through	   different	   causal	   pathways.	   	   Australia	   is	   in	   the	   clear	  membership	  of	  all	  conditions	  except	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures.	  	  This	  was	  in	  effect	  the	  exact	  opposite	  course	  of	  the	  other	  regulators,	  especially	  its	  prevalence	  of	  voluntary	  executive	  base	  pay	  disclosures.	   	  China	  has	  widespread	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  base	  pay	  and	  a	  certain	  left-­‐leaning	  legislature,	  at	  least	  in	  nominal	  terms.	  	  France	  similarly	  had	  a	  left-­‐leaning	  legislature	  leading	  up	  to	  its	  2005	  regulation	  of	  executive	  base	  pay,	  but	  presence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  base	  pay.	   	  India	  began	  regulating	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  compensation	  in	  2000,	  although	  it	  did	  not	  have	  prevalence	  of	  voluntary	   practice	   among	   firms	  nor	   did	   it	   have	   a	   left-­‐leaning	   legislature.	   	   At	   least	  one	  other	  condition	  had	  to	  combine	  in	  a	  causal	  pathway;	  of	  those,	  only	  Germany	  and	  the	   United	   States	   have	   the	   necessary	   absence	   of	   voluntary	   pay	   disclosures	   at	   the	  time	  of	  their	  regulation.	  	  Germany	  and	   the	  United	  States	   regulate	   companies’	  disclosure	  of	   executive	  base	   pay	  when	   companies	   do	   not	   previously	   disclose	   such	   information	   and	  when	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these	  countries	  had	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures.	   	  France	  joins	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  regulate	  companies’	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  stock	  options;	  the	  casual	  path	  similarly	   includes	   the	  absence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  and	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	  prior	  to	  regulation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  corporate	  scandals	  related	  specifically	  to	   executive	   stock	   options.	   	   In	   these	   two	   types	   of	   executive	   compensation,	   the	  absence	   of	   certain	   conditions,	   namely	   voluntary	   practice	   or	   related	   corporate	  scandals,	   is	   still	   causal.	   	  When	  combined	  simultaneously	  with	   the	  presence	  of	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures,	   they	  explain	  between	  one-­‐third	  and	  one-­‐half	  of	   the	  regulation	  in	  up	  to	  half	  of	  the	  regulating	  countries.	  	  	  The	   disclosure	   of	   executive	   shareholdings	   had	   a	   similar	   causal	   path	  comprising	  the	  absence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  and	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  cumulative	  regulation	  by	  the	  other	  countries	  in	  this	  study.	  	  This	  is	  partially	   because	   the	   United	   States	   precedes	   the	   other	   cases	   in	   the	   required	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  compensation,	  which	  also	  precedes	  the	  focal	  time	  period	  of	  this	  study.	  	  The	  path	  to	  regulation	  of	  executive	  shareholdings	  is	  unique	  to	  this	  single	  case.	   	  The	  United	  States	  is	  also	  the	  only	  country	  that	  regulates	  prior	  to	  this	  study’s	  intended	   period	   of	   analysis.	   	   However,	   the	   same	   conditions	   hold	   for	   the	   United	  States	   in	   both	   the	   original	   year	   of	   regulation,	   1933,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   start	   of	   the	  temporal	  period	  of	  this	  study,	  1990.	  	  	  Further	   research	   on	   the	   full	   legislative	   history	   linking	   party	   agenda	   to	  regulation	  might	  elucidate	  precise	  efforts	  by	  elected	  officials	  of	   left-­‐leaning	  parties	  in	   Germany	   and	   the	   United	   States	   to	   enact	   related	   legislation.	   	   There	   is	   also	   a	  
 239 
potential	  gap	  between	  such	  legislation	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  compensation	  disclosures	  by	  state	  agencies	   to	  enforce	  and	  monitor	  corporate	  disclosures	  of	   this,	  or	  other,	  kinds.	   	  Nevertheless	  the	  salient	  findings	  of	  this	  analysis	  demonstrate	  that	  the	   presence	   of	   majority	   left-­‐leaning	   parties	   in	   legislatures	   combines	   with	   the	  absence	   of	   firms’	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   executive	   compensation	   to	   lead	   to	  regulation.	  	  
	  
Regulation	  of	  Executive	  Shareholdings	  Unlike	   its	   related	   form	  of	   executive	   compensation,	   base	  pay,	   shareholdings	  do	  not	  follow	  any	  causal	  path	  of	  sufficient	  coverage.	  	  The	  scores	  for	  the	  outcome	  and	  conditions	  appear	  in	  Table	  C.3.	  	  
Table	  C.3	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Executive	  Shareholdings	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conditions	  were	  used	  in	  the	  minimization	  procedure	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  solutions	  in	  Table	  C.4.	  
Table	  C.4	  
Paths	  to	  Regulation	  of	  Executive	  Shareholdings	  












$2/7:+,&6:;<=9:>,3>:7*#2 ?@AAB ?@AAB ?@CCC 4)D ?@AAB ?@CCC
E/26,#"-,"*6()"%*+,"- ./0( 4-,5*&( )"%*+,"-(
;<=9:7*#2F ?@BAA ?@?CG ?@HHH
+,&6:7*#2 ?@AAB ?@??? ?@AGI
J-+&2#&K,/+&()"%*+,"-
$2/7:;<=9:7*#2 ?@BAA ?@BAA A@??? 4)D ?@BAA A@???
?@BAA ?@B?L4)D
 241 
maximum	   thresholds	   for	   executive	   share	   ownership.	   	   In	   the	   United	   States,	   the	  regulated	  disclosures	  date	  back	  early	  in	  SEC	  history,	  so	  are	  perhaps	  unique	  among	  the	   other	   cases.	   	   Although	   this	   particular	   form	  of	   shareholder	   compensation	   does	  not	  follow	  a	  logical	  path	  to	  regulation	  for	  any	  other	  cases,	  a	  similar	  form	  of	  equity-­‐linked	  compensation	  for	  executives	  does	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
Regulation	  of	  Executive	  Stock	  Options	  Table	  C.5	  presents	   the	  scores	  of	   the	   five	  causal	  conditions	  and	  the	  outcome	  for	  each	  country-­‐case	  as	  per	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  stock	  options.	  	  
Table	  C.5	  
Scores	  for	  Conditions	  and	  Regulations:	  Executive	  Stock	  Options	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conditions,	  when	  combined	  with	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures,	   leads	   to	   regulation.	   	  The	  parsimonious	   solution	   includes	   both	   prac•LEFT	   and	   LEFT•high.	   	   Despite	   the	   few	  number	  of	   cases	  with	  nonzero	  values	   for	  SCAN,	   it	   is	  not	  an	  easy	  counterfactual	   to	  eliminate.	  	  TIES	  are,	  however,	  easy	  counterfactuals	  to	  eliminate	  in	  the	  intermediate	  solution	  because	  they	  were	  eliminated	  in	  the	  parsimonious	  solution.	   	  A	  single	  path	  with	   a	   sufficiently	   high	   consistency	   score	   comprises	   the	   intermediate	   solution,	   as	  indicated	  in	  Table	  C.6.	  	  
Table	  C.6	  












$2/7:67/-:+,&6:;<=9:>,3> ?@ABC ?@ABC D@??? ?@ABC D@???
E/26,#"-,"*6()"%*+,"-
$2/7:;<=9F ?@GBH ?@DBD ?@IDB
/
;<=9:>,3> ?@CIC ?@?HJ ?@IAH
/
K-+&2#&L,/+&()"%*+,"-













from	  0.3262	  to	  0.6845.	   	  This	  particular	  change	  results	   in	  Germany’s	  removal	   from	  the	  causal	  path	  in	  the	  complex	  solution	  that	  returns	  from	  this	  revised	  minimization.	  	  Consistency	  remains	  the	  same	  and	  coverage	  decreases	  slightly	  to	  0.266.	  	  Results	  for	  the	  parsimonious	  and	   intermediate	  solutions,	  both	  of	  which	  do	  apply	   to	  Germany,	  improve	  slightly.	  	  The	  parsimonious	  solution	  has	  only	  one	  path,	  prac•LEFT,	  instead	  of	   two,	   and	  with	   coverage	  of	  0.5	  and	  consistency	  of	  1.	   	  The	   intermediate	   solution,	  prac•scan•LEFT,	   has	   identical	   scores.	   	   As	   in	   the	   original	   minimization	   for	   this	  practice,	  the	  absence	  of	  voluntary	  practice	  and	  stock	  option	  scandals	  combine	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  to	  lead	  to	  regulation.	  	   To	  engage	  an	  additional	  thought	  experiment,	  I	  re-­‐evaluated	  the	  paths	  in	  the	  QCA	   for	   all	   of	   the	   governance	   practices	   after	   recoding	   China’s	   legislature.	   	   In	   the	  original	  coding,	   I	  had	  considered	  China’s	   legislature	  to	  be	  100%	  left-­‐leaning	  for	  all	  years	  owing	  to	  the	  nominally	  communist	  majority	  in	  the	  People’s	  National	  Congress.	  	  However,	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   Chinese	   communists	   are	   capitalists	   in	   practice,	   so	   I	  recoded	  the	  legislature	  as	  0.5	  for	  maximum	  ambiguity	  in	  fuzzy	  set	  terms,	  as	  well	  as	  0	   for	   entirely	   right-­‐leaning.	   	   The	   regulation	   of	   executive	   stock	   options	   is	   the	   first	  governance	  practice	   in	  which	  any	  change	  to	   the	  paths	  was	   found.	   	  Specifically,	   the	  same	   path	   for	   American	   and	   German	   regulation,	   prac•LEFT,	   results	   in	   the	  intermediate	  solution	  with	  slightly	  higher	  unique	  coverage	  (0.201	  up	   from	  0.171),	  which	   is	   negligible.	   No	   change	   to	   the	   results	   of	   the	   complex	   or	   parsimonious	  solutions	   occurred.	   	   A	   new	   path	   in	   the	   intermediate	   solution	   emerged,	   however.	  	  Applying	  again	  only	  to	  German	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  ties•LEFT	  was	  an	  alternative	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path,	  with	   raw	  coverage	  of	  0.365	  and	  consistency	  of	  0.800.	   	  This	   implies	   that	   that	  absence	  of	  stock	  market	  ties	  between	  American	  or	  German	  exchanges	  and	  all	  others	  combined	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   to	   lead	   to	   the	   regulation.	  	  The	   difference	   between	   these	   paths	   in	   the	   revised	   intermediate	   solution	   is	   not	  statistically	   significant.	   	   Even	   when	   I	   recoded	   China’s	   legislature	   as	   0	   to	   indicate	  100%	   right-­‐leaning,	   the	   same	   paths	   returned	   with	   even	   lower	   coverage	   and	  consistency	  scores.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  original	  has	  a	  higher	  consistency	  level	  suggesting	  that	   the	   recoding	   of	   China	   as	   having	   an	   ambiguously	   centrist	   legislature	   is	  insignificant	   to	   the	   original	   QCA	  model.	   	   This	   experiment	   should	   not	   suggest	   that	  China’s	  legislature	  is	  insignificant	  as	  currently	  coded,	  rather	  that	  the	  original	  coding	  as	   predominantly	   left-­‐leaning	   combines	  with	   the	   values	   of	   its	   other	   conditions	   to	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  path	  to	  regulation	  in	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  	  The	  concurrent	  absence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosures	  of	  executive	  stock	  options,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  related	  executive	  stock	  option	  scandals,	  combines	  with	  a	  left-­‐leaning	  legislature	   to	   produce	   required	   disclosures	   in	   France,	   Germany,	   and	   the	   United	  States.	  	  This	  path	  explains	  nearly	  half	  the	  outcome	  of	  regulation.	  	  Below	  I	  discuss	  the	  paths	  and	  suggest	  other	  causes	  that	  possibly	  explaining	  the	  remaining	  portion	  of	  the	  outcome	  unexplained	  in	  the	  QCA.	  The	   absence	   of	   executive	   stock	   option	   scandals	   was	   co-­‐requisite	   for	  regulation	   in	   France,	   Germany,	   and	   the	  United	   States.	   	   Left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   in	  these	   countries	   were	   unfazed	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   stock	   option	   scandals	   or	   the	   lack	   of	  voluntary	   disclosure	   thereof:	   they	   drafted	   legislation	   to	   require	   disclosure	   of	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executive	   stock	   options	   nonetheless.	   	   Their	   regulation	  might	   be	   considered	  more	  preemptive	   of	   the	   very	   types	   of	   scandals	   that	   regulators—or	   at	   least	   those	  authorized	  by	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures—assumed	  possible.	  	  The	   left-­‐leaning	   legislatures	   and	   regulations	   for	   both	   Germany	   and	   the	  United	  States	  apply	  equally	  to	  the	  executive	  base	  pay	  disclosures	  as	  well	  as	  to	  that	  for	  executive	  stock	  options.	  	  	  In	   2001,	   the	   French	   legislature’s	   political	   makeup	   was	   handsomely	   left	  leaning.	   	  The	  Socialists	  held	  250	  seats	   in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	   	  The	  Rally	   for	  the	  Republic	  (RPR)	  held	  140,	  the	  Communists	  36,	  and	  various	  radical	  and	  green	  parties	  together	  held	  33	  seats	   to	  round	  out	   the	   left-­‐leaning	  block	   in	   the	  chamber	  wherein	  the	  center-­‐right	  Union	  for	  French	  Democracy	  (UDF)	  held	  only	  113	  seats.	  	  Meantime	  in	  the	  Senate,	  the	  RPR	  held	  96	  seats,	  the	  Socialists	  83,	  and	  Republican,	  Communist,	  and	  Citizen	  held	  23	  for	  a	  total	  of	  202	  seats	  while	  the	  center-­‐right	  held	  just	  72,	  split	  53	  between	  the	  Centrist	  Union	  and	  19	  for	  the	  Democratic	  and	  European	  Social	  Rally.	  	  The	   regulation	   in	  France	   is	   found	   in	  Articles	  L.225-­‐102-­‐1	  of	   the	   commercial	   code,	  which	  requires	  full	  disclosure	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  compensation	  per	  recipient	  executive.	  Australia,	   China,	   and	   India	   regulated	   this	   practice	   before	   2008	   but	   each	  followed	   a	   different	   path.	   	   Australia	   and	   China	   had	   widespread	   prevalence	   of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  executive	  stock	  options,	  though	  India	  did	  not.	  	  Of	  the	  three,	  only	  China	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  having	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  prior	  to	  regulation	  but	  because	  of	  its	  prevalence	  of	  voluntary	  disclosure,	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  same	  path	  as	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	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There	  is	  great	  similarity	  between	  the	  causal	  paths	  and	  outcomes,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  cases	  (except	  for	  France),	  in	  the	  two	  executive	  compensation-­‐related	  practices.	  	  Both	   can	  be	   sufficiently	   described	   as	   the	   absence	   of	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   these	  two	  types	  of	  executive	  compensation	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  legislatures	  in	  the	  years	  prior	  to	  regulation.	  	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States	  follow	  the	  same	  path	  in	  regulating	  disclosures	  of	  executive	  base	  pay;	  France	  joins	  them	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  stock	  option	  disclosures.	  	  	  I	  did	  not	  analyze	  all	   forms	  of	  executive	  compensation.	   	  Nor	  could	  I	  map	  the	  causal	  path	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  executive	  shareholding	  disclosures	  across	  the	  cases.	  	  Other	  forms	  of	  compensation	  are	  perhaps	  more	  elusive	  and	  less	  comparable	  across	  countries	   and	   companies.	   	   Certainly	   some	   of	   these	   regulations	   were	   created	   in	  response	   to	   companies	   remunerating	   their	   executives	   in	   financially	   creative	  ways.	  	  Further,	  there	  is	  some	  variation	  as	  to	  what	  companies	  are	  willing	  to	  disclose	  and	  the	  responses	   such	   disclosures	   can	   generate:	   disclosures	   have	   not	   reduced	   total	  executive	  compensation	  in	  any	  of	  the	  cases!	  	   Balanced	  panel	  data	  for	  cross-­‐country	  executive	  compensation	  over	  this	  time	  period	  is	  elusive,	  although	  a	  few	  points	  are	  known	  generally.	   	  From	  2000	  to	  2006,	  equity-­‐based	   pay	   among	   American	   CEOs	   increased	   while	   base	   pay	   decreased	  sharply,	   and	   other	   advanced	   economies	   have	   tentatively	   converged	   towards	   a	  similar	  pay	  structure	  (Fernandes	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  Stock	  options,	  which	  were	  previously	  illegal	   in	   Japan	  until	  1997	  and	   in	  Germany	  until	  1998,	  have	  become	  a	  widespread	  form	   of	   executive	   compensation.	   	   Samples	   of	   British	   firms	   in	   the	   FTSE	   350	   index	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(141≤N≤328)	   between	   2002	   and	   2008	   indicate	   that	   turnover	   of	   compensation	  consultants	   correlates	   positively	   with	   increased	   executive	   compensation	   (Goh	   &	  Gupta	   2010);	   samples	   of	   American	   firms	   across	   different	   industries	   in	   1993	  (N=218)	   and	   in	   2002	   (N=232)	   indicate	   that	   the	   frequency	   of	   compensation	  committee	   meetings	   and	   overall	   board	   size	   are	   positively	   correlated	   with	  transparency	   of	   executive	   compensation	   disclosures.	   	   My	   study	   stops	   short	   of	  comparing	   base	   pay	   and	   equity-­‐based	   compensation,	   i.e.	   shareholding	   and	   stock	  options,	   but	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   regulated	   disclosures	   have	   had	   varying	  success	  in	  keeping	  pace	  with	  new	  forms	  of	  pay.	   	  French	  law	  has	  had	  a	  prescriptive	  requirement	  for	  disclosing	  all	  forms	  of	  executive	  compensation	  regardless	  of	  form,	  whereas	   American	   regulations	   for	   decades	   reacted	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   diverse	  forms	   of	   pay,	   incrementally	   honing	   the	   specificity	   of	   compensation	   disclosures.	   	   I	  looked	   at	   corporate	   governance	   scandals,	   as	   reported	   in	   the	   media,	   as	   a	   causal	  condition.	   	   The	   absence	   of	   scandals	   related	   to	   stock	   options	   is	   a	   co-­‐factor	   in	   the	  regulation	  of	  stock	  option	  disclosures.	  	  On	  a	  related	  point,	  Core	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  find	  no	  support	  in	  the	  media’s	  negative	  reporting	  of	  CEO	  compensation—even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  ‘scandalous’—as	  altering	  CEO	  compensation	  levels.	  	  	  Disclosure	   of	   executive	   compensation,	   of	   both	   base	   pay	   and	   stock	   options,	  was	  regulated	  in	  Australia	  by	  2004,	  albeit	  not	  through	  the	  causal	  path	  that	  France,	  Germany	   and	   the	   United	   States	   share.	   	   Australia	   took	   similar	   steps	   to	   the	   United	  States	  by	  first	  consolidating	  states’	  regulatory	  oversight	  of	  securities	  at	  the	  national	  level	   (1991),	   then	   developing	   broad	   regulations	   for	   listed	   companies	   under	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enhanced	   powers	   for	   regulation	   (2001) 65 ,	   including	   required	   disclosures	   of	  executive	   compensation	   (2004).	   	   	   Yet	   Australia’s	   regulation	   occurs	   well	   after	   the	  United	  States	  and	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	   the	  causal	  path	   that	  describes	  American	  and	  German	  regulation	  of	  executive	  compensation	  disclosures.	  	  Other	  causes	  unique	  to	   Australia	   and	   the	   United	   States	   are	   plausible.	   	   Among	   common	   law	   countries,	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  exceptionally	  high	  portions	  of	  their	  securities	  regulators’	  budgets	  devoted	  to	  enforcement	  coupled	  with	  criminal	  sanction	  (Coffee	  2007).	   	   This	   particular	   feature	   of	   their	   regulatory	   environments	   could	   be	   either	  condition	  or	  outcome,	  depending	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  causality,	  but	   it	  certainly	  sets	  these	  two	  cases	  apart	  from	  the	  others.	  Hill	   (2005)	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   post-­‐Enron	   era,	   it	   is	   the	   law	   that	   drives	  corporate	   governance	   norms	   in	   the	   United	   States	   whereas	   previously	   it	   was	   the	  norms	   driving	   the	   law.	   	   She	   cites	   other	   evidence	   that	   in	   Europe,	   calls	   for	  independent	   directors	   might	   be	   resisted	   because	   concentrated	   share	   ownership	  prevails;	  likewise	  in	  Asia,	  the	  “outside”	  director	  might	  prevail	  over	  the	  UK/US-­‐style	  “independent”	  director.	  	  “[O]ne	  development	  in	  Australia	  that	  has	  strengthened	  the	  enforcement	  of	  directors’	  duties	   is	   the	   increasingly	  strategic	  use	  by	   the	  Australian	  Securities	   and	   Investments	   Commission	   (ASIC)	   of	   the	   civil	   penalty	   regime	   as	   a	  regulatory	   mechanism”	   (Hill	   2005:	   402).	   	   Seldom	   used	   previously,	   the	   2001	  Financial	  Services	  Reform	  Act	  strengthened	  the	  ability	  of	  ASIC	  to	  prosecute	  market	  misconduct.	   	   	   The	   Corporate	   Law	   Economic	   Reform	   Program	   (Audit	   Reform	   and	  
                                                65	  See	  the	  Australian	  Securities	  and	  Investments	  Commission	  Act	  2001.	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Corporate	   Disclosure)	   Act	   2004	   (also	   known	   as	   CLERP	   9),	   following	   the	   HIH	   and	  One.Tel	  scandals,	  strengthened	  ASIC’s	  hand	  by	  requiring	  a	  lower	  standard	  of	  proof	  for	  offense	  than	  criminal	  prosecution66.	  	  “Previously,	   executive	   remuneration	   had	   been	   viewed	   as	   a	   classic	  corporate	   governance	   problem,	   necessitating	   a	   range	   of	   regulatory	  techniques	   to	   reduce	   or	   eliminate	   managerial	   self-­‐interest,	   such	   as	  fiduciary	   duty	   liability,	   use	   of	   independent	   directors,	   remuneration	  committees,	  or	  greater	  shareholder	  control.	  	  Under	  the	  new	  paradigm,	  however,	   executive	   remuneration	   was	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   corporate	  governance	  problem,	  but	  as	  a	   solution—it	  was	   recast	  as	  a	   corporate	  governance	  technique	  in	  its	  own	  right”	  (Hill	  2005:	  409).	  	  My	   results	  on	   the	   regulation	  of	   executive	   compensation	  disclosures	   in	  France	  and	  Germany	   echo	  Hill’s	   argument	   about	   the	   Australian	   case.	   	   The	   Australian	   scandal	  that	  I	  included	  in	  this	  study,	  HIH,	  was	  key	  in	  corporate	  governance	  reform.	  	  CLERP	  9	  (as	  opposed	   to	  earlier	   sets	  of	  CLERP	  reforms)	   “was	  explicitly	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  failures	  that	  had	  been	  exposed	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  HIH.	  	  It	  was	  reactive	  more	  than	  proactive”	  (Haines	  2009).	   	  She	  further	  points	  out	  Australian	  corporate	  governance	  shifted	   from	  self-­‐regulation	   to	  co-­‐regulation,	   i.e.	   the	  government	  with	  professional	  accounting	  bodies,	  no	  longer	  just	  these.	  Based	  on	  my	  findings	  across	  the	  different	  corporate	  governance	  practices,	   I	  concur	   with	   Hill’s	   thesis	   that	   regulatory	   outcomes	   across	   countries,	   even	   those	  nearly	   identical	   in	   legal	  reform,	  could	  still	  be	  vastly	  different	   in	   interpretation	  and	  enforcement.	   	  My	   overall	   findings	   likewise	   contribute	   to	   the	   related	   debate	   about	  the	  convergence	  of	  capital	  markets	  despite	  persistent	  regulatory	  divergence.	  	  	  	  
                                                66	  I	  document	  these	  scandals	  in	  the	  Australian	  case	  in	  chapter	  2	  as	  well.	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Regulation	  of	  Fees	  for	  Audit	  Services	  The	   problem	   of	   limited	   diversity—when	   logically	   possible	   configurations	  have	  no	   empirical	   cases—is	   especially	   acute	   in	   the	  QCA	  of	   fees	   for	   audit	   services.	  	  Only	   two	   countries	   came	   to	   regulate	   the	   disclosure	   of	   audit	   services,	   Canada	   and	  China,	  and	  no	  configurations	  of	  causal	  conditions	  explain	  the	  outcome	  in	  these	  two	  cases.	  	  The	  scores	  in	  the	  sufficiency/necessity	  matrix	  in	  Table	  3.14	  partially	  explain	  why.	   	   Values	   closer	   to	   1	   for	   conditions	   indicate	   degree	   of	   importance	   in	   either	  sufficiency	   or	   necessity	   (Goertz	   2006).	   	   Not	   one	   condition,	   however,	   is	   causally	  sufficient	   and	   only	   membership	   in	   highly	   developed	   capital	   markets	   is	   causally	  necessary.	  	  
Table	  C.7	  
Sufficiency	  /	  Necessity	  Matrix	  of	  Causal	  Conditions:	  Audit-­‐Fees	  
	  Further	   this	   governance	   practice,	   and	   the	   limited	   regulation	   thereof,	   possibly	  overlaps	  with	  another	   large	  area	  of	   law,	  namely	   tax	   law	  and	  accounting	   rules	  and	  standards,	  which	  have	  plausibly	  other	  overlapping	  conditions	  apart	   from	  the	  ones	  specified	  for	  the	  other	  governance	  practices.	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Regulation	  of	  Fees	  for	  Non-­‐Audit	  Services	  Similarly,	  fees	  for	  non-­‐audit	  services	  have	  no	  feasible	  solution	  sets.	  	  Table	  C.8	  indicates	   overlapping	   necessity	   scores	   for	   voluntary	   practice	   and	   left-­‐leaning	  legislatures,	  yet	  none	  of	  the	  conditions	  is	  causally	  sufficient.	  	  Moreover,	  China	  is	  the	  only	  country	  to	  regulate	  the	  disclosure	  of	  fees	  for	  non-­‐audit	  services.	  	  
Table	  C.8	  
Sufficiency	  /	  Necessity	  Matrix	  of	  Causal	  Conditions:	  Non-­‐Audit	  Fees	  
	  Because	  only	  one	  country	  regulates	  this	  practice,	  there	  is	  no	  cumulative	  regulation	  condition	  specified	  for	  this	  practice.	   	  Fees	  for	  audit	  and	  non-­‐audit	  services	  have	  no	  explanatory	   paths	   in	   this	   fsQCA,	   and	   so	   have	   reached	   the	   end	   of	   their	   proverbial	  roads.	  	  
Regulation	  of	  General	  Corporate	  Governance	  Disclosure	  Table	  C.9	  presents	   the	   scores	  of	   the	   causal	   conditions	   and	   the	  outcome	   for	  each	  country-­‐case	  as	  per	  the	  regulation	  of	  general	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure.	  	  Like	   director	   independence,	   the	   regulation	   of	   general	   corporate	   governance	  disclosure	   includes	   six	   causal	   conditions	   in	   the	   complex	   solution,	   albeit	   different	  conditions.	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India	   it	   is	   the	  presence	  of	  stock	  market	   listing	  rules	  combined	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  voluntary	  practice	  that	  produces	  regulation.	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India’s	  path	  in	  the	  parsimonious	  solution.	  	  Otherwise,	  and	  like	  the	  experiments	  with	  the	   paths	   in	   the	   regulation	   of	   disclosures	   of	   executive	   stock	   options	   and	   auditor	  independence,	   the	   recoding	   of	   China’s	   legislature	   has	   negligible	   impacts	   on	   the	  paths	   to	   other	   countries’	   regulation.	   	   Notably,	   China	   does	   not	   join	   the	   path	   to	  regulation	  of	  any	  of	  these	  practices	  when	  its	  legislature	  is	  recoded.	  The	  regulation	  of	  general	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure	  occurs	  in	  half	  the	  countries,	  three	  of	  which	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  one	  of	  two	  causal	  paths:	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  stock	  exchange	  listing	  rule	  plus	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  voluntary	  practice	  and	  highly	  developed	   capital	  markets,	   or	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   stock	  market	   listing	   rule	   and	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  practice.	   	  The	   latter	  path	  applies	  uniquely	   to	   India,	  which	  does	  not	  make	  for	  comparison.	  	  The	  former	  applies,	  however,	  to	  both	  China	  and	  France.	  	  The	  path	   to	   regulation	   of	   general	   corporate	   governance	   disclosures	   reveals	   common	  causes	   yet	   suggests	   diversity	   of	   corporate	   governance	   regulations,	   and	   their	  sources,	  persists.	  The	   notable	   absence	   of	   stock	   market	   listing	   rules	   to	   disclose	   general	  corporate	   governance	   at	   firms	   in	   China	   and	   France	   is	   equally	   important	   to	   the	  subsequent	   regulation	   in	   these	   countries.	   	   This	   point	   might	   serve	   to	   reinforce	  institutional	   similarities	   among	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   countries,	   whereby	   non-­‐state	  capital	   markets	   actors	   play	   heightened	   roles	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   rules,	   at	   least	  initially.	   	  Conversely,	  countries	  with	  more	  state-­‐centric	  rulemaking,	   like	  China	  and	  France,	  might	  be	   averse	   to	   letting	   stock	  markets	  make	  up	   their	  own	   rules.	   	  These	  countries	  did	  not	  craft	  regulation	  on	  their	  own,	  however.	  	  China	  specifically	  looked	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beyond	  its	  borders	  for	  the	  template	  of	  those	  rules,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  state-­‐originated	   or	   market-­‐originated,	   but	   without	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	  backing,	   the	   rules	   would	   have	   no	   meaning.	   	   It	   was	   a	   supranational	   body,	   the	  European	  Union,	  that	  influenced	  French	  regulation	  to	  require	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure,	   and	   was	   itself	   largely	   influenced	   by	   a	   particular	   member	   state,	   i.e.	  Germany,	  to	   formulate	  regulations.	   	   I	  only	  considered	  stock	  market	   listing	  rules	  as	  additional	   to	   the	   requirements	   already	   set	   by	   securities	   regulators,	   and	   only	   as	  conditions	   for	   new	   regulations.	   	   Future	   studies	   could	   consider	   listing	   rules	   as	   an	  outcome	  for	  comparison	  to	  other	  regulations,	  both	  extant	  and	  new67.	  	  	  The	   prevalence	   of	   voluntary	   disclosure	   of	   general	   corporate	   governance	  among	  the	  companies	  of	  each	  regulating	  country	  is	  a	  causal	  condition	  as	  part	  of	  the	  path	   to	  regulation.	   	   In	  China,	  all	  155	  of	   its	   listed	  companies	  were	  disclosing	  at	   the	  time	   of	   the	   2007	   regulation.	   	   China	   was	   barely	   in	   the	   set	   of	   countries	   of	   highly	  developed	   capital	   markets,	   compared	   to	   the	   other	   nine	   focal,	   its	   cumulative	  percentage	  of	  its	  GDP	  derived	  from	  capital	  markets	  was	  37.5%	  in	  2008.	  	  	  The	  China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (CSRC)	  issued	  Notice	  No.	  28	  in	  2007	   on	   “Matters	   concerning	   Carrying	   out	   a	   Special	   Campaign	   to	   Strengthen	   the	  Corporate	   Governance	   of	   Listed	   Companies”	   describing	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	  general	  investigation	  of	  corporate	  governance	  at	  listed	  companies.	  	  This	  campaign	  of	  governance	   improvements	   required	   companies	   to	   first	   self-­‐examine	   their	  
                                                67	  I	  conducted	  the	  QCA	  using	  the	  listing	  rules	  as	  outcome	  but	  very	  low	  scores	  of	  the	  conditions	   appeared	   on	   sufficiency/necessity	   matrix	   and	   no	   possible	   solutions	  resulted	  for	  any	  of	  the	  governance	  practices.	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governance	  weaknesses,	   solicit	   public	   opinion	   on	   improvements,	   and	   report	   their	  rectification	   steps.	   	   Whether	   the	   required	   improvements	   to	   Chinese	   corporate	  governance	  were	  cosmetic,	  the	  risk	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  was	  made	  clear	  by	  the	  CSRC:	  “As	   to	   a	   listed	   company	   with	   problems	   in	   its	   governance	   structure	   and	   the	  controlling	  shareholder	  or	  actual	  controller	  that	  gravely	  affects	  the	  independency	  or	  infringes	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  listed	  company,	  the	  CSRC	  shall	  keep	  a	  close	  eye	  on	  their	  refunding,	  share	  transfer,	  acquisition	  and	  merger,	  restructuring,	  etc.”	  	  	   The	  CSRC	  issued	  Notice	  212	  in	  2007	  revising	  the	  format	  for	  listed	  companies’	  annual	  reports,	  implementing	  a	  “more	  than	  less”	  principle	  for	  corporate	  governance	  standards	   at	   mainland	   companies	   with	   overseas	   listings:	   Article	   8	   stipulates	   that	  these	   companies	   must	   comply	   with	   the	   strictest	   standards	   of	   the	   exchanges	   on	  which	  they	  are	  listed,	  and	  publicize	  such	  in	  their	  disclosures.	  	  Section	  6,	  “Corporate	  Governance	  Structure”	  articles	  27	   to	  31	   require	  multiple	  disclosures	  pertaining	   to	  director	   independence,	   specialized	   committees,	   executive	   compensation,	   internal	  control	  mechanisms	  and	  disclosures.	  Although	   the	  CSRC	  promulgated	   its	  own	  Code	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	   for	  Listed	   Companies	   in	   2001,	   it	   was	   largely	   influenced	   by	   the	   Hong	   Kong	   Stock	  Exchange	   listing	   rules.	   	   This	   juridification	   of	   external	   corporate	   governance	  standards	  in	  mainland	  China	  may	  have	  been	  necessary	  for	  the	  standards	  to	  have	  any	  salience.	  	  As	  an	  official	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Securities	  Exchange	  (“SSE”)	  Research	  Center	  claims,	  voluntary	  practices	  rarely	  become	  rules	  in	  China;	  rather	  the	  rules	  come	  first.	  	  The	  CSRC’s	  code	  originated	  in	  the	  SSE’s	  1999	  draft	  code,	  begun	  in	  1997	  and	  based	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largely	  on	  the	  OECD’s	  draft	  of	  the	  Principles	  of	  Corporate	  Governance,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	   Combined	   Code	   and	   Cadbury	   Reports	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	   what	  American	   firms	  were	   already	  doing	   voluntarily,	   influenced	  mainly	   by	   institutional	  shareholders.	   	   	  He	  claims	   that	   the	   framework	   is	  borrowed	  but	   that	   the	  adaptation	  process	  is	  specific	  to	  governance	  problems	  in	  China.	  In	  China,	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   regulation	   stems	  additionally	   from	   foreign	  influence,	   namely	   American	   stock	   exchange	   listing	   rules	   and	   British	   corporate	  governance	   codes.	   	   A	   Tsinghua	   University	   professor	   of	   corporate	   law	   notes	   that	  many	   Chinese	   graduates	   of	   American	  management	   and	   law	   schools	   came	   back	   to	  China	   and	   used	   their	   education	   as	   background	   for	   drafting	   Chinese	   corporate	  governance.	   	   One	   of	   them	   became	   the	   deputy	   director	   of	   the	   China	   Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission,	  now	  head	  of	  its	  international	  affairs	  division.	  	  According	  to	  the	   law	  professor:	   “Their	  original	  objective	  was	   to	   transplant	  and	  rewrite	  Chinese	  securities	  law.”	  	  	  71	   of	   75	   French	   companies	   were	   voluntarily	   disclosing	   their	   general	  corporate	  governance	  practices	  when	  the	  state	  began	  requiring	  the	  same	  practice	  in	  2008.	   	   France	  was	   certainly	   in	   the	   set	   of	   countries	  with	   highly	   developed	   capital	  markets	  when	  it	  regulated	  general	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure	  in	  2007.	  	   French	  regulation	  was	  a	  transposition	  of	  a	  European	  Union	  directive,	  as	  was	  its	  regulation	  of	  specialized	  committees.	   	  The	  EU	  directive	  was	  partially	  influenced	  by	  other	  member	  countries,	  namely	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  even	  though	  their	   regulation	   of	   general	   corporate	   governance	   each	   followed	   alternative	   paths.	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The	  Act	  of	  3	  July	  2008	  amends	  various	  aspects	  of	  French	  company	  law	  in	  order	  to	  comply	   with	   EU	   law	   and	   transpose	   Directive	   2006/46/EC,	   which	   requires	   that	  companies	   identify	  which	  EU	  national	   corporate	   governance	   code	   that	   they	   adopt	  and	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  any	  provisions	  they	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  apply.	  	  	  This	  also	  transposed	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle	  into	  French	  regulation	  of	  general	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure.	  	  	  	   The	   presidents	   of	   both	   French	   business	   associations,	   AFEP	   and	   MEDEF,	  commissioned	   a	   corporate	   governance	   report	   in	   2002,	   “Pour	   Un	   Meilleur	  
Gouvernement	   des	   Entreprises	   Cotées,” 68 	  which	   became	   the	   standard	   French	  corporate	  governance	  code.	   	  The	  result	  of	  previous	  reports	   in	  1995	  and	  1999,	   the	  compiled	   2003	   version	   was	   written	   by	   then	   president	   of	   French	   bank,	   Société	  Générale.	   	   It	  addressed	   issues	  not	  then	  covered	  by	  French	   law,	  such	  as	  specialized	  board	   committee	   functions	   and	   the	   independence	   of	   various	   market	   actors	  impinging	  on	  listed	  companies.	  	  The	  author	  claimed	  that	  the	  report	  was	  intended	  to	  provide	   greater	   transparency	   for	   investors.	   	   There	   was	   a	   risk,	   however,	   that	   the	  addition	   of	   a	   governance	   practice	   or	   recommendation	   becomes	   an	   end	   in	   itself:	  “Toute	  norme	  peut	  être	  vérifiée	  dans	  le	  box-­‐ticking,”	  he	  claimed,	  which	  could	  preclude	  more	   serious	   inquiry	   into	   governance.	   	   According	   to	   him,	   the	   later	   2008	   version,	  which	  was	  revised	  by	  AFEP	  and	  MEDEF	  to	  include	  additional	  recommendations	  on	  executive	  compensation,	  errs	  by	  overemphasizing	  director	  independence,	  which	  the	  
                                                68 	  The	   primary	   author	   later	   preferred	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   gouvernance	   to	  
gouvernement	  because,	  according	  to	  him,	  the	  latter	  refers	  only	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  company	  whereas	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  that	  as	  well	  as	  to	  best	  practice.	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author	  argues	  has	  no	  miracle	  recipe	  for	  achieving.	  	  There	  are	  so	  called	  independent	  directors,	  he	  regrets,	  who	  are	  “admirablement	  incompétents.”	  The	  German	  case	  would	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  had	  it	  transposed	  EU	   Directive	   2006/46	   into	   national	   law	   just	   one	   year	   earlier.	   	   As	   for	   the	   causal	  conditions	   returned,	   Germany	   would	   have	   been	   in	   the	   set	   of	   companies	   where	  voluntary	  practice	  was	  prevalent.	  	  Although	  at	  the	  first	  year	  of	  regulation,	  2001,	  only	  11	   of	   64	   German	   companies	   voluntarily	   disclosed	   their	   corporate	   governance	  practices,	  they	  dramatically	  increased	  to	  62	  companies	  disclosing	  out	  of	  64	  by	  2008,	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  with	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	  principle.	  	  Even	  if	  Germany	  had	  transposed	   the	   EU	   directive	   just	   one	   year	   earlier,	   it	   would	   not	   have	   changed	   the	  outcome	  score	  of	  0.75.	  	  The	  initial	  coding	  took	  place	  in	  2008.	  	  However,	  as	  a	  note	  of	  refinement	   for	   future	  QCA	   research	   involving	   temporal	   and	   sequential	   conditions,	  this	  points	  to	  an	  area	  of	  methodological	  advancement.	  	  	  An	  alternate	  path	  for	  India	  is	  described,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  path	  for	  China	  and	  France	   above,	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   stock	   market	   listing	   rule	   and	   the	   absence	   of	  voluntary	  corporate	  governance	  disclosure.	   	  The	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Board	  of	  India	   (SEBI)	   commissioned	   corporate	   governance	   committee	   in	   1999,	   chaired	   by	  one	  of	  its	  own	  board	  members,	  Shri	  Kumar	  Mangalam	  Birla.	  	  In	  2000	  the	  committee	  requested	   changes	   to	   the	   listing	   agreements	   at	   both	   the	   Bombay	   Stock	   Exchange	  and	  the	  National	  Stock	  Exchange	  of	  India	  by	  introducing	  a	  new	  clause.	  	  “The	  Report	  On	  Corporate	  Governance	  In	  The	  Annual	  Report	  Of	  Companies”	  otherwise	  known	  as	  “Clause	   49”	   has	   a	   list	   of	   suggested	   disclosures	   on	   other	   practices	   analyzed	   here,	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namely	   specialized	   committees	   and	   director	   independence,	   among	   others.	  Additionally,	   Clause	   49,	   Annexure	   2,	   item	   1	   suggests	   that	   listed	   companies	   file	   a	  “brief	   statement	   on	   company’s	   philosophy	   on	   code	   of	   governance.”	   	   These	   non-­‐mandatory	  items	  "should	  be	  specifically	  highlighted."69	  	  	  India’s	   regulation	   also	   comes	   from	   SEBI.	   	   Its	   Disclosure	   and	   Investor	  Protection	   Guidelines	   of	   2000	   requires	   companies	   to	   disclose	   in	   their	   prospectus	  adherence	   to	   general	   corporation	   governance	   guidelines	   (Section	   6.9.5.3) 70 .	  	  Although	  termed	  “Guidelines”,	  they	  do	  not	  adhere	  to	  a	  semblance	  of	  the	  “comply	  or	  explain”	   principle	   as	   in	   other	   countries’	   regulations;	   SEBI	   itself	   calls	   these	  “instructions”	  in	  the	  definitions	  of	  terms	  in	  the	  Guidelines.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  assign	  the	   score	   of	   1	   for	   this	   outcome.	   	   In	   this	   causal	   path,	   it	   is	   notably	   the	   absence	   of	  voluntary	  disclosure	  of	  general	  corporate	  governance	  by	  Indian	  firms.	  	  In	  2000,	  only	  30	   of	   84	   Indian	   companies	   (35.7%)	   voluntarily	   disclosed	   their	   governance,	  corresponding	   to	   a	   fuzzy	   set	   score	   of	   0.	   	   The	   path	   returned	   in	   the	   intermediate	  solution,	  however,	  has	  low	  coverage	  and	  applies	  to	  only	  India.	  	   	  	   	  
                                                69	  Recall	  that	  the	  coding	  for	  stock	  market	  listing	  rules	  takes	  a	  crisp	  set	  score	  of	  1	  for	  such	   disclosures	   suggested,	   but	   not	   required,	   by	   stock	   exchanges,	   whereas	  regulation	  incurs	  a	  multi-­‐value	  score	  of	  0,	  0.25,	  0.75	  or	  1.	  	  70	  Section	  6.5.9.7A,	   inserted	   in	  2007,	   specifies	   further	   that	   companies	  must	   supply	  “[A]	  disclosure	   to	   the	  effect	   that	   the	   issuer	  has	  complied	  with	   the	  requirements	  of	  Corporate	  Governance	  contained	  in	  the	  Equity	  Listing	  Agreement,	  particularly	  those	  relating	   to	   composition	   of	   Board	   of	   Directors,	   constitution	   of	   committees	   such	   as	  Audit	  Committee,	  Shareholder	  /	  Investor	  Grievance	  Committee,	  etc.).” 
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A	   key	   insight	   into	   the	   early	   formation	   of	   India’s	   corporate	   governance	   reforms	  indicates	  its	  uniqueness	  compared	  to	  later	  reforms	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  	  “Unlike	  governance	  reforms	  in	  many	  countries	  that	  arise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  major	  corporate	  scandals,	  the	  process	  of	  governance	  reforms	  in	  India	  was	   initiated	   by	   industry	   leaders.	   India’s	   first	   major	   corporate	  governance	   reform	   proposal	   was	   launched	   by	   the	   Confederation	   of	  Indian	  Industry	  (CII),	  India’s	  largest	  industry	  and	  business	  association	  (…)	   The	   CII	   Code	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   corporate	   governance	  standards	  found	  outside	  of	  India	  [and]	  was	  a	  significant	  step	  forward	  for	   a	   country	   not	   then	   known	   for	   robust	   corporate	   governance	  standards.	  However,	  the	  CII	  Code’s	  voluntary	  nature	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  broad	   overhaul	   of	   governance	   norms	   and	   practices	   by	   Indian	  companies.	  Although	   the	  CII	  Code	  was	  welcomed	  with	  much	   fanfare	  and	   even	   adopted	   by	   a	   few	   progressive	   companies,	   many	   then-­‐believed	   that	   ‘under	   Indian	   conditions	   a	   statutory	   rather	   than	   a	  voluntary	   code	   would	   be	   more	   purposeful	   and	   meaningful’”	  (Afsharipour	  2010:	  9).	  	  
